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Nguyen, Hang Thu (Ph.D., Economics) 
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Privatization and Economic Growth 
Thesis directed by Professor Robert F. Mc Nown 
 
This thesis tries to enhance our understanding of the role of trade liberalization as it 
relates to economic growth and the factors affecting trade liberalization in various countries. In 
addition, this thesis deals with the problem of endogeneity with various econometric methods. 
 
Chapter 2 presents a study of the impact of trade liberalization policy on economic 
growth with the simultaneous application of privatization policy in 25 transitional countries. 
The analysis applies two stage least squares (2SLS) to panel data from 1994 to 2006 for these 
25 countries.  The estimated results provide evidence of a significantly positive effect of both 
trade liberalization and privatization on economic growth, when controlling for political conflict 
and macroeconomic stability.  
 
Chapter 3 emphasizes the political economy of trade protection by examining the role of 
lobbying as it relates to trade liberalization in the United States. I test the Grossman-Helpman 
model (1994) for a US annual panel data set including 193 four-digit SIC 87 US industries over 
the time period between 1997 and 2001 by applying a simultaneous three equation system. The 
effective rate of protection (ERP) is for the measure of trade protection. The estimated results 
offer support for the Grossman and Helpman model (1994). However, lobbying has a weak 
effect on trade protection.  
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Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth for Malaysia 
and South Korea. A four variable vector autoregression (VAR) is used to study the relationships 
between trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth over the time period from 
1970 to 2004 (for Malaysia) and from 1976 to 2007 (for Korea). The differences in the 
estimated results are explained by the differences in the economic policies between the two 
countries.  Although both countries implemented policies of export-orientated industrialization, 
the Malaysian government promoted foreign direct investment (FDI) as a tool of 
industrialization, while the Korea government built an “integrated national economy” using 
“chaebol” industrial structures and minimizing the role of FDI.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
 Trade liberalization is understood as the relaxing and removal of trade barriers, including 
tariffs and nontariff barriers, in order to create a free flow of goods and services from one 
country to other countries in the world. Trade liberalization takes on specific characteristics for 
different groups of countries. For instance, developed countries carried out trade liberalization 
earlier than developing countries, with the hope of increasing their economic growth.  But while 
trade liberalization has been the slogan of developing countries for the past several decades, the 
political economy of trade protection now seems to have become more dominant in the 
developed countries. Therefore, studies of trade liberalization must be sensitive to specific 
characteristics of each type of country. 
 
 Transitional countries, including the Eastern European countries, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and countries like Vietnam and China, have been carrying out economic 
reform in previously closed-to-market economies. In these transitional economies, trade 
liberalization policies and privatization policies have been simultaneously enacted—a 
distinguishing characteristic of these transitional economies. Therefore, studies on the 
relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth need to take into account the 
effects of simultaneous privatization and trade liberalization on economic growth.  
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 Trade liberalization in the Asian Tiger countries can be seen in the shift from import-
substitution policies to export-orientation policies. The impact of trade liberalization on 
economic growth is displayed in the relationship between trade (exports and imports) and 
economic growth. But, due to the fact that the Asian Tiger economies are connected with FDI, 
the relationship between trade and economic growth is not separate from the relationships 
between trade and FDI or between FDI and economic growth. 
 
As mentioned above, the process of trade liberalization in developed countries occurred 
much earlier than in the developing, transitional economies. Since the 1970s, trade liberalization 
in developed countries, mostly in the United States, has conflicted with political-economic 
benefit. Lobbying, which proxies for political economic force, is considered an important factor 
affecting the trade liberalization process in the US.   
 
1.2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
 
   Does trade liberalization promote economic growth? It is amazing that after two decades 
of continuous argument over this problem, the answer is still ambiguous. Using different models 
and different assumptions, researchers have found different answers. Barlow (2006) was a rare 
paper that estimated the relationship between openness, privatization and growth in the 22 
transitional countries, during the period from 1993 to 2001. Barlow found that trade 
liberalization had a positive effect on economic growth, while privatization had a negative effect. 
However, the coefficient of privatization was sensitive to the data sample and had both negative 
and positive signs, and more than half of the regressions were not statistically significant. The 
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author also overcame the endogeneity of openness and privatization by applying IV-GMM, 
created by Arellano and Bond in 1991. The instruments for openness and privatization were the 
lags, the differences of openness and the differences of privatization, which may have provided 
insufficient information to explain openness and privatization. Not only Barlow (2006), but 
many other papers have tried to solve endogeneity problems of openness and privatization, such 
as Frankel and Romer (1999), Romalis (2007), Godoy and Stiglizt (2006), and others. Many of 
the papers in the literature have not tested whether openness or privatization needs to be 
instrumented, or whether their instruments are weak or not redundant and exogenous. Ignoring 
these tests may have led to biased results. Therefore, this study is an attempt to research and fill 
this gap in the literature. 
 
 The political economy of trade protection has received great attention from the 1970s to 
the present.  During that time, economists have been trying to build an endogenous protection 
model to explain the political economy of trade protection. The Grossman and Helpman model 
of 1994 (hereafter the G-H model) marked a turning point in this literature, as it was the first 
model that allowed the political economy of trade protection to be presented through the 
lobbying variable. According to the authors, lobbying influenced the government’s choice of 
trade policy. After the G-H model, there were a few studies, such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) 
and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) that tested whether the G-H (1994) fit the actual data. 
A common characteristic of prior empirical studies has been that they have used tariffs or 
nontariff barriers (NTB) to proxy for trade protection. The definition of the effective rate of 
protection (hereafter ERP) states that if input tariffs are lower than output tariffs, the ERP is 
higher than the output tariffs.  Statistical data provides evidence that developed countries, such as 
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the U.S., Japan, and others, have imposed a higher tariff rate on consumption goods than on 
intermediate goods, which leads to a high ERP for the producers. The question is whether the 
theory of endogenous protection is correct in cases in which trade protection is measured by the 
ERP. To my knowledge, the answer to this question has not yet been revealed in the literature. In 
fact, prior empirical studies, which have applied the instrumental variable method, have not 
provided enough evidence to show the validity of their instruments. Therefore, their estimated 
results may be biased, if their instruments are weak or not exogenous. Furthermore, almost all 
papers have used the U.S. annual data from 1983 with three-digit SIC87 categories.  Using that 
data set imposes some limitations: (1) the number of observations is small, which may cause 
ineffective estimation, and (2) it does not provide sufficient information about U.S. trade policy, 
since this policy has changed over the years.  This gap in the literature has also motivated the 
present study. 
 
The great economic achievement in the Asian countries from the 1970s to the present is 
the source of a tremendous body of theoretical literature. The literature partly provides 
theoretical explanations, based on the export-led growth hypothesis, the export-driven growth 
hypothesis, the import-compression growth hypothesis, and the intertemporal budget-constraint 
hypothesis. The empirical results from different authors for one Asian country sometimes are in 
conflict. Two-way causality between Korean exports and imports was discovered by Fung, 
Sawhney, Lo, and Xiang (1994) and Oskoee (1997), but both Mahadevan et al. (2008) and Kim 
et al. (2009) provided evidence of no causality between Korean exports and imports. Chang et al. 
(2000) found two-way causality between Taiwanese exports and imports, but Mahadevan et al. 
(2008) suggests no causality between them, and other conflicts in findings also exist. What 
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causes these conflicting results? In studying prior studies of Asian countries, I have found that 
they typically use a bivariate VAR model or a trivariate VAR model to consider the dynamic 
impact among some of the four following variables: GDP, exports, imports and FDI. However, 
theoretical analysis reveals that three series, FDI, exports and imports, interact in their 
relationships with GDP. Therefore, there exists a possibility of cointegration between the four 
series. Also, a bivariate or trivariate VAR model constructed from two series or three series out 
of four series (GDP, exports, imports and FDI) will be misspecified.  In addition, the prior 
studies ignored dynamic analysis, such as impulse responses and variance decompositions, and 
had limitations in their econometric procedures to apply the VAR model, such as ignoring VAR 
diagnostics. All of these factors may have caused biased results. It is for these reasons, also, that 
I have been motivated to conduct the present study. 
  
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of the role of trade 
liberalization in relation to economic growth and the factors that affect it, for various groups of 
countries. Furthermore, this study tries to overcome endogeneity problems by applying different 
econometric methods.  
 
Chapter 2 emphasizes the effect of trade liberalization and privatization on economic 
growth in transitional countries. Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of lobbying on U.S. trade 
protection. It tests the G-H political economy model (1994), using the ERP as a measure of 
protection. Chapter 4 studies the impact of trade and investment liberalization on the economic 
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growth of Malaysia and Korea, using a cointegrated VAR involving FDI, trade and economic 
growth. Furthermore, this chapter interprets the VAR results in terms of the development 
strategies of the two Asian economies. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
This dissertation applies three econometric methods to overcome the endogeneity 
problem: (1) the two-stage least–squares (2SLS) method for single equations, (2) simultaneous 
three-equation systems and (3) the VAR model.  
 
Chapter 2 applies the 2SLS method for a single equation of economic growth for 25 
transitional countries from 1994 to 2006. The dependent variable is economic growth rate. The 
two right-hand side endogenous variables are the openness index and privatization. The control 
variables are political conflict, inflation, change in productivity, change in labor and change in 
investment. The instrumental variables to explain the two endogenous variables are: (1) The 
WTO dummy variable, (2) the landlocked dummy variable, (3) the openness index of largest 
trade partners, (4) the ratio between public output and private output, and (5) the ratio between 
government debt and GDP. The Wu-Hausman test has been implemented in order to check 
whether openness and privatization are endogenous or not. In addition, I conduct the test for 
weak instruments, the test for redundancy and the Sargan test to check the validity of 
instrumental variables. I also test fixed effects versus random effects by using the Hausman test 
(1978), the Breush-Pagan statistic test and the test for fixed effects. The robustness check of 
estimated results is carried out in two ways: (1) testing whether estimated results are robust with 
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different structures of the sample set and (2) testing the specification of the instrumental variable 
TIME_LANDLOCK.  
 
Chapter 3 applies the simultaneous three-equation systems to test the G-H model (1994) 
for the U.S. annual panel data set, including the 193 four-digit SIC 87 U.S. industries from 1997 
to 2001. The ERP is the measure of trade protection. My econometric model builds on the 
simultaneous three-equation system of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The first equation 
is the trade protection equation (ERP equation); the second equation is the import equation; the 
third equation is the lobbying equation (PAC equation). The Wu-Hausman test, the test for weak 
instruments, the test for redundancy and the Sargan test have been carried out in order to check 
the empirical validity of the model as specified. I also test the robustness of the estimated results 
when import demand elasticity is moved to the left hand side of the ERP equation. 
 
Chapter 4 applies a four-variable VAR model involving four endogenous variables: the 
logarithm of real GDP, the logarithm of real exports, the logarithm of real imports and the 
logarithm of FDI. The dynamic relations among these four variables are investigated for 
Malaysia and Korea during the time period from 1970 to 2004 (Malaysia) and from 1976 to 2007 
(Korea). The econometric method includes the following steps: (1) testing the unit root of four 
time series, (2) constructing a four-variate VAR model, (3) VAR diagnostics, (4) the Johansen 
cointegration test, (5) the Granger Causality/Block exogeneity test and (6) dynamic simulation 
(the impulse response function and variance decomposition). 
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1.5 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Chapter 2 provides support for a significantly positive effect of both trade liberalization 
and privatization on economic growth, while controlling for political conflict and 
macroeconomic stability. Based on comparison of beta coefficients, privatization policy effects 
on economic growth are greater than those for trade liberalization policy. In addition, political 
and macroeconomic stability considerably influence economic growth. For these countries, a 
political conflict offsets the contribution of one standard deviation in privatization and trade 
liberalization on economic growth. The robustness check confirms that all empirical results are 
robust. 
 
Chapter 3 provides evidence to support the G-H model. (1) In the lobbying industries, 
trade protection increases (trade liberalization decreases) whenever the inverse import 
penetration increases and the import-demand elasticity decreases. (2) In the industries without 
lobbying, trade protection increases (trade liberalization decreases) with a lower inverse import 
penetration and a higher import-demand elasticity. However, lobbying has weak effects on trade 
protection, since the share of lobbying in the government‘s objective is very small (0.8 %). The 
robustness check confirms that all empirical results are robust. 
 
Chapter 4 provides evidence that the four variables are cointegrated for both Malaysia 
and Korea. Exports are a long-run source of both Malaysian and Korean economic growth.  For 
Malaysia, there is evidence to support the two-way causalities between each pair among the four 
variables, except for causality from GDP to exports. For Korea, there is one-way causality from 
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exports, imports and GDP to FDI, from exports and imports to GDP, and from exports to 
imports. Exports are not affected by the other three variables. Trade liberalization has a positive 
effect on Malaysian economic growth, while the effect of trade liberalization on Korean 
economic growth is ambiguous. The difference in the estimated results is consistent with the 
difference in economic policies between the two countries.  Both countries have implemented 
exports-orientation industrialization. However, the Malaysian government gives the leading role 
in industrialization to FDI, while the Korea government has built what is often called an 
integrated national economy, relying on industrial conglomerate chaebols and minimizing the 
role of FDI.  
 
1.6 ARRANGEMENT OF THE STUDY 
 
  This thesis consists of four main chapters. The Second chapter analyzes the impact 
of trade liberalization and privatization on the economic growth of transitional countries. The 
third chapter studies the impact of lobbying on U.S. trade protection. The last chapter estimates 
relations between trade liberalization, FDI and economic growth in a VAR for Malaysia and 
Korea. The VAR results are interpreted in the light of alternative growth strategies pursued by 
these two economies.   
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
After the end of the communist era, the Eastern European countries, the commonwealth 
of independent states, and countries like Vietnam and China went through economic reforms that 
included trade liberalization and privatization, with the hope of improving their economies to 
achieve higher growth rates. The simultaneous, rather than separately timed, enactment of trade 
liberalization policies and privatization policies has been a distinguishing characteristic of these 
transition economies. Therefore, studies that investigate only the relation between trade 
liberalization and economic growth, or only the relation between privatization and economic 
growth, may not be suitable to analyze transition economies. Thus, this paper focuses on the 
simultaneous effects of the two policies on economic growth.   
 
What are the simultaneous effects of trade liberalization and privatization on economic 
growth? Addressing this question is of critical importance to policy makers in transition 
countries, who have an interest in finding a reasonable adjustment between the two policies, in 
order to improve economic growth.  
 
Barlow (2006) was one of the rare papers that considered the simultaneous effects of both 
policies, in 22 transition countries from 1993 to 2001. The author found that trade liberalization 
had a positive effect on economic growth, while privatization had a negative effect. However, 
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the coefficient of privatization was sensitive to the data sample and had both negative and 
positive signs,1 and more than half of the regressions were not statistically significant. Barlow 
also overcame the endogeneity of openness and privatization by applying Instrumental Variable 
– Generalized Moment Method (IV-GMM)2, the instruments for openness and privatization were 
the lags, the differences in openness and the differences in privatization. However, the paper did 
not show the test for weak instruments. 
 
Not only Barlow (2006), but many other papers tried to solve endogeneity problems of 
openness and privatization. Finding the appropriate instruments was a challenge for economists. 
After a long period of examination of this problem, it appeared that there were only two types of 
instruments for openness that included the geographical variables recommended by Frankel and 
Romer (1999) and the decrease of U.S. MFN tariffs recommended by Romalis (2007). The 
instruments of Romalis were probably not suitable for transition countries, and the data were not 
sufficient, since the United States was not a large trading partner of many transition countries. 
Therefore, the impact of decreasing U.S. MFN tariffs may not have proxied for higher market 
access of transition countries in order to push up their trade volumes. In the course of reviewing 
the literature, I have found that many authors do not check whether openness or privatization in 
their models need to be instrumented, or whether their instruments are weak or not redundant and 
exogenous. Ignoring these tests may lead to biased results. 
                                                 
1
 Barlow cut the original sample into smaller samples and then regressed again. The coefficient signs of privatization 
in those small samples were both negative and positive.   
 
 
2
 IV-GMM is method combined instrumental variable method and generalizing method of moment. The instruments 
are lag and difference of variable its self. Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend this method. See chapter 8 in 
Balgati (2001). 
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Thus, there is a gap in the literature on endogeneity that needs to be studied, and that gap 
has become an important focus of this research. The contribution of this research project to 
literature is three-fold. First, I construct the appropriate instrumental variables for openness and 
privatization. Second, I apply econometric techniques to test the endogeneity and the validity of 
instruments. Third, I provide a forecast of the simultaneous effects of openness and privatization 
on economic growth, the foundation for making macroeconomic policies in the transition 
countries. 
 
I use a data set including 25 transition countries during the period from 1994 to 2006. To 
overcome the endogeneity of openness and privatization, I apply the two-stage least–squares test 
(2SLS) to estimate the effects of openness and privatization on economic growth under both 
fixed and random effects. The set of instrumental variables includes the openness index of 
trading partners of transition countries, the date of a country’s becoming a WTO member, the 
ratio of government debt over GDP, the ratio of public share over private share in GDP and the 
product of time and a land-locked dummy. I check the validity of instruments by applying the 
Wu-Hausman test, the weak instrument test, the test for redundancy and the test for 
overidentifying restrictions. The results from these tests show that openness and privatization 
need to be instrumented and that the instruments are valid. I also test fixed effects versus random 
effects by using the Hausman test (1978), the Breush-Pagan statistic test, and the test for fixed 
effects. The Hausman test (1978) provides evidence for the use of fixed effects. The primary 
estimation results suggest that both openness and privatization have a positive effect on 
economic growth when political conflict and macroeconomic stability are controlled for. 
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I check the robustness of the empirical results in two ways. (1) One way is to classify the 
original sample into six groups: Central European, Baltic, European CIS, South East Europe, 
Caucasia and Central Asian Countries. Taking out each group from the original sample, and then 
running regressions, I have found that the signs of coefficients of all independent variables are 
the same as the signs of the coefficients of those variables in the original sample, and they are 
mostly significant. (2) The other way is to check the robustness of my estimated results in the 
specification of the instrumental variable (the landlocked dummy interacted with time). I regress 
the sample in three steps. First, I include the time dummy variable. Second, I replace this 
variable by the landlocked dummy variable. Third, I add both the time dummy variable and the 
landlocked dummy variable to the instrument set. The statistical results show that coefficients of 
all variables in the structural equation are still statistically significant and have the same sign and 
small changes in value as the original estimated results.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section is a literature review; 
the third section describes the methodology; and the fourth section reports the primary estimation 
results. The fifth section presents the conclusions.  
 
2. 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review in this chapter addresses three topics. The first is the relationship 
between trade liberalization and growth; The second is the relationship between privatization and 
growth; The third is the relationship between trade liberalization, privatization and growth.  
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2.2.1 Trade Liberalization and Growth 
 
2.2.1.1 Theoretical Model 
 
This section will open with a fundamental question in economic development and 
international economics: Does trade liberalization push up economic growth? It is amazing that 
after two decades of continuous argument over this problem, the answer is still ambiguous. With 
different models and different assumptions, we get different answers. In the paper entitled 
“Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) summarized modern theories related to this question as follows:  
 The negative relation between trade restrictions and growth was discovered in static 
models without market failures, in endogenous growth models with non-diminishing 
returns in input factors, or in learning by doing and endogenous technological progress.  
 The positive relation occurs in static models of market failure.3  
 No relation between trade restrictions and long-term output growth is found in models 
with exogenous technological progress and diminishing returns in input factors. 
 
2.2.1.2 Empirical Model 
 
Support for theoretical models has come from a substantial body of empirical evidence. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) employed a new instrumental variable for openness that helped 
                                                 
3
 Assume that there are market failures; for example, positive externalities in production of competing import 
sectors. The production cost will reduce and then the output will increase. 
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economists solve the endogeneity problem of openness. Basing their work on the gravity 
model—that geographic characteristics have important effects on bilateral trade and are 
uncorrelated with income—Frankel and Romer used geographical variables as instruments for 
openness. These instrumental variables included: (1) the average weight of distance between two 
countries, which was measured by the distance between the capitals of the two countries; (2) a 
dummy variable that equaled one if the countries had a common border and zero otherwise; and 
(3) a dummy variable that equaled one if a country was landlocked and zero otherwise. Frankel 
and Romer used 2SLS to test the effect of openness on growth, under the control of population 
size and area, for 63 countries in 1985. Openness was measured by the ratio of trade volume 
(export plus import) to GDP in 1985. Their results suggested that trade had a statistically 
significant and positive effect on growth. According to Frankel and Romer (1999), trade 
increased income by increasing each determinant of income, such as the ratio of physical capital 
to labor, technological progress and human capital. They tested this school of thought by 
regressing each determinant of income on trade, population size and area.  
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) examined previous research and concluded that there was 
no evidence of a positive relationship between trade liberalization and growth. Instead of 
constructing a specifically empirical model, they replicated the empirical models of Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999) and other researchers, to show 
problems in the empirical strategy and measurement of openness index. According to Rodriguez 
and Rodrik, the openness index constructed by Sachs and Warner was a dummy variable mainly 
derived from the black market premium and the state monopoly in export. But these two 
variables were not related to trade policy. Edwards (1998) used a more thorough approach, with 
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nine openness indicators, to check the robustness of the positive relationship between trade and 
growth. By replicating Edwards (1998), Rodrick and Rodriguez showed that a high proportion of 
the openness coefficient was statistically insignificant and negative. In addition, they also 
suspected that the growth data of poor countries was highly unreliable. Therefore, Rodrick and 
Rodriguez argued that Edwards’ conclusion of a positive relationship between openness and 
growth was an overstatement. Rodriguez and Rodrik also questioned the use of geographical 
variables, which were Frankel and Romer’s instrumental variables. They contended that 
geographical variables had no impact on trade. To prove it, they replicated Frankel and Romer 
(1999) with other geographical variables, such as distance from the equator, percentage of land 
area located in the tropics and a dummy variable for region in the second stage. In addition, they 
thought that the ratio of trade volume to growth did not reflect trade policy. Through these 
analyses, Rodrick and Rodriguez concluded that there was little evidence to support a positive 
relationship between trade liberalization and growth.  
 
Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2005) were also concerned about the endogeneity of 
openness. They found a positive effect of openness on growth for a sample set covering 82 
countries from 1960 to 2000. They applied IV-GMM using lags and differences in openness as 
instrumental variables. Openness was equal to the residual from the regression of the logarithm 
of the ratio of trade volume to GDP on the logarithms of area and population and the dummy 
variables for oil export and landlocked countries. The dependent variable was the first difference 
of per capita GDP. The explanatory variables were trade openness and a set of control variables, 
which included the rate of secondary school enrollment (which proxied for human capital 
investment), the average ratio of private credit to GDP (which proxied for financial depth), an 
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average rate of inflation (which proxied for macroeconomic stability) and the average number of 
main telephone lines per capita (which proxied for public infrastructure). In addition, Chang et 
al. used some variables that changed only across countries, such as political risk, the labor 
market, firm exit (or entry), the flexibility index and the index of economic freedom.  
 
Romalis (2007) returned once again to the endogeneity problem of openness. Nearly 
seven years after Frankel and Romer (1999) recommended geographical variables as 
instrumental variables, Romalis introduced a new instrumental variable for openness. The main 
advantage of Romalis’s instrumental variable was that it was constructed under panel data. 
Romalis considered tariff barriers of the United States as instrumental variables for openness. 
This arose from the school of thought that a lower tariff of a large trading partner meant higher 
market access and led to trade expansion. Like Frankel and Romer (1999), Romalis also used the 
openness index, which was the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. However, they used 
different measures of per capita GDP, constructed from different sources. They used 2SLS to 
estimate the effect of openness on growth for 135 developing countries from 1960 to 2000. They 
also found a positive relationship between openness and growth. However, this instrument was 
not effective if the United States was not a large trading partner of the countries. For some 
groups of countries, U.S. tariff barriers could be the same, but the growth rates differed, meaning 
that the structure of this instrumental variable did not reflect the market access of the countries 
exactly. Besides, the absence of control variables in the regression model meant that the results 
of the paper could have been biased.4 
                                                 
4
 Do not include the control variable that leads to the econometric problem of the omitted variable. See Green 
(2008), page 133, chapter 7, section 7.2: Specification analysis and model building. 
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2.2.2 Privatization and Growth 
 
2.2.2.1 Theoretical Model 
 
My research project also includes the relationship between privatization and growth. 
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there are no theoretical models dealing with this relation. Thus, 
it is difficult to present a model using the characteristics of privatization. 
 
2.2.2.2 Empirical Model 
 
The empirical evidence has shown mixed results. Plane (1997) found a significant 
positive relationship between privatization and economic growth for 35 developing countries 
between 1988 and 1992. The author used two models, the Tobit and Probit models, to test the 
determinants of privatization. The explanatory variables in the two models were the same and 
included per capita GNP, the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP, the ratio of public debt to 
GDP, the ratio of saving rate to GDP, the real effective exchange rate, a variable reflecting 
market capitalization, a variable reflecting the structural adjustment program and a dummy 
variable for Latin American countries. All explanatory variables were sourced in 1988. In the 
Probit model, the dependent variable took the value of one if a country implemented 
privatization from 1988 to 1992, and zero otherwise. In the Tobit model, the dependent variable 
was defined as the cumulative proceeds from asset sales of state-owned enterprises, from 1988 to 
1992, as a share of the 1990 GDP. The results from the two models showed that a country with a 
higher per capita GNP, foreign direct investment, level of market capitalization and public debt, 
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as well as lower real effective exchange rate, saving rate and level of structural adjustment will 
have higher probability of privatization. Plane was the first to try solving the endogeneity of 
privatization. To investigate the impact of privatization on economic growth, as well as to 
overcome the endogenous bias of privatization, Plane used 2SLS. The first stage consisted of the 
Tobit or Probit equations. The second stage was an OLS regression of the GDP growth rate on 
international terms of trade, the external current account, economic policy variables and the 
predicted probability of privatization in either the Probit model or the Tobit model. The author 
found that privatization had a significantly positive effect on economic growth. However, he 
only used the Hausman test to test endogeneity of privatization. These results perhaps fell into 
the case in which the instrumental variables were weak instruments or not exogenous. An 
additional weakness of the study was that Plane did not define which variables were the control 
variables in his 2SLS model.  
 
Cook and Uchida (2003) used data from 63 developing countries between 1988 and 1997 
and the method of the extreme-bounds analysis (EBA). In order to conduct the EBA, they ran an 
OLS regression of the GDP on I, M and Z, as explained below, and obtained coefficients a1, a2 
and a3, respectively. I was the set of variables commonly included in the regression, such as the 
log of the initial GDP, the initial life expectancy at birth, the average rate of population growth, 
the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP and 
the rate of secondary school enrollment. M was the set of policy variables, such as the 
privatization policy. Cook and Uchida (2003) also used the same privatization indicator as Plane 
(1997). Z was the set of control variables. They used 12 variables in set Z, including openness 
(which was measured by the ratio of trade to the GDP), average inflation rate, and average ratio 
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of government budget surplus/deficit to GDP and dummy regional variables, among other 
variables. Cook and Uchida (2003) changed the combination of variables in set Z and obtained 
different values for coefficient a2 and a corresponding standard deviationσ . The upper extreme 
bound was measured by a maximum value of a2 plusσ . The lower extreme bound was measured 
by a minimum value of a2 minusσ . The result was robust when the upper and lower extreme 
bounds had the same sign. By using EBA, Cook and Uchida (2003) confirmed that privatization 
had a negative effect on growth, the opposite result from Plane’s paper, which used the same 
measurement of privatization for developing countries. This showed the sensitivity of the results 
to a larger sample, longer period of time and different econometrics methods. In particular, their 
use of OLS did not deal with the well-known endogeneity problem for privatization. 
 
Like Plane (1997), Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) were concerned about the endogeneity 
problem. Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) chose 2SLS as the solution to eliminate the endogeneity of 
privatization. The level of privatization was measured by the weighted average of the indices of 
small-scale and large-scale privatization. The speed of privatization was measured by the 
difference between the privatization levels of 1990 and 2001. They used the initial condition as 
the instrumental variables for privatization.5 These instrumental variables included the years 
under communist rule, the difference between the black market exchange rate and official 
exchange rate in 1990, the percentage of defense expenditure in GDP in the 1980s and the sum 
of three trade distortions: trade openness, the share of external trade in the GDP and the share of 
trade with socialist countries in the GDP in the late 1980s. They also used a three-stage least-
                                                 
5
 See De Melo et al. (1997) and Popov (2000).  
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squares regression6 (3SLS) to confirm the robustness of their results. They found that the level of 
privatization had a positive impact upon growth, but that the speed of privatization had a 
negative effect on growth, in a sample of 23 transitional economies over the period from 1990 to 
2001. This result supported the school of thought that gradual privatization would obtain a higher 
growth rate. Since the number of observations was so small (25 observations), the estimation 
results may not have been reliable. On the other hand, the authors did not offer any tests for 
endogeneity or for validity of instruments. It is an intuitive judgment that the instrumental 
variables, such as the number of years under communist rule or trade openness in the 1980s, may 
not have been exogenous. 
 
2.2.3 Privatization, Trade Liberalization, and Growth 
 
2.2.3.1 Theoretical Model 
 
It is unfortunate that there are no theoretical models in the current literature to present 
this relation. However, evidence from the relation between trade liberalization and privatization 
and welfare supports the possible existence of this relation, which I intend to research.  
 
Chao and Yu (2006) designed their model for a small open economy in which two 
identical countries were undergoing economic reform with trade liberalization and privatization 
policies. This model was based on the international mixed oligopoly model, with partial 
privatization of domestic firms, used by Matsumura (1998). Privatization would transfer one part 
                                                 
6
 They check the robustness of their estimated results by using three-stage least-squares regression. Their estimated 
results from 2SLS and 3SLS are consistent.  
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of public ownership into private ownership. While the existence of state-owned firms was based 
on government subsidies, the existence of privatized firms depended on profit maximization. The 
privatized firms would reduce their output and increase the price of goods to maximize their 
profits. Therefore, privatization would lead to a decline in market supply and a decline in 
consumer surplus. Since consumer surplus was the main component of welfare, privatization 
would decrease welfare. On the other hand, lower tariffs, which imply trade liberalization, would 
lead to increases in the market supply, and therefore to increases in welfare. 
 
2.2.3.2 Empirical Model 
 
Barlow (2006) was the only paper that estimated the relationship between openness, 
privatization and growth in transition economies for the 22 transition transition countries during 
the period from 1993 to 2001. He discovered that trade liberalization played an important role in 
improving economic growth. This impact was very clear in the early period of the transition 
(1993-1996) and for the countries that were closest to the European Union. For the rest of the 
countries and in the later period of the transition (1997-2001), trade liberalization increased 
economic growth while privatization retarded growth. Using the IV-GMM, Barlow ran a 
regression of current GDP on the initial GDP, the log of inflation, the war dummy variable, the 
lag of the index of trade policy, the lag of the index of privatization, the lag of the index of 
internal market reforms, the lag of the interaction between the two policies, the first difference in 
the index of trade policy, the first difference in the index of privatization and the first difference 
in the index of internal market reform. The index of the trade policy was the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD’s) transition indicator for foreign exchange and trade 
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liberalization. The index of privatization was defined as the weighted average of the indices of 
small-scale and large-scale privatization. All indices were from the annual report of EBRD. 
 
In summary, Barlow’s paper raised the important problem that the simultaneous effect of 
both openness and privatization on economic growth needed to be considered. His paper used 
IV-GMM, in which the instruments were lags and differences of openness and privatization. 
Barlow concluded that privatization had a negative effect on growth. However, in only 4 of 10 
regressions, the coefficient of privatization was significant, but with opposite signs. I think that 
these estimation results may have been biased, since the lag and the difference of privatization 
may not have been strong instruments, even though they were exogenous, as reported by the 
Sargan test. The limitations of Barlow’s paper encouraged a search for other, stronger 
instruments for openness and privatization. 
 
The above literature review shows that endogeneity of both openness and privatization 
needs to be considered. One of the greatest difficulties in overcoming the endogeneity of 
openness and privatization is to find the appropriate instruments. The instruments of Frankel and 
Romer (1999) were used only for cross-sectional data. The instruments of Romalis may not have 
been suitable for transition countries, since the United States was not a large trade partner of 
many transition countries. Therefore, the impact of decreasing U.S. tariffs may not have proxied 
for higher market access of transition countries in order to push up their trade volumes. This 
difficulty has encouraged me to identify new instruments for openness.  
 
24 
 
Exploring papers related to solving the endogeneity of openness and privatization, I have 
found many that did not check whether openness or privatization in their models needed to be 
instrumented, or whether their instruments were weak instruments or were not exogenous. All 
tests are very important, since they check the validity of the instruments that researchers use. 
These tests are an important step in determining the consistency of estimation results. For these 
reasons, I have become strongly motivated to research effective tests for endogeneity.  
 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this research is to estimate the relations between privatization, openness 
and growth, by correcting the endogeneity of openness and privatization. In this research, I use 
2SLS estimation of single-equation linear models. In the methodology section that follows, I 
describe the 2SLS estimation of single-equation linear models and the tests for the validity of 
instruments.  
 
2.3.1 Single-equation estimation of the 1st equation of the structural model by 2SLS 
 
Woodridge (2002) considered the first equation of the structural model (p. 83, eq.5.1):  
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where y1 is T x 1 vector of the dependent variable; Y1 is T x (M* -1) vector of the endogenous 
explanatory variables; X1 is T x K* vector of the exogenous variables included in the 1st 
equation; ε1 is T x 1 vector of the error term; T is the number of observations; M* is the number 
of endogenous explanatory variables; and K*
 
is the number of exogenous variables included in 
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the 1st equation. In my econometric model, y1 denotes GROW. Y1 includes PRI and OPEN. X1 
consists of WAR, INFLA, INVEST, EMPLOY and PRODU. T = 325, M* = 2 (PRI and OPEN) 
and K*=5 (WAR, INFLA, INVEST, EMPLOY and PRODU).  
The reduced form of Y1 is (Woodridge, 2002, p. 83, eq. 5.4) 
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where X is T x K vector of the determinant variables; 1ˆV is T x (M*-1) matrix of error term; K is 
the number of all determinant variables K=10.  X includes X1 and X2. X1 is T x K* vector of the 
determinant variables included in the 1st equation. X2 is T x K** vector of the determinant 
variables excluded from 1st equation (hereafter called the excluded instruments).  K**=K – K* is 
the number of determinant variables excluded from equation 1 (K**=5). X2 is assumed to satisfy 
the IV exclusion restriction that there is no correlation between X2 and the dependent variable in 
the structural equation. In my model, X2 includes instrumental variables: (1) The WTO dummy 
variable, (2) The landlocked dummy variable, (3) The openness index of largest trade partners, 
(4) The ratio between public output and private output, (5) The ratio between government debt 
and GDP. The motivation to choose these instruments is explained in Section 2.4.1, p.35-37. 
These excluded instrumental variables are assumed to satisfy the IV exclusion restriction that 
they do not correlate with GROW: E (X2, y1) = 0. Section 2.4.1, p.38-39 provides arguments 
about the IV exclusion restriction. The definition of each variable will be given in the next part.  
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2.3.2 Testing for Endogeneity and Testing for Validity of Instruments 
 
An estimation result may still be biased if the instruments of endogenous explanatory 
variables are not valid. To test the consistency of 2SLS, I have implemented the following tests: 
the Wu-Hausman test, the weak instrument test, the redundancy test, and the overidentifying 
restriction test (Sargan test). 
 
2.3.2.1. Testing for Endogeneity (Wu-Hausman Test) 
 
Consider the structural equation (1): 
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Since ε 1 is uncorrelated with X, so Y1 is endogenous if and only if ( ) 01ˆ1 ≠VE ε . The linear 
projection of ε 1 on 1ˆV in error form is 
11
ˆ
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where ( ) ( )21ˆ/11ˆ1 VEVE ελ = , then Y1 is exogenous if and only if 01 =λ .  
Plugging equation (3) into equation (1), we have (Woodridge, 2002, p. 119, eq. 6.14) 
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According to Woodridge (2002), the procedure of the Wu-Hausman test is as follows:  
(1) Compute OLS residual ( 1ˆV ) from the first stage reduced form regression of Y1 on X.  
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(2) Regress y1 on Y1, X1 and 1ˆV . Then, test H0: 01 =λ . If we reject H0, there is evidence to 
believe that Y1 is endogenous and the model must be estimated by an instrumental variable 
approach such as 2SLS. 
 
2.3.2.2 Testing Overidentifying Restrictions (Sargan Test) 
Consider the structural equation (1): 
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Woodridge (2002) demonstrates that the null hypothesis of the Sargan test is H0: E(X’ε 1) = 0, 
where X is the complete set of predetermined variables. The procedure of the Sargan test is as 
follows:  
(1) Compute 2SLS residuals from the structural equation SLSZy 2111 ˆˆ δε −= .  
(2) Regress 1εˆ  on X, the complete set of predetermined variables.  
The test of overidentifying restriction is S = T R2 ~ [ ]
2
)1( ** −− MKχ , where T is the number of 
observations, R2 is the usual R-squared and K** - (M* -1) is the number of overidentifying 
restrictions (that is, the difference between the number of excluded instruments and the number 
of right-hand side endogenous variables). This test is valid in the case of overidentification. If we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis, the overidentification restriction is valid. The instrumental 
variables are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural 
equation with assuming that we have one valid instrument. “If we reject the null hypothesis, then 
our logic for choosing the IVs must be reexamined” (Woodridge, 2002, p. 123). 
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2.3.2.3 Testing Weak Instruments 
 
If the correlations between endogenous explanatory variables and their excluded 
instruments are nonzero but small, those instruments are called weak instruments. There has 
been much attention to this in the econometric literature of the past 10 – 15 years. If the 
instruments are weak, 2SLS estimation may be biased and hypothesis tests have large-size 
distortion. Testing a weak instrument is carried out with a joint test of the statistical significance 
of the coefficients of all excluded instruments in the first-stage regression. The test statistic is 
simply the F-statistic of the first stage. Staiger and Stock (1997) give the rule of thumb for the 
case of one endogenous explanatory variable and one instrument. This rule states that the 
instrument is weak if the F-statistic for the first stage is less than ten. But, when the number of 
endogenous variables and the number of instruments increase, this rule is not appropriate. To 
develop the test for weak instruments in the case of n endogenous explanatory variables, Stock 
and Yogo (2004) have established a table of critical values with a 5% significance level. 
Therefore, the instrument is weak if the test statistic that is followed by Cragg and Donald (1993) 
is less than the critical value in the table.7 The critical value is based on the type of IV estimator, 
the number of instruments, the number of endogenous explanatory variables and the level of bias 
or size distortion the researcher is willing to accept.  
 
                                                 
7
 The test for weak instruments of Stock and Yogo (2004) is based on the test statistic of Cragg and Donald 
(1993).This test statistic coincides with the F-statistic for the first stage of 2SLS, in the case of only one right-hand 
side endogenous variable. The difference between Stock and Yogo and Cragg and Donald is that Stock and Yogo 
test the null hypothesis of weak instruments against the alternative of strong instruments. The null hypothesis of 
Stock and Yogo allows the parameters are identified. But, Cragg and Donald test the null hypothesis of weak 
instrument when the parameters are underidentified. Therefore, the critical values of Stock and Yogo and Cragg and 
Donald are different.  Accoridng to Stock and Yogo, “a group of instruments is weak if the bias of the IV estimator, 
relative to the bias of ordinary least squares (OLS), could exceed a certain threshold b, for example 10%.” And “if 
the conventional α-level Wald test based on IV statistics has an actual size that could exceed a certain threshold r, 
for example r = 10% when α = 5%.” See Stock and Yogo (2004), page 3, 4. 
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2.3.2.4 Testing for Redundancy 
 
A redundant instrument is an instrument that does not provide useful information about 
the endogenous variable. Adding a redundant instrument does not improve the asymptotic 
efficiency of estimation. Besides, using a large number of instruments can cause poor 
justification. Therefore, dropping redundant instruments is necessary.  
 
Consider the structural equation (1). 
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where Y1 is an endogenous regressor and X1 is an exogenous regressor.  
  The reduced form of Y1 (or the first stage equation) is 
111
ˆˆ VXY +Π=  .   
Where X is a set of instruments which consist of excluded instruments X2 and included 
instruments X1, as follows:  
( )[ ] 11211211 ˆˆˆ VXXY +ΠΠ=  .        (5) 
Assume that X2 consists of two parts: X2A and X2B, where X2A are possibly redundant 
instruments. 
The redundant condition offered by Breusch et al. (1999) is  
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X2A are said to be redundant instruments if, when we regress Y1 on the full set of excluded 
instruments X2, the coefficient on X2A is zero; or if, when we regress Y1 on the full set of both 
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excluded and included instruments, the coefficient on X2A is zero; or, if adding X2A to the 
instrument set does not change the fitted value )ˆ(Y . 
Breusch et al. (1999) describes the procedure to test for redundancy as follows: 
1. Regress equation (5) by OLS; 
2. Test the significance of X2A, using a large-sample Lagrange Multiplier test.8 
The test statistic is distributed by chi-square, with a degree of freedom equal to the number of the 
endogenous regressors times the number of the tested instruments. 
 
2.3.3 Random Effects and Fixed Effects 
 
Omitted variables occur when we cannot include some necessary variables in the 
regression model, due to reasons such as unavailability of data or ignorance. Therefore, the error 
term will include these omitted variables. If the omitted variables and the independent variables 
are correlated, then those variables are endogenous. However, in panel data, we can see the other 
occurrence of omitted variables as time-constant variables, called unobserved effects (ci). 
Unobserved effects often capture features of individuals (although in my model, they are features 
of countries) that do not change over time.  
 
The model with unobserved effects can be written as (Balgati, 2001, p. 11, eq. 2.1 and 
2.2) 
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8
 See Green, 2008, p. 166 and pp. 502-507. 
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where i denotes cross-section and t denotes time. β is K x 1 vector and Xit is N x K matrix . K is 
the number of explanatory variables. When ci occurs in the model, there is serial correlation in ui,t 
such that E(ui,t, ui,s) = 2ασ  for t ≠s. Ignoring ci causes at least an incorrect standard errors and 
ineffecient estimation. 
 
There are two approaches to unobserved effects (ci): (1) random effects estimation where 
ci is treated as random effects, so that ci is considered a random variable and is put into the error 
term; and (2) fixed effects estimation where ci is treated as fixed effects, so that ci is considered a 
parameter to be estimated. 
 
2.3.3.1 Fixed Effects Model 
 
To rewrite equation (7) for the fixed effects model, we have (Green, 2008, p. 194,          
eq. 9-12) 
iiii XIcy εβ ++= .          (8) 
Where I is T x 1 column of ones 
To rewrite equation (8) under matrix form,  
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Where di is a dummy variable and D is nT x n matrix and D = [d1, d2, . . . , dn].      
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2.3.3.1.1 Testing for Fixed Effects (F-test) 
 
The null hypothesis is H0: c1=c2=…=cN-1 = 0. 
Testing for fixed effects is carried out by checking the joint significance of dummy variables by 
the F-test. The procedure is that we run OLS and the fixed effects version of the model. The test 
statistic is (Balgati, 2001, p. 13, eq. 2.12) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) KTNNW
UNRESRES F
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F −−−≈−−−
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= 1,12
22
1/1
1/
  ,       (11) 
where 2RESR is the restricted residual sums of squares, and 2UNRESR  is the unrestricted residual 
sums of squares. 2RESR is obtained from OLS on the pooled model, while 2UNRESR is obtained from 
the least–squares dummy variable regression. Rejecting H0 means there is evidence to support 
the existence of individual effects in the model. 
 
2.3.3.2 Random Effects Model 
 
To rewrite equation (7) for the random effects model, we have (Green, 2008, p. 201,          
eq. 9-25) 
itiitiitit ccXy εεβα +=+++= it
' u   where  .      (12) 
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This model makes the assumptions (Green, 2008, p. 201, eq. 9-26) that 
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2.3.3.2.1 Breusch-Pagan (1980) specification test (BP test) 
 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) constructed the BP test from the Lagrange multiplier test for 
the random effects model.  
The null hypothesis is H0: 02 =cσ  or ( ) 0, =isit uuE . 
The BP test statistic is (Green, 2008, p. 205, eq. 9-39)  
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If H0 is rejected, random effects exist in the model. 
 
2.3.3.3 Fixed or Random effects? 
 
Should fixed effects or random effects estimation be used? The Hausman specification 
test recommends a solution for choosing between fixed effects and random effects estimation. 
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2.3.3.3.1 Hausman Specification Test (1978) 
 
The Hausman specification test is based on the difference between fixed effects and 
random effects. Fixed effects are consistent when ci correlates with Xi,t while random effects are 
not.  
The null hypothesis of the Hausman specific test is H0: E(ci, Xit) =0.  
 The Hausman statistic is (Green, 2008, p. 208, eq. 9-40)  
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] 21' ˆˆˆˆˆˆ KREFEREFEREFE VarVar χββββββ ≈−−− −  ,                   (14) 
where FEβˆ  is the coefficient vector of explanatory variables obtained from fixed effects 
regression, and REβˆ  is the coefficient vector of explanatory variables obtained from random 
effects regression. If the null hypothesis is rejected, only fixed effects estimation is suitable; 
otherwise, both random and fixed effects are suitable. 
 
2.4 PRIMARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
2.4.1 Data 
 
I use a panel data set that covers 25 transition countries from 1994 to 2006. The transition 
countries include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, FYR, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
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The dependent variable (GROW) is the growth rate of GDP. The main independent 
variables are the openness index (OPEN) and privatization (PRI). The level of privatization is 
measured by an average of indexes of small-scale and large-scale privatization. The calculation 
of indexes of large-scale privatization (LSP) is based on the privatization levels of the assets of 
large-scale public enterprises; for example, more than 75%, 50%, or 25% and less than 25%.  
The calculation of indexes of small-scale privatization (LSP) is also based on the privatization 
levels of the assets of small-scale public enterprises. These indexes are established and reported 
by EBRD. The openness index is measured by the ratio of trade volumes to GDP. The data on 
trade volumes and GDP are also taken from EBRD. 
 
My econometric model includes control variables such as change in investment/GDP 
(INVEST), change in employment, change in labor productivity (PRODU), war (WAR) and the 
inflation rate (INFLA).9 The INVEST variable is a proxy for the change in physical capital. The 
EMPLOY variable is a proxy for the change in labor. The PRODU variable is a proxy for 
technological progress. The WAR variable is a proxy for political conflict, while INFLA is a 
proxy for macroeconomic instability. WAR is a dummy variable, which receives the value of one 
if a country has political conflict in that year and otherwise is zero. The information related to 
political conflict in transition countries in my data set is taken from Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). The data of all other control variables are obtained from EBRD.  
 
                                                 
9
 The traditional theory of economic growth holds that economic growth is determined by production factors such as 
investment, labor and technological progress. Besides, the role of inflation rate and political conflict on the 
economic growth of transition countries is affirmed by many authors, such as Barlow (2006). 
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The instruments for openness and privatization are WTO, PARTNER, 
TIME_LANDLOCK, GOVDE and PUB_PRI. WTO variable is the year in which a country 
became a WTO member. WTO is a dummy variable, which receives the value of one if the 
country began to be or already was a WTO member in that year and zero otherwise. The data is 
taken from World Trade Organization (WTO). PARTNER is the average weight of an openness 
index of the composite of the five largest trading partners. These openness indexes are also 
measured by the ratios between trade volumes and GDP. The information about trading partners 
and the data on trade volumes of partners are taken from UN COMTRADE. The data about GDP 
of trade partners are taken from World Bank. TIME_LANDLOCK is the multiplication of two 
variables: YEAR and LANDLOCK. YEAR is a time variable, which receives value from 1994 to 
2006. LANDLOCK is dummy variable, which receives the value of one if a country is 
landlocked, and zero otherwise. The data on LANDLOCK is taken from the CIA. GOVDE is 
government debt over GDP. The data on government debt is taken from EBRD.  PUB_PRI is the 
ratio of public share of GDP over private share of GDP. The data on public firms’ share over 
GDP and private firms’ share over GDP are obtained from EBRD.  
 
Rose (2004) and Subramanian and Wei (2003) studied the effect of WTO on trade. 
According to the authors, when countries became members of WTO, they had to follow bilateral 
mutual negotiations on cutting trade protection, and therefore, their openness increased. This 
conclusion led to the assumption that having become a WTO member was an important factor in 
change in the openness of the country. In this research, therefore, I have constructed a WTO 
variable and consider it a potential instrument of openness. 
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Romalis (2007) showed that a decrease in U.S. MFN tariffs—he assumes that the United 
States was the largest trade partner of developing countries—increased the possibility of market 
access for a developing country, and therefore increased the openness of that country. Therefore, 
the openness index of the largest trade partners of each transition country could provide 
necessary information to explain change in the openness index of that country. For this reason, 
therefore, I constructed the variable PARTNER and chose it as a potential instrument of 
openness.  
 
Frankel and Romer (1999) used LANDLOCK as an instrument of openness. This arose 
from the idea that geographic characteristics of each country provided advantages or created 
limitations for that country in trade with the rest of the world. Therefore, I have borrowed from 
Frankel and Romer (1999) the use of LANDLOCK as a potential instrument of openness. 
However, LANDLOCK is a dummy variable and a time-constant variable, which receives the 
value of one if the country is landlocked and zero otherwise. To use it as an instrument for 
openness in the panel data sample, I multiply the LANDLOCK variable by the TIME variable to 
create a new variable, TIME_LANDLOCK. This means that I consider that LANDLOCK 
impacts openness through its joint impact with TIME on openness. This structure translates 
LANDLOCK into a time series. Section 5 confirms that this specification of the instrumental 
variable TIME_LANDLOCK is robust. 
 
During the communist era, the public sector characteristically dominated the whole 
economy of a transition country. The operation of public firms did not aim toward profitability, 
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but only toward social welfare.10 The government had to use financial sources such as taxes, 
foreign debt, and exports to subsidize the operation of public firms. Lacking knowledge of 
management, technological progress, the dynamics of competition, and the relationship between 
demand and supply, public firms tended to operate ineffectively. The communist economy 
suffered from a high pressure of government debt owed to foreign countries.  When the 
communist government did not have enough capacity to continue subsidizing public firms, then 
the government had to sell public firms to domestic or foreign investors. Therefore, higher levels 
of government debt created higher motivation for privatization in the transition countries. Plane 
(1997) used the ratio of government debt to GDP as the instrument of privatization. In this paper, 
I have followed Plane (1997) in choosing the ratio of government debt to GDP as an instrument 
of privatization.  
 
Privatization transforms public firms into private firms. The purpose of privatization is 
not only to release the government from its heavy financial burden and to improve the 
effectiveness of public firms, but also to establish the foundation for market mechanisms through 
creating competitive sectors and private firms, and to push up economic growth. On the other 
hand, the governments of transition countries think that political institutions need to be ensured 
by economic forces such as the contribution of public firms in the economy. Therefore, the share 
of public firms’ output to GDP, relative to the share of private firms’ output to GDP, can be 
considered important information to explain the change in privatization level. It follows from this 
that using only the share of private firms’ output to GDP does not provide necessary information 
to explain the change in privatization levels. Therefore, I have adopted the ratio of public firms’ 
                                                 
10
 See Matsumara, T. (1998), p.473. 
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output to GDP to private firms’ output to GDP as an instrument for privatization.  This is the first 
use of this ratio in this way. 
 
These instruments are assumed to satisfy the IV excluded restriction that they do not 
directly affect growth, but only have direct impact on openness and privatization. To my 
knowledge, there are not any theoretical or empirical models that display the direct effect of 
WTO, PARTNER, LANDLOCK, and PUB_PRI on economic growth. There is evidence to 
support the relationship between WTO, PARTNER, and LANDLOCK and trade or openness, 
and none that shows becoming a WTO member, having sea border, or the openness index of the 
largest trade partner has any direct linkage with the economic growth of a country.   
 
There has been some concern about the direct impact of government debt on economic 
growth, but few studies have been done concerning this relationship. Recently, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) have claimed that debt at low or moderate levels does not affect economic growth, 
but that if the ratio between debt and GDP is higher than 90%, then debt does have a negative 
effect on economic growth. Bivens and John (2010) have insisted that there is no theoretical 
model to display direct impact of government debts on economic growth. The theoretical model 
related to this issue would display the impact of government debt on economic growth through 
the channel of interest rate and investment. However, Bivens and John provide analysis and 
empirical evidence suggesting that there is no linkage between government debt and economic 
growth. They show that in the 1940s, the United States had a high ratio of debt to GDP, but 
economic growth rate was still double that in a period with a lower ratio of debt to GDP. By the 
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Granger causality test, Bivens and John (2010) have not found causality of debt ratio on 
economic growth.  
 
The claim of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) that debt has a negative effect on economic 
growth if the ratio between debt and GDP is higher than 90% has little relevance to this study. In 
my sample set, the average level of debt over GDP is 40.5%. There are only 16 observations—
the total observations equal 325—that show a ratio between debt and GDP that is greater than 
90%. Examining the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, for example, we find that there is no linkage 
between debt and economic growth. The economic growth rate at the high ratio, in fact, is higher 
than the economic growth rate at the low ratio.  In 1995, the ratio between debts and GDP was 
52.4 % and the economic growth rate was -5.40 %, while in 2000, the ratio between debts and 
GDP was 107.34 % and the economic growth rate was 5.44 %. There are also many cases in 
which the economic growth rates are very different, although the ratio of debts over GDP is the 
same.  
 
The other concern is whether the ratio of public output over private output affects the 
economic growth rate. Up to now, there have not been any theoretical or empirical studies that 
have mentioned the direct effect of this ratio on economic growth. This ratio is only a 
characteristic of transitional economies. The ratio between public output and private output can 
be considered an indicator used by governments of transition countries to adjust the privatization 
level. I do not find any statistical evidence to support the relationship between economic growth 
and the ratio between public output and private output in my sample. Albania maintained the 
same ratio between public output and private output (0.333) during the time period from 1996 to 
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1999, but the economic growth rate changed within a large range (9.1 % in 1996; -10.2 % in 
1997; 12.7 % in 1998; and 10.1 % in 1999). Many other countries provide similar evidence. For 
example, from 1994 to 1996, Belarus kept the same ratio between public output and private 
output (0.5667), but the economic growth rate changed from -11.7% in 1994 to 2.8 % in 1996. 
From 1997 to 2000, the ratio between public output and private output was 4, but the economic 
growth rate changed (11.4% in 1997; 8.4% in 1998; 3.4% in 1999; 5.8 % in 2000; and 4.7 % in 
2001). From 2001 to 2004, the ratio between public output and private output was 3, but the 
economic growth rate varied (5.0% in 2002; 7.0 % in 2003; and 11.4 % in 2004).  
 
  Table 2.1 displays a summary of the main variables and also some of the characteristics 
of my sample. The observations total 325 and the data on variables such as OPEN, PRI, WAR, 
TIME_LANDLOCK, PUB_PRI, WTO, and PARTNER can be fully seen. From 1994 to 2006, 
the growth rate of GDP reached its highest rate at 34.5 %. The growth rate of GDP that is higher 
than 10 % is about 11% of whole sample. However, 16% of whole sample has negative growth 
rate of GDP. The lowest growth rate of GDP is 30.9%. The other feature of the sample is the 
inflation rate. 52% of the whole sample has a two-digit inflation rate; 39% of the whole sample 
has a three-digit inflation rate; 4% of the whole sample has a four-digit inflation rate. However, 
1.8% of the whole sample has a negative inflation rate. The change in investment is also great. 
The growth rate of investment is 23.4% on average, 100.49% as the maximum rate and -311% as 
the minimum rate. The ratio of public share of GDP to private share of GDP decreases from 
1994 to 2006. The average ratio is 1.027, the maximum ratio is 5.666, and the minimum ratio is 
0.25. In general, the government debt to GDP reduces. The average level of the government debt 
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to GDP is 40.5%; the maximum ratio of government debt to GDP is 319.79 % in Hungary in 
1994.  
 
Table 2.1: Statistical Summary of All Variables 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GROW  319 3.937749 6.736982 -30.9 34.5 
OPEN  325 82.95631 29.42397 34.7 241.8 
PRI  325 3.275462 0.7658746 1 4.165 
WAR  325 0.1569231 0.3642891 0 1 
INFLA  318 97.72408 458.4971 -1.374 6041.595 
PRODU  306 6.450654 12.66028 -66.2 84.3 
EMPLOY  316 -0.2433544 4.310237 -22 28.3 
INVEST  290 2.761671 16.9127 -48.40764 103.333 
TIME_LANDLOCK 325 1040 1000.744 0 2006 
PUB_PRI  325 1.027479 1.092151 .25 5.666667 
WTO  325 0.4338462 0.4963686 0 1 
GOVDE  297 40.50165 32.21594 3.996 319.792 
PARTNER  325 69.56384 15.43999 27.108 115.775 
 
Before presenting the estimation results, I provide the results from an econometric test 
that show evidence supporting the choice of random effect versus fixed effect model as well as 
instruments. 
 
2.4.2 Random Versus Fixed Effect 
 
The test results are reported in Table 2.2.  
First, I have used the F-test to test the individual effects. The result rejects the null 
hypothesis, since F (23, 231) = 5.81 and p = 0.000. Therefore, the unobserved effects and model 
must be estimated by either random or fixed effects. 
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Next, I have used the Breusch-Pagan test to test the null hypothesis H0 that the variance 
of unobserved effects (ci) is zero. The test rejects the null hypothesis, since chi-sq (1) = 67.08 
and p = 0.000. This result provides evidence that my model can be estimated either by random or 
fixed effects.  
 
The above results did not give concrete direction for my estimate. Therefore, I employed 
the test for random versus fixed effects discussed by Hausman (1978). The Hausman statistic for 
fixed effects versus random effects reports chi-sq (7) = 54.08 and p = 0.000. Based on this result, 
I will estimate my econometric model only by fixed effects. 
 
Table 2.2: Random versus Fixed Effect 
 
 
Hausman  Specific Test 
 
F-Test that all u_i = 0 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test 
 
Chi-sq (7) = 54.08  
P-value = 0.000 
 
F(23, 231) = 5.81    
P-value = 0.0005 
 
Chi-sq (1) = 67.08 
P-value = 0.000 
 
 
2.4.3 Testing the Validity of Instruments 
 
The results from testing the validity of instruments are reported in Table 2.3 with fixed 
effects estimation. All tests are passed, to support the validity of all instruments. Table 2.3 
reports the results of four tests: the endogeneity test, the test for weak instruments, the IV 
redundant test, and the Sargan test. 
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In the fixed effects model, the endogeneity test can be implemented by using the Wu-
Hausman test. The Wu-Hausman statistic rejects the null hypothesis that there is no correlation 
between GROW and the residuals from the first stage regression, because F (2,229) = 14.89 and 
p = 0.000. Therefore, the Wu-Hausman test suggests that both PRI and OPEN are endogenous 
variables.  
 
In addition, the joint test of weak instruments provides evidence that the chosen 
instruments are not weak. In the first stage regression of PRI, F (5,228) = 42.19 and p = 0.000, 
while in the first stage regression of OPEN, F (5,228) = 9.94 and p-value = 0.0000. The Cragg–
Donald Wald F statistic is 8.201. It is higher than 5.91, the critical value for the weak instrument 
test of Stock and Yogo (2004), based on 20% maximal IV relative bias and a 5% significance 
level for the case of two endogenous explanatory variables and five excluded instruments. It is 
also higher than 6.89, the critical value for the weak instrument test of Stock and Yogo (2004), 
based on 30% maximal IV relative size and 5% significance level, for the case of two 
endogenous explanatory variables and five excluded instruments. Therefore, the instrument set is 
not weak in the case of 20% maximal IV relative bias and 30% maximal IV relative size. 
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Table 2.3: Tests for the Validity of the Instruments under Fixed Effects  
 
Endogeneity test by Wu-Hausman test 
Hypothesis H0: No correlation between GROW and residuals from first stage regression. 
If H0 is rejected, there is correlation and PRI & OPEN need to be instrumented. 
 F (2, 229) = 14.89 
P-value = 0.0000 
 
Test of weak instrument 
Hypothesis H0 : All instruments are weak 
If H0 is rejected, then all instruments are not weak 
 
First stage regression of PRI:  Joint test of all instruments 
F(5, 228) = 42.19 
P-value = 0.0000 
 
First stage regression of OPEN: Joint test of all instruments 
F(5, 228) =  9.94 
P-value = 0.0000 
 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic:                                                                        8.201 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:    5% maximal IV relative bias        13.97 
                                                                   10% maximal IV relative bias       8.78 
                                                                   20% maximal IV relative bias       5.91 
                                                                   30% maximal IV relative bias       4.79 
 
                                                                         5% maximal IV size              19.45 
                                                                        10% maximal IV size             11.22 
                                                                        20% maximal IV size               8.38 
                                                                        30% maximal IV size               6.89 
 
IV redundancy test: (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments) 
Hypothesis H0: instrument is redundant or instrument provides no useful information. 
If H0 is rejected, then instruments provide useful information and are not redundant. 
 
Instrument                           Chi-sq(2)                                     P-value         
TIME_LANDLOCK             9.297                                          0.0096 
PUB_PRI                             12.217                                         0.0022 
WTO                                    11.676                                         0.0029 
GOVDEB                              7.953                                         0.0188 
PARTNER                            15.911                                        0.0004 
 
Sargan statistic: (overidentificatio test of all instruments):       
                      
Hypothesis H0: all instruments are exogenous 
Sargan test statistic:  Chi-sq(3) = 5.844,     P-value  = 0.1174 
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On the other hand, the test for redundancy of each instrument confirms that each 
instrument provides useful information to explain PRI and OPEN, hence they cannot be omitted. 
Test statistics for TIME_LANDLOCK, PUB_PRI, WTO, GOVDE, and PARTNER are 9.297, 
12.217, 11.676, 7.953 and 15.911, respectively. P-values are 0.0096, 0.0022, 0.0029, 0.0188, and 
0.0004, respectively.  
 
Finally, the Sargan test, or the overidentification test, suggests that the overidentification 
restriction is valid. The instrumental variables are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated 
with error term in the structural equation. In the fixed effects model, chi-sq (3) = 5.844 and p-
value = 0.1174. 
 
2.4.4 2SLS Estimation Result 
 
Table 2.4 reports the estimation result of 2SLS. The column in Table 2.4 corresponds to 
2SLS estimation’s results for fixed effects. In each cell, the first line reports the estimated 
regression coefficient value of the standardized beta coefficient and the level of statistical 
significance. Symbols ***, **, * denote 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance levels, respectively. The 
second line reports standard error. The coefficients of all regressors are statistically significant.  
 
Empirical results from 2SLS estimation under fixed effect suggest that privatization and 
openness simultaneously promote economic growth in transition countries. Since both policies 
promote the same direction of economic growth, the joint impact of the two policies on 
economic growth is automatically predicted as positive.  
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Table 2.4: Summary of 2SLS Regression Results  
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
No standard Beta coefficient 
Dependent variable: GROW 
Standard Beta coefficient 
Dependent variable: GROW 
Random 
effects 
Fixed Effects Random 
effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
PRI 3.088*** 
(0.778) 
6.918*** 
(1.347) 
0.351*** 
(0.088) 
0.786*** 
(0.153) 
OPEN 0.100*** 
(0.028) 
0.085** 
(0.039) 
0.436*** 
(0.122) 
0.371** 
(0.168) 
WAR -3.546*** 
(1.069) 
-6.090*** 
(1.521) 
-0.191*** 
(0.057) 
-0.329*** 
(0.082) 
INFLA -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.786*** 
(0.127) 
-0.644*** 
(0.134) 
PRODU 0.194*** 
(0.023) 
0.161*** 
(0.021) 
0.364*** 
(0.0436) 
0.301*** 
(0.039) 
EMPLOY 0.208*** 
(0.074) 
0.212*** 
(0.063) 
0.133*** 
(0.047) 
0.136*** 
(0.040) 
INVEST 0.064*** 
(0.015) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.162*** 
(0.038) 
0.121*** 
(0.035) 
Note:  
* = 0.1 significant level; ** = 0.05 significant level; and *** = 0.01 significant level 
 
My result is different from Barlow’s results (2006): that trade liberalization has a 
statistically significant positive effect on economic growth, and that privatization has a 
statistically nonsignificant, negative effect on economic growth. When comparing estimation 
methods, IV-GMM applied by Barlow (2006) used only internal instruments, including first lag 
and first difference of independent variables, but did not use external instruments. Internal 
instruments cannot provide sufficient information to explain endogenous variables (openness and 
privatization). In this case, misspecification in application of the estimation method may have 
been a reason for the wrong sign and statistical insignificance of the coefficient of the 
privatization variable found by Barlow.  
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In addition, Barlow’s model (2006) did not control for production factors such as 
physical capital, labor, and technological progress. Barlow (2006) mentioned that Campos 
(2000) provided evidence to support the hypothesis that production factors do not influence 
economic growth in the transition stage. However, my findings relate to the impact of production 
factors on the economic growth of transition countries, and give evidence to support the 
traditional theory of endogenous growth and provide an opposite view to Campos (2000). Those 
three factors simultaneously contribute positively to economic growth. The standardized beta 
coefficients for physical capital, labor and technological progress are 0.121, 0.136, and 0.301, 
respectively. The standardized beta coefficient of technological progress is highest and is nearly 
triple that of physical capital and labor. This shows that technological progress is the most 
important factor in production. Transition countries should focus on upgrading advanced 
technology to improve their economic growth.  
 
Comparing the standardized beta coefficients in fixed effects estimation, I have realized 
that the privatization policy had nearly twice the relative effect on economic growth as the 
openness policy, from 1994 to 2006. In fixed effects estimation, the standardized beta coefficient 
of privatization is 0.786, while the beta coefficient of openness is 0.371. If openness were to 
increase by one standard deviation, economic growth would increase only by 0.371 of a standard 
deviation; while if the privatization level were to increase by one standard deviation, economic 
growth would increase by 0.786 of a standard deviation. This shows that in order to accelerate 
economic growth, governments of transition countries might well emphasize privatization policy. 
It also implies that during the period from 1994 to 2006, building the foundation for market 
mechanisms through establishing competitive sectors played an important role in economic 
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reform of transition economies. However, statistical data shows that openness increased 
considerably from 1994 through 2006, except for a few countries such as Albania, Armenia, and 
Uzbekistan, while the privatization level increased little. The growth rate of openness reached a 
maximum of 124.5%, while the growth rate of privatization reached a maximum of 40%. This 
may have been caused by the difficulties in implementing the privatization process, such as asset 
evaluation of public firms, choosing the privatization method, procedure in selling stocks and 
other problems.  
 
In addition, the empirical results show the important role of stabilizing political conflict 
and mostly macroeconomic conditions. Political conflict and macroeconomic instability can 
decrease considerably the effects of privatization policy and trade liberalization in promoting 
economic growth. The standardized beta coefficient of INFLA is -0.644, which is very close to 
the value of the standardized beta coefficient of OPEN and PRI under an absolute comparison. 
To maintain the positive effects of trade liberalization and privatization policies on economic 
growth, governments of transition countries would need to implement macroeconomic 
stabilization policies and minimize political conflict. The statistical data from 1994 to 2006 
provides promising signs of stabilization of the macroeconomics of transition countries. The 
inflation rate of transition countries decreased considerably, from an inflation rate of three or 
four digits in 1994, to an inflation rate of one or two digits in 2006. In general, political conflict 
is well controlled in many transition countries in my data sample, except for Kyrgyz, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Uzbekistan. 
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2.4.5 Robustness Check 
 
I checked the robustness of the empirical results in two ways. The first was to observe the 
changes in the coefficients with different structures of the sample. The second was to check 
whether the instrumental variable of the landlocked dummy interacted with time, a reasonable 
specification.  
 
First, I classified the original sample into six groups: Central European, Baltic, European 
CIS, South East Europe, Caucasia, and Central Asian Countries. I took out each group from the 
original sample and then ran the regressions. The statistical results show that signs of coefficients 
of all independent variables in the smaller sample are the same as the signs of coefficients of 
those variables in the original sample. More than 80% of the total coefficients are statistically 
significant. Some loss of significance is expected with the smaller samples. Table 2.5 reports the 
results of the robustness check for fixed effect estimation only. 
 
Second, I examined the robustness of my estimated results with the instrumental variable 
TIME_LANDLOCK. I regressed the sample in three ways. First, I included the time dummy 
variables: dummy1994, dummy1995… dummy2006 in the instruments set. DummyT variable 
received the value of one for the year of T and zero otherwise (T = 1994, or 1995… or 2006). 
Second, I replaced the TIME_LANDLOCK variable by the LANDLOCK variable only. Third, I 
added both time dummy variables and the LANDLOCK variable in the instrumental set. The 
statistical results show that coefficients of all variables in the structural equation are still 
statistically significant and have the same sign. The values of coefficients are changed very little 
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compared with the original estimated results. The P-value of openness is little higher than that of 
the original estimated result. All results reported in Table 2.6 confirm the robustness of my 
original estimated results.  
 
Table 2.5: Robustness Report of Fixed Effects Estimation by Dropping Countries  
of One Region  
 
Independent  
Variables 
Dependent Variable: GROW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRI 8.767*** 
(1.497) 
7.086*** 
(1.445) 
6.324*** 
(1.147) 
10.456*** 
(2.074) 
6.748*** 
(1.408) 
3.936*** 
(1.309) 
OPEN 0.047 
(0.083) 
0.088** 
(0.041) 
0.052 
(0.036) 
0.042 
(0.040) 
0.085** 
(0.035) 
0.063** 
(0.027) 
WAR -5.084 
(2.077) 
-6.071*** 
(1.598) 
-6.682*** 
(1.884) 
-4.369** 
(1.781) 
-6.733*** 
(1.734) 
-3.809** 
(1.286) 
INFLA -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
PRODU 0.156*** 
(0.025) 
0.163*** 
(0.022) 
0.162*** 
(0.020) 
0.161*** 
(0.027) 
0.177*** 
(0.022) 
0.141*** 
(0.019) 
EMPLOY 0.208*** 
(0.072) 
0.229*** 
(0.069) 
0.206*** 
(0.061) 
0.364*** 
(0.079) 
0.194*** 
(0.067) 
0.117* 
(0.062) 
INVEST 0.036*** 
(0.014) 
0.048*** 
(0.014) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.039** 
(0.015) 
0.058*** 
(0.013) 
0.070*** 
(0.014) 
CONT -27.525*** 
(7.018) 
-26.502*** 
(4.741) 
-21.758*** 
(4.313) 
-34.865*** 
(6.256) 
-26.499*** 
(4.708) 
-14.998*** 
(3.743) 
Number of 
Observation 
199 230 221 210 235 215 
Note: 
Central European countries: Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Poland, Slovenia. 
Baltic countries:  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
European CIS countries: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine. 
South East Europe countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania 
Caucasia countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia. 
Central Asian Countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
(1) Take Central European Countries out of original sample 
(2) Take Baltic Countries out of original sample 
(3)Take European CIS countries  out of original sample 
(4) Take South East Europe countries out of original sample 
(5) Take Caucasia countries out of original sample 
(6) Take Central Asian Countries out of original sample 
* = 0.1 significant level; ** = 0.05 significant level; and *** = 0.01 significant level 
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check of the Specification of the TIME_LANDLOCK Variable 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Original 
Estimate 
Results 
Robustness Check 
(1) (2) (3) 
PRI 6.918*** 
(1.347) 
6.122*** 
(1.207) 
7.194*** 
(1.401) 
6.122*** 
(1.207) 
OPEN 0.085** 
(0.039) 
0.054* 
(0.031) 
0.073* 
(0.043) 
0.054* 
(0.031) 
WAR -6.090*** 
(1.521) 
-5.861*** 
(1.391) 
-5.806*** 
(1.568) 
-5.861*** 
(1.391) 
INFLA -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
PRODU 0.161*** 
(0.021) 
0.168*** 
(0.020) 
0.161*** 
(0.021) 
0.168*** 
(0.020) 
EMPLOY 0.212*** 
(0.063) 
0.235*** 
(0.060) 
0.217*** 
(0.063) 
0.235*** 
(0.060) 
INVEST 0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.012) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.012) 
Note:  
(1): Adding time dummy variables 
(2): Replace TIME_ LANDLOCK variable by LANDLOCK variable 
(3): Adding both time dummy variables and LANDLOCK variable 
* = 0.1 significant level; ** = 0.05 significant level; and *** = 0.01 significant level 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper estimates the simultaneous effect of trade liberalization and privatization 
policies on economic growth. I used 2SLS with a full package of tests for endogeneity, weak 
instruments, redundancy and overidentifying restrictions. The tests establish the empirical 
validity of the model as specified. The main finding is that openness and privatization have 
statistically significant and simultaneously positive effects on economic growth. Based on 
comparison of beta coefficients, privatization policy effects on economic growth are greater than 
trade liberalization policy. In addition, political and macroeconomic stability influence economic 
growth considerably. For these countries, a political conflict offsets the contribution of one 
standard deviation in privatization and trade liberalization on economic growth. The robustness 
check confirms that all empirical results are robust. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE PROTECTION:  
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The political economy of trade protection has been given great attention from the 1970s 
to the present.  During that time, economists have been trying to build an endogenous protection 
model to explain the political economy of trade protection. The Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
model (hereafter G-H model) marked a turning point in this effort. It was the first model that 
allowed the political economy of trade protection to be presented through a lobbying variable. 
According to the authors, lobbying had great influence over the U.S. Government’s choices of 
trade policies.  
 
To verify whether the G-H model was consistent with the practical data, Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999) used the maximum likelihood method for the U.S. annual data set from 1983, with 
three-digit SIC87 industries11 Their estimated results provided evidence to support the G-H 
model. By using the simultaneous three-equation system for the same data set, Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) also found evidence to support the G-H model. However, the argument 
about whether the G-H model matches the practical data still continues. 
 
                                                 
11Standard Industrial Classification in 1987 is denoted as SIC87 
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A common characteristic of empirical studies prior to this one has been that they have 
used tariffs or nontariff barriers (NTB) to proxy for trade protection. The definition of the 
effective rate of protection (hereafter ERP), in fact, implies that if input tariffs are lower than 
output tariffs, then the ERP is higher than the output tariffs.  Statistical data from prior studies 
has provided evidence that developed countries, such as the United States, Japan, and others, 
have imposed higher tariff rates on consumption goods than on intermediate goods, which 
implies a high ERP for producers. The question is whether the theory of endogenous protection 
is correct when trade protection is measured by ERP. To my knowledge, the answer to this 
question has not yet been revealed in the literature. In fact, prior empirical studies using the 
instrumental variable method have not provided evidence to show the validity of their 
instrument. Therefore, their estimated results may be biased, if their instruments are weak and 
not exogenous. Furthermore, almost all prior papers have used U.S. annual data from 1983 with 
three-digit SIC87 categories.  Using the 1983 data set leads to some limitations: (1) The number 
of observations is small, which may cause ineffective estimation, and (2) The data do not provide 
sufficient information about U. S. trade policy, since this policy has changed over the years.   
 
This gap in the literature has motivated me to conduct the present study, which offers the 
following contributions to the literature of empirical testing of the G-H model: (1) I use the ERP 
to proxy for trade protection; (2) I use panel data constructed by the U.S. annual data for 193 
four-digit SIC industries over the time period from 1997 to 2001; (3) I minimize bias in the 
estimated results from the simultaneous equation system by conducting several tests on the 
validity of instruments such as the WU-Hausman test for endogenity, the weak instrument test 
and the overidentification test. 
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My estimated results support the G-H model as follows:  (1) In the lobbying industries, 
trade protection increases with a higher inverse import penetration and lower import-demand 
elasticity; (2) In the industries without lobbying, trade protection increases with a lower inverse 
import penetration and higher import-demand elasticity. The share of lobbying in the U.S. 
Government’s objectives is very small (0.008), while the share of welfare in the Government’s 
objectives is great (0.992). These estimated results suggest that U.S. trade policy was not 
affected seriously by lobbying between 1997 and 2001.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized into three parts. The second part is the literature 
review, the third part covers methodology and the last part is the conclusion. 
 
3.2 LITURATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review consists of two parts. The first part is a review of the theory of 
endogenous protection.  The second part is a review of the theory of effective protection. 
 
3.2.1 The Theory of Endogenous Protection 
 
The theory of endogenous protection was developed in the 1970s and has been 
continuously tested and changed since then. In this section, I present only a prominent theoretical 
study, Grossman and Helpman (1994), and some empirical tests of the G-H model. 
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Grossman and Helpman (1994) constructed the political economy model of protection, in 
which special interest groups made political contributions to influence the U.S. Government’s 
choice of trade policies. According to the authors, lobbying made politicians “sell” their political 
influence. Therefore, trade protection could be structured as a function of “political favors.” In 
this model, the Government set import and export taxes or subsidies to maximize social welfare 
and political contributions (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p.838, eq.5). 
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where G was the Government objectives function; W was social welfare; PAC was political 
contributions (lobbying); β  was share of welfare in the Government objectives; LI was labor 
income; π  was profit of firm; TR was trade tax revenue; and CS was consumer surplus.           
 
The interaction between the U.S. Government and the lobbies was assumed to be 
expressed by the Nash equilibrium.  Their model was presented under the formula (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994, p.842) 
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where ti was ad valorem tariffs on goodsI,; ei = - MI’(pi)pi / Mi (pi) was the import-demand 
elasticity of goodsI; zi  was inverse import penetration Yi / Mi,; Yi was the value of domestic 
output; Mi was import value; β  was the share of welfare in the Government objectives; Lα  was 
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the share of the population that owned the specific factor = ∑
=
L
i
i
1
α ; and Ii was a dummy that took 
a value of one if industry j had lobbying, and a value of zero otherwise. 
The G-H model (G-H model) estimated that trade protection and import penetration had a 
negative relationship in the industries, which were represented by the lobbies. Another result of 
this model was that import elasticity and trade protection had a negative relationship. When 
import elasticity was higher, the dead-weight loss from protection was higher, and thus the 
Government’s dynamic of trade protection falls. If the Government did not care about political 
contributions or if all industries were represented by lobbying, then trade protection was 
insignificant or free trade was preferred.   
 
3.2.2 Empirical Studies on Endogenous Protection 
 
Trefler (1993) used the 1983 U.S. data set and employed the simultaneous two-equation 
system to investigate the relationship between import penetrations and trade protection. In using 
the simultaneous two-equation system, he intended to solve the potential problem that both 
import penetration and trade protection were not exogenous. His simultaneous two-equation 
system included the NTB equation and the import equation.12  
 
Trefler (1993) suggested that a higher level of import penetration led to a higher level of 
trade protection in the NTB equation, while, in the import equation, a higher level of protection 
led to a reduction of import penetration. In addition, Trefler reported the impact of other factors 
                                                 
12
 See Trefler, 1993, p. 140-144.  
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on trade protection. Trade protection was required to be higher when seller concentration, buyer 
concentration, the unemployment rate, the firm scale and capital stock were high. Occupations 
with high incomes, such as science and engineering, received the most protection. 
 
However, Trefler’s (1993) estimated results had some limitations. In the NTB equation, 
the coefficient of import penetration was not statistically significant.  Only the coefficients of 
variables such as exports, buyer concentration scale, capital stock, change in import penetration, 
seller concentration and unemployment rate were statistically significant. The coefficients of the 
remaining exogenous variables were not statistically significant. In the import equation, only the 
coefficients of physical capital and occupations were statistically significant. 
 
Trefler (1993) checked the consistency of his predicted results by sensitivity analysis, 
which included (1) observing the change of the NTB coefficients in the import equation with 
different sets of instruments;  (2) employing the Wu-Hausman test to measure the endogeneity of 
each regressor in the NTB equation or in the import equation; (3) investigating the sensitivity of 
the import-equation NTB coefficient to the omission of observations; (4) checking the sensitivity 
of estimated results to different measurements of trade protection, such as average tariffs and the 
tariffs’ coverage ratio.13 Trefler found that his estimated results were robust under sensitivity 
analysis.  
 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) looked for empirical evidence supporting the G-H model.  
They translated equation (1) into an econometric model and then moved import-demand 
elasticity to the left-hand side of equation (1): 
                                                 
13
 See Trefler (1993), p. 155.  
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where γ= [ - αL / (β/ 1-β) + αL ], and δ = [ 1 / (β/ 1-β) + αL ]. 
The authors tested equation (1), using the maximum likelihood method. Both inverse import 
penetration and the lobbying variables were treated as endogenous variables, which were 
explained by the set of determinant variables recommended by Trefler (1993). 
 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) used a data set from 1983 with three-digit SIC87 categories.  
They took the data on import-demand elasticity from Shields et al. (1986). The data on the 
inverse import penetration ratio were taken from the trade and immigration data file of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The data of the remaining variables were taken 
from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Trefler (1993).  To construct a dummy variable 
for political contributions, they used a threshold level of $100,000,000. If the political 
contribution value was higher than that threshold, the dummy variable received a value of one, 
and a value of zero if the political contribution value was lower.  
 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) found empirical evidence supporting  the claim of the 
theoretical G-H model that trade protection patterns in the lobbied industries (called the 
organized sector) differed from those in the industries without lobbying (called the unorganized 
sector).  In the unorganized sector, a higher level of trade protection resulted from a higher level 
of import penetration in the G-H model.  Goldberg and Maggi (1999) did not find opposite 
evidence in the unorganized sector. The estimated parameters, β and αL, were high. This 
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indicated that the United States was oriented toward trade liberalization. Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999) found a small weight of political contributions in the Government objectives function 
( β =0.02). However, they still argued that there was not enough evidence to reject the G-H 
model hypothesis about the impact of lobbying on trade policy. 
 
To determine the consistency of their estimated results, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) 
employed a sensitivity analysis that consisted of (1) testing whether the occurrence of import-
demand elasticity on the left-hand side was a reasonable specification; (2) estimating the model 
with different lobbying dummy variables, based on different threshold levels; (3) investigating 
the change in the coefficients when the political dummy variable was treated as an endogenous 
variable; (4) observing the change in the estimated results with different definitions of dependent 
variables.  They replaced the dependent variable t / (1+t) by only t or by [t / (1+t)] *e * z and 
then estimated the model; (5) analyzing the sensitivity of the estimated results with different 
types of NTB coverage ratios.14 Their findings were robust with regard to all types of sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) emphasized an empirical test of the G-H model.  
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) differed from Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and other 
papers in that they employed intermediate input.15   
 
                                                 
14
 See Trefler(1993), p. 155. There are three types of NTB coverage ratios: the price-oriented NTBs (e.g., variable 
levies or dumping duties), the quantity-oriented NTBs (e.g., quotas or voluntary export restraints), and the threat-
oriented NTBs (e.g., countervailing investigations). 
 
15
 See Proposition 2, page 842 in Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
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Their econometric model was 
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where t was the U.S. nontariff barrier coverage of imports from partner j; z was inverse import 
penetration; e was import-demand elasticity; I was a dummy variable that received a value of one 
if the industry had lobbying; PAC was political contributions; VA was value added; 
INTERMTAR was average tariffs on intermediate goods; INTERMNTB was average NTB 
coverage of intermediate goods; DOWNSTREAMSHR was the percentage of an industry’s 
shipments used as intermediate goods; DOWNSTREAMHERF was “intermediate-goods-output 
buyer concentration”; HERF was the Herfidahl index of firm concentration; XN, XP, XM are the 
sets of control variables . 
 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) used the data from 1983 and the same data source 
as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Trefler (1993). They used 2SLS estimation for the 
simultaneous three-equation system, with the same set of instrumental variables as recommended 
by Trefler (1993). Their estimated results strongly supported the main implications of the G-H 
model.  The estimated coefficients of Z/e and (I*z/e) were negative and positive, respectively, 
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and statistically significant. This showed that import penetration had a positive effect on the 
lobbied industries and a negative effect on the industries without lobbying. The estimated 
coefficients on INTERMTAR and INTERMNTB were both statistically significant and positive. 
This implied that the rate of protection on intermediate goods had a positive effect on the rate of 
protection on final goods. The estimated coefficients of DOWNSTREMSHR and 
DOWNSTREAMHERF were both statistically significant and positive, confirming that lobbying 
competition in downstream industries caused higher lobbying spending.  
 
To determine the consistency of their estimated results, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) carried out sensitivity analysis. First, they investigated the change in the estimated results 
when the econometric model was linear. Second, they estimated the model with separate 
variables: z, I*z/e, 1/e and I*1/e. Finally, they determined whether the estimated results changed 
with different measurements of dependent variable NTB (bilateral NTB and trade data between 
the United States and five developed countries: UK, Japan, Italy, Germany and France). This 
sensitivity analysis showed that their estimated results were robust with the different 
specifications of the model. 
 
3.2.3 Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) 
 
Studies of ERP have been prevalent since the 1960s. In this literature review, I do not 
focus on separate papers related to the theory of ERP, due to the fact that my paper does not 
intend to explore the development of this theory.  Instead, I use ERP as one of the main variables 
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to replace tariffs or the coverage ratio of NTB.  Therefore, I cover general knowledge on ERP, 
what it is and how to measure it. 
We usually know the nominal rate of protection (NRP), which is measured by tariffs on 
final goods or intermediate goods. In general, the tariffs on consumption goods are high, while 
the tariffs on intermediate goods are low (and sometimes, zero).  The ERP deals with the tariff 
structure that includes tariffs on both final goods and intermediate goods. It is defined as the 
percentage by which a country’s trade barriers increase the value added per unit of output 
(Corden, 1966, p.222). 
 
Cordern (1966) recommended the ERP’s calculations.  First, he considered the one-input 
model.  In free trade (no trade barriers) the value added per unit of output m (Vm) is measured by  
Vm = Pm – Cm = Pm (1-anm),         (7) 
where Pm is the price per unit of output m; Cm is the cost per unit of output m and; anm is the 
share of input n in cost per of output m. 
If tariffs are imposed on output and input, the value added V’m is  
V’m = Pm [(1+tm) – anm (1 + tn)],        (8) 
Where tn is the tariff rate on input n; and tm is the tariff rate on output m. 
The ERPm is measured by (Corden, 1966, p.222, eq.4) 
ERPm = (V’m  -  Vm ) / Vm  = ( tm  - anm tn ) / (1 – anm ) = 
nm
nmnm
m
a
att
t
−
−
+
1
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   (9)  
From equation 9, we have: 
1. If tn = tm, then ERPm = tn = tm. If the input and output tariffs are the same, the ERP is the 
same as the output tariffs. 
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2. If tn  > tm, then ERPm < tm < tn. If the input tariffs are higher than the output tariffs, the 
ERP is lower than the output tariffs. 
3. If tn < tm, then ERPm > tm > tn. If the input tariffs are lower than the output tariffs, the 
ERP is higher than the output tariffs. 
Next, he considered multiple input models with n inputs. ERP is calculated by the following 
formula (Balassa, 1965, p. 577, eq. 1 and Corden, 1966, p.223, eq.4.2) 
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The literature review shows that most papers use NRP (tariffs or nontariffs). The question 
is whether the theory of endogenous protection is right when trade protection is measured by 
ERP. Therefore, my research emphasizes empirically testing the theory of endogenous protection 
by using ERP as the representative variable for trade protection.  When testing the G-H model, 
most authors use the U.S. coverage ratio of nontariff barriers instead of the U.S. tariff rate, 
because the U.S. tariff rate is so low that it would have considerable influence on the estimated 
results. The definition of ERP shows that if input tariffs are lower than output tariffs, ERP is 
higher than output tariffs.  The statistical data provide evidence that developed countries, such as 
the United States, Japan and others, impose higher tariff rates on consumption goods than on 
intermediate goods, and this leads to a high ERP for the producers. Therefore, employing ERP in 
empirical tests of the theory of endogenous protection might bring interesting results. 
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Considering the econometric side, most papers, starting from Trefler (1993), have 
constructed econometric models in which tariffs (in practice the authors use nontariff barriers) 
and also import penetration are treated as endogenous variables.  They have found strong 
evidence to support the G-H model. But to my knowledge, no papers have provided sufficient 
evidence for the validity of their instruments, and their estimated results will be biased if their 
instruments are weak or not exogenous.  
 
Furthermore, almost all papers have used data from 1983 with three-digit SIC87 
categories.  Because the variables are not classified in the same industry code, the number of 
observations in the final data set, after matching all classifications of different variables, will be 
narrowed and will yield a small sample. I am not aware of any papers in this field with data sets 
constructed as panel data. In addition, U.S. trade policy has changed considerably since 1983. 
Therefore, using data only from 1983 does not cover sufficient information about U.S. trade 
policy, the relationship between U.S. trade protection and U.S. import penetration, as well as the 
impacts of other determinants on U.S. trade protection.   
 
For these reasons, my paper uses the data set from 1997 to 2001, with 4 digit-SIC87 
code, to test the G-H model, by applying the simultaneous three-equation system with trade 
protection measured by the ERP.  
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3.3 METHODLOGY 
 
My econometric model borrows the method of the simultaneous three-equation system of 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). I use the simultaneous three-equation system to test the 
G-H model for the data set, which is classified in four-digit SIC87 categories and covers the time 
period of 1997-2001. The first equation is the trade protection equation (ERP equation); the 
second is the import equation; the third is the lobbying equation (PAC equation).  
 
The NTB equation investigates the impact of import penetration on trade protection.  The 
construction of this equation is based on the specifications of the G-H model. Therefore, it 
includes three main independent variables: import penetration, import-demand elasticity and 
political contributions. The two main variables in the NTB equation must be (z /e) and [PAC * 
(z/e)]. The choice of a dependent variable to proxy for trade protection is one feature that 
distinguishes my model from other published models. Instead of using NTB, as previous studies 
have, I use ERP to proxy for trade protection. Therefore, the dependent variable in my first 
equation is ERP. The two right-hand side endogenous variables are (1) import penetration, scaled 
by import-demand elasticity (z/e), and (2) the product of lobbying spending and import 
penetration, scaled by import-demand elasticity [PAC * (z/e)].   
 
The other feature that distinguishes my model from previous ones is the construction of 
the political variable. While Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) used dummy political variables, I use lobbying spending, due to difficulty in choosing the 
threshold level.  Following Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Trefler (1993), my 
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determinant set for trade protection includes the seller concentration ratio (SCR4), the 
geographical concentration index (GCR), the industry scale (SCALE), the percentage of 
employees covered by unions (UNION) and the size of employment (EMPSIZE). In my data set, 
the industry scale variable (SCALE) is measured by the number of plants scaled by the number 
of companies, while Trefler (1993) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) use the variable 
SCALE defined as the added value, scaled by the number of companies. Following Bohara and 
Kaempfer (1991), I have placed macroeconomic variables, such as the growth rate of GDP or 
trade balance, in the set of control variables. Finally, I use the size of capital stock as a control 
variable in the NTB equation, instead of using capital stock, as recommended by Trefler (1993), 
because we need to control the size of companies when investigating the impact of import 
penetration on trade protection in the lobbied industries. Two main specifications of company 
size are employment size and the size of capital stock. Therefore, I utilize both employment size 
and the size of capital stock in the first equation, instead of following Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Trefler (1993).     
 
My second equation is the import equation that investigates the impact of trade protection 
on import penetration. A higher level of trade protection is expected to a lower level of import 
penetration. The dependent variable in the import equation is U.S. import penetration, which is 
classified by four-digit SIC87 categories. A right-side endogenous variable is the ERP scaled by 
import-demand elasticity.  This differs from the approach of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000). They investigated only the impact of trade protection on import penetration, ignoring 
import-demand elasticity, while I observe the joint effect of trade protection and import-demand 
elasticity on import penetration. This makes the second equation match up with the first equation 
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in constructing the right-hand side endogenous variable.  The set of determinant variables in the 
import equation is based on Trefler (1993), who used the factor shares: labor share 
(LABSHARE), capital share (CAPSHARE) and inventory share (INVENSHARE).  I do not 
include the share of land and the share of subsoil in this equation, due to limitations of the data 
source. In addition, Trefler (1993) showed the insignificant effect of those factors on import 
penetration.  Trade balance may have an impact on import penetration, based on the logic that a 
higher level of trade protection leads to a lower level of import penetration when the trade 
balance is low. Therefore, I regard trade balance as a control factor when observing the effect of 
trade protection on import penetration. 
The third equation is the lobbying equation, which presents the response of political 
spending to the dead-weight loss from trade protection. In the G-H model, a level of trade 
protection results from maximizing the objectives function, which is a weighted sum of political 
contributions and social welfare. The marginal impact of political contributions on trade 
protection will be reduced when trade protection reaches a high level accompanying a low level 
of import penetration.  Therefore, lobbying spending will decrease when the level of trade 
protection is high. Of course, two main right-side variables are ERP and import penetration.  
Since the first two equations investigate the two-way impact between trade protection and import 
penetration, both trade protection and import penetration must appear simultaneously in the third 
equation, thus ensuring the logic of the whole equation system. That is why the coefficients of 
the two variables in the third equation must have opposite signs. My third equation is different 
from that of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) in that I do not use the logarithm form. This is 
because lobbying spending data has negative numbers (when lobbying spending is refunded) and 
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import-demand elasticity has a negative number.16  I borrow from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) to use lobbying spending scaled by the added value (PAC/VA) as the dependent variable. 
The difference lies in the way the two right-side endogenous variables are constructed. While 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) used only nontariff barriers and the import penetration, I 
scale these variables by import-demand elasticity.  This method allows me to investigate the 
response of political contributions to the joint effects of trade protection and import-demand 
elasticity, as well as to the response of political contributions to the joint effects of import 
penetration and import-demand elasticity. In addition, this structure allows the third equation to 
match up with the first two equations.  From the first equation, if PAC is moved to the left side, 
then the right side must be the product of ERP and import-demand elasticity (ERP * e).  
Similarly, If PAC appears on the left side, the right side must be the product of import-demand 
elasticity and import penetration [e * (1/ z)]. I borrow from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2002) the use of the Herfindahl index as a control variable in this equation. I also employ level 
of unionization as a control variable in this equation, because a high level of unionization leads 
to higher lobbying spending.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) considered the positive value of import-demand elasticity as the “wrong sign”(p. 
1149). They used sensitivity analysis, which replaced the positive value of import-demand elasticity with a veru 
small negative value. This conflicts with the study of Gawande (2000) that uses the logarithm of import-demand 
elasticity.  
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My econometric model is 
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The definitions and notations of all the variables in my econometric model are described in the 
next part.  
 
3.4. PRIMARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
3.4.1. The Data 
 
I use a panel data set covering the time period 1997-2001 and aggregating up to four-digit 
SIC87 categories.   The panel data set cannot be further prolonged, since many variables in the 
sample set are only available from 1997.  
Three left-hand side endogenous variables are ERP, import penetration (1/z) and political 
contributions scaled by the added value (PAC/VA).  Two right-hand side endogenous variables 
of equation (11) are inverse-import penetration, scaled by import-demand elasticity (z/e), and the 
product of political contributions and inverse import penetration, scaled by import-demand 
elasticity [PAC* (z/e)].  The right-hand side endogenous variable of equation (12) is the product 
of ERP and import-demand elasticity (ERP * e).  Two right-hand side endogenous variables of 
equation (13) are (1) the product of ERP and import-demand elasticity (ERP * e) and (2) the 
product of import-demand elasticity and import penetration [e*(1/z)]. The set of determinants 
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(XE) in equation (11) includes the geographical concentration ratio (GCR), the seller 
concentration ratio (SCR4), the industry scale (SCALE), employment size (EMPSIZE), the size 
of capital stock (CAPSIZE), the union coverage percentage (UNION) and the growth rate of 
GDP (GROW). The set of determinants (XM) in equation (12) contains labor share 
(LABSHARE), inventory share (INVENSHARE), capital share (CAPSHARE) and trade balance 
(TRABALANCE). The set of determinants in equation (13) consists of the Herfindahl  index 
(HHindex) and the union coverage percentage (UNION). 
 
ERP is estimated by equation (10). The data on tariffs are sourced from United States 
tariff data set of Romanlis, classified by the ten-digit harmonized tariff schedule of the United 
States (HTS) for the time period 1989 – 2001 (Feenstra, Romalis, and Scott 2002). The data on 
the input-output coefficients for the time period 1997 – 2001 are taken from the BEA. These 
input-output coefficient data are classified by the input-output code (I-O). This code can be 
transformed into the HTS code, SIC87 code or North American Industrial Classification System 
Code (NAICS) by the SIC87–IO, HTS–IO and NAICS97-IO concordance provided by the BEA. 
 
Import penetration is equal to import value scaled by total shipment value. The data on 
U.S. import values are taken from the U.S. import and export data of Robert Freenstra at the 
Center for International Data at University of California. The data descriptions are discussed in 
NBER Working paper # 9387 (Freenstra, Romanlis, & Scott 2002). This data set provides the 
U.S. import data for the time period 1972 – 2006 at four-digit SIC87 categories. The data on total 
shipment value covering the time period 1992 – 2006 were taken from NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry Database of Becker and Gray.  This database also provides the data on 
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physical capital, labor, employment size, added value, total shipment value, inventory and 
material cost. The data cover the time period 1992 – 2006 and are classified by two, three, or 
four-digit SIC87 categories as well as six-digit NAICS 97 categories and are classified into two, 
three and four-digit SIC87 categories and six-digit NAICS97 categories. 
 
The data on import elasticity are provided by William R. Hauk (Haulk 2006).  The data 
are only for the year of 1997 and are classified into ten-digit HTS categories as well as six-digit 
NAICS 97 categories.  
 
The data on political contributions (PAC) are sourced from the Center for Responsive 
Politics. They cover the period of 1989 – 2008 and are classified in their own code.  Chris Magee 
has translated this code into SIC87 categories. This concordance is discussed in Beaulieu and 
Magee (2004). 
 
The seller concentration ratio of the four biggest firms and the Herfindahl index of firm 
concentration are taken from U.S. Census Bureau. The data are only for the year 1997. For this 
reason, I use the product between Herfindahl index and years.    
 
The geographic concentration index is calculated by equation (Trefler, 1993, p. 157) 
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where VAij is the added value of industry i at state j, and POPj is the population of state j. The 
data on population are taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The data on the level of 
unionization are sourced from the Union Membership and Coverage database of CPS. They are 
classified by the Census Industry Code (CIC). The concordance between the CIC code and the 
three-digit SIC87 categories is taken from the CPS. Hirsch & Macpherson (2003) describe this 
data set.  
 
The macroeconomic variables such as GROW and TRABALANCE are taken from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. The data are classified not by the 
industrial code, but by years.  TRABALANCE is measured by the export value minus the import 
value.  
 
Table 3.1 displays the definitions and notations of all variables.  The variables (z, z/e, 
PAC*(z/e), SCR4 and HHINDEX are scaled by 103, 103, 103, 106 and 106, respectively. 
PAC_VA is multiplied by 106. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the basic statistics of all variables, including mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, standard deviation and the number of observations. The statistics are based 
on a sample set with 965 observations covering 193 four-digit SIC87 industries over the time 
period 1997 – 2001.  
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Table 3.1: The Definition of All Variables 
Variable Definition Measurement 
ERP Effective rate of protection  (The formula of 
calculation is based on equation (13)  
 
1/z Import penetration =  shipment value / import value  
z Inverse import penetration = 1/ import penetration Scaled by 103 
PAC/VA Political contributions / added value Multiply with 
106 
e Import-demand elasticity  
z/e Inverse import penetration / import-demand elasticity Scaled by 103 
PAC * (z/e) Political contributions * ( inverse import penetration / 
import-demand elasticity) 
Scaled by 103 
(1/z) * e Import penetration * import-demand elasticity   
ERP * e Effective rate of protection * import-demand elasticity  
SCR4 Seller concentration ratio Scaled by 106 
GCR Geographical concentration ratio ( calculated by 
equation 17) 
 
SCALE Industry scale =  shipment value / number of 
companies 
 
EMPSIZE Number of employee / number of companies  
CAPSIZE Capital stock / number of companies  
UNION Percentage covered by union  
GROW The grow rate of GDP  
CAPSHARE Capital share = capital stock / shipment value  
INVENSHARE Inventory share = inventory / shipment value  
LABSHARE Labor share = payroll / shipment share  
TRABALANCE Export value – import value  
HHINDEX Herfindahl index of firm concentration Scaled by  106 
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Table 3.2: The Statistical Summary of All Variables 
Variable  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
           
Obs 
1 z/e -0.02991 -0.00434 -8.36E-06 -5.67224  0.216864  955 
2 PAC * (z/e) -0.00575 -3.54E-05  1.10E-05 -1.04454  0.058550  624 
3 PAC_VA  27.60927  2.764012  1326.638 -0.49603  105.5255  624 
4 ERP  0.048383  0.025471  1.504735 -1.65933  0.121529  927 
5 ERP * e -0.10575 -0.03236  2.235844 -11.3799  0.438886  927 
6 (1/z) * e -1.14554 -0.23068 -0.00018 -119.665  6.500305  955 
7 GCR  0.497879  0.511238  0.780388  0.204364  0.084187  965 
8 GROW  2.378200  3.012000  3.297000 -0.255  1.345948  965 
9 SCR4  0.052406  0.052202  0.092246  0.017973  0.017415  965 
10 SCALE  24.53746  9.185185  363.3540  0.008948  43.43178  955 
11 UNION  15.73710  13.70000  47.70000  0.700000  8.987071  965 
12 INVENSHARE  0.134498  0.124975  0.492420  0.016803  0.063629  955 
13 CAPSHARE  0.036047  0.030763  0.213650  0.003459  0.023009  955 
14 LABSHARE  0.099681  0.099199  0.416736  0.010289  0.049408  955 
15 EMPSIZE  0.106426  0.048340  1.670000  6.32E-05  0.195608  955 
16 CAPSIZE  15.80291  3.692296  277.1469  0.002399  33.77545  955 
17 TRABALANCE -0.9042 -0.10535  28.30898 -103.241  7.001850  965 
18 HHINDEX 0.646359   0.683858  1.326663  0.070095  0.331724  965 
 
The average ERP is 4.8%. The maximum ERP is 150.4% and the minimum ERP is -
165.9%. The four-digit SIC87 industries that have ERPs higher than zero and lower than 10% 
account for approximately 67% of the total industries. Around 12.7 % of four-digit SIC87 
industries have ERPs that are higher than 10%, but lower than 50%. Around 4.8% of four-digit 
SIC87 industries have ERPs that are higher than 50% and lower than 100%. Approximately 4% 
of four-digit SIC87 industries have ERPs that are higher than 100%. However, only about 4% of 
four-digit SIC87 industries have ERPs that are less than zero. Figure 3.1 displays the distribution 
of the ERPs of U.S. four-digit SIC87 industries over the time period 1997 – 2001. In summary, 
we can say that the ERP of the United States is small.  
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Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of the average MFN tariffs for about 1200 8-digit 
HTS industries with approximately 6000 observations. The maximum average MFN tariffs are 
461.9% and the minimum average is 0%.  Industries that have average MFN tariffs higher than 
zero and lower than 10% account for approximately 71.7% of the total industries. About 11.6 % 
of 8-digit HTS industries have average MFN tariffs that are higher than 10%, but lower than 
50%. Around 1.3% of 8-digit HTS industries have average MFN tariffs that are higher than 50% 
and lower than 100%. Approximately 2% of 8-digit HTS industries have average MFN tariffs 
that are higher than 100%. In summary, we can say that the average MFN tariffs of the United 
States are low. 
 
Figure 3.3 exhibits the distribution of PAC and also reports PAC statistics. The average 
PAC expenditures per each four-digit SIC87 industry is $70,559, while the maximum 
expenditure reaches $2,665,600. Figure 3 displays the distribution of PAC expenditures. About 
47% of four-digit SIC87 industries pay PAC expenditures less than or equal to $5,000. About 14 
% of four-digit SIC87 industries pay PAC expenditures less than or equal to $10,000, but more 
than $5,000. The average percentage of four-digit SIC87 industries that are covered by 
unionization is about 15%. The maximum is about 47%, while the minimum is around 0.7%.  
 
The data on PAC are smaller than the data on firm lobbying, which are taken from Center 
for Responsive Politics. These data are from 1998 up to now and are organized into 9 categories 
of industries. It is very difficult to find the specific lobbying expenditures for each four-digit 
SIC87 industry within those 9 categories. On the other hand, my data set is from 1997-2000. 
Therefore, I am unable to apply this data to my dissertation at the present. Using the political 
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expenditures by PAC may underestimate the weight of lobbying in the government objective 
function. This is a limitation of this study and requires further studies.  
 
Figure 3.1: The Distribution of ERP 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Distribution of Average MFN tariffs 
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Figure 3.3: The Distribution of PAC 
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***, respectively. Because 3SLS estimation is more effective than 2SLS estimation, I only 
discuss the estimated results from 3SLS estimation in this section. 
 
Table 3.3: 2SLS Estimation of Three Simultaneous Equation Systems 
 
Independent 
equation 
No standardized Beta Coefficient 
Dependent variable 
Standardized Beta Coefficient 
Dependent variable 
ERP 
equation 
(ERP) 
Import 
equation 
(1/z) 
Lobbying 
Equation 
(PAC/VA) 
ERP 
equation 
(ERP) 
Import 
equation 
(1/z) 
Lobbying 
Equation 
(PAC/VA) 
z/e -1.6098** 
(0.7310) 
  -2.8655** 
(1.3012) 
  
Pac * (z/e) 8.6609** 
(4.0380) 
  4.1726** 
(1.9454) 
  
(1/z) * e   17.976** 
(7.865) 
  1.1073** 
(0.4845) 
ERP * e  -4.796*** 
(1.187) 
-227.362** 
(97.58) 
 -2.0711*** 
(0.5126) 
-0.9456** 
(0.4058) 
SCR4 -1.0017 
(0.7380) 
  -0.1435 
(0.1058) 
  
GCR -0.0723 
(0.1420) 
  -0.0501 
(0.0984) 
  
SCALE -0.0007 
(0.0005) 
  -0.2641 
(0.1787) 
  
EMPSIZE 0.297 
(0.2110) 
  0.4789 
(0.3396) 
  
CAPSIZE -0.0005 
(0.0005) 
  -0.1295 
(0.1390) 
  
UNION -0.0022 
(0.0020) 
 0.714 
(0.825) 
-0.1645 
(0.1479) 
 0.0440 
(0.0508) 
GROW -0.0055 
(0.0080) 
  -0.0607 
(0.0886) 
  
CAPSHARE  2.006 
(3.713) 
  0.0454 
(0.0841) 
 
INVENTSHARE  3.228** 
(1.271) 
  0.0202** 
(0.0080) 
 
LABSHARE  2.589** 
(1.081) 
  0.1259** 
(0.0526) 
 
TRABALANCE  -0.037*** 
(0.010) 
  -0.2549*** 
(0.0689) 
 
HHINDEX   -11.895 
(24.201) 
  -0.0374 
(0.0761) 
Note: 
* = 0.1 significant level; ** = 0.05 significant level; and *** = 0.01 significant level 
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Table 3.4: 3SLS Estimation of Three Simultaneous Equation Systems 
 
Independent  
equation 
No Standardized Beta Coefficient Standardized Beta Coefficient 
ERP 
equation 
(ERP) 
Import 
equation 
(1/z) 
Lobby 
equation 
(PAC/VA) 
ERP 
equation 
(ERP) 
Import 
equation 
(1/z) 
Lobby 
equation 
(PAC/VA) 
z/e -1.555** 
(0.717) 
  -2.7679** 
(1.2763) 
  
PAC * (z/e) 8.216** 
(3.955) 
  3.9583** 
(1.9054) 
  
(1/z) * e   20.275** 
(7.619) 
  1.2489** 
(0.4693) 
ERP * e  -4.993*** 
(1.149) 
-262.586** 
(95.338) 
 -2.156*** 
(0.4962) 
-1.0921** 
(0.3965) 
SCR4 -0.892 
(0.715) 
  -0.1278 
(0.1025) 
  
GCR -0.110 
(0.138) 
  -0.0762 
(0.0956) 
  
SCALE -0.0006 
(0.0005) 
  -0.2144 
(0.1787) 
  
EMPSIZE 0.256 
(0.207) 
  -0.4120 
(0.3332) 
  
CAPSIZE -0.0003 
(0.0004) 
  -0.0862 
(0.1112) 
  
UNION -0.0022 
(0.002) 
 0.701 
(0.746) 
-0.1627 
(0.1479) 
 0.0432 
(0.0460) 
GROW -0.0067 
(0.0076) 
  -0.0742 
(0.0842) 
  
CAPSHARE  2.003 
(3.311) 
  0.0454 
(0.0750) 
 
INVENTSHARE  3.313** 
(1.159) 
  0.0207** 
(0.0073) 
 
LABSHARE  3.064** 
(1.009) 
  0.1490** 
(0.0491) 
 
TRABALANCE  -0.030*** 
(0.010) 
  -0.2067*** 
(0.0689) 
 
HHINDEX   -18.748 
(22.161) 
  -0.0589 
(0.0697) 
Note: 
* = 0.1 significant level; ** = 0.05 significant level; and *** = 0.01 significant level 
 
The estimated results from equation (11) provide evidence to support the G-H model. The 
coefficient of inverse import penetration scaled by import-demand elasticity (z/e) is negative and 
statistically significant, while the coefficient of the product between political contributions and 
inverse import penetration scaled by import-demand elasticity (PAC * (z/e)) is positive and 
statistically significant.  The coefficients of (z/e) and [PAC * (z/e)] are -1.555 and 8.216, 
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respectively, while the standardized beta coefficients of (z/e) and [PAC * (z/e)] are              -
2.7679 and 3.9583, respectively, and significant at the 0.05 level. If inverse import penetration 
were to increase by one standard deviation, lobbying causes trade protection increase by 3.9583 
standard deviations. Without lobbying, if inverse import penetration were to increase one 
standard deviation, trade protection would decline by 2.7679 standard deviations. This implies 
that inverse import penetration has a positive effect on trade protection in the lobbied industries 
and has a negative effect on trade protection in the industries without lobbying.  Therefore, my 
estimated results support the findings of Trefler (1993), Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). However, Trefler did not find a statistically significant 
coefficient on import penetration. The gap between my estimated results and the estimated 
results of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) partly results 
from the fact that I do not construct the PAC variable as a dummy variable. If the PAC variable 
were constructed as a dummy variable, the different levels of the threshold would create different 
dummy variables. Therefore, the estimated results might be affected by the choice of the 
threshold level.  Because previous studies used only data from 1983, the chosen threshold level 
displays the political context of only that year. There is no guarantee that this political feature 
repeats in following years. In practice, politics change from decade to decade and from year to 
year. Therefore, a reasonable threshold level cannot be drawn from my PAC data, which are 
constructed as panel data covering the time period 1997 – 2001.  
 
In addition, because the absolute value of the standardized beta coefficient of [PAC * 
(z/e)] is higher than that of (z/e), lobbying causes inverse import penetration to have a stronger 
influence on trade protection. This is because the offset of the impact of inverse import 
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penetration on trade protection, between lobbied industries and industries without lobbying, will 
be positive.  Furthermore, my estimated results also support the quantitative implications of the 
G-H model. First, the sum of the coefficients of (z/e) and [PAC* (z/e)] is positive. Because z is 
scaled by 103, (z/e) is scaled by 103 and [PAC * (z/e)] is scaled by 103, the estimated values of γ 
and δ in original units are -1.555 10-3 and 8.216 10-3. The sum of coefficients on (z/e) and 
[PAC*(z/e)] = (-1.555 10-3 + 8.216 10-3) = 6.661 10-3 > 0. From equation (3), we can calculate 
the relative weight that the Government places on welfare relative to lobbying expenditure (β): 
δγ
γ
β
++
+
=
1
1
            (15)                                                                                                                         
                           
,
           
where δ is the coefficient of [PAC * (z/e)] and γ is the coefficient of (z/e).  Appendix A provides 
the details on how to get equation (15). Pluging in the original values of δ and γ and we have                               
β = (-1.555 10-3 +1)/ (1 -1.555 10-3 + 8.216 10-3) =0.991838362. The Government objectives 
function is  
∑
∈
+=
n
Li
iPACWG 008.0  992.0  
                                                           
.
       
I apply the Delta method to calculate the standard error of β. These calculations are 
presented in Appendix B. The standard error of β is 3.902583 10-3. I am concerned about 
whether the United States is pure welfare or not. Therefore we need to test the null hypothesis is 
H0: β = 1 versus the alternative H1: β < 1   
The test statistic is 0971337227.2
003902583.0
1991844274.01
−=
−
=
−
=
σ
β
t     (16) 
This result rejects the null hypothesis that β is equal to 1, suggesting that trade protection in the 
United States is affected by lobbying.  However, the share of lobbying in the Government 
objectives is very small (0.008), and thus lobbying has weak effects on trade protection. My 
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result is close to the findings of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) that the weight of welfare in the 
Government’s objectives is 0.98, while the weight of lobbying in the Government‘s objectives is 
only 0.02. However, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) refuse to draw the conclusion that the United 
States is pure welfare. My estimated result is different from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) that the Government places weight on total net welfare (gross welfare less political 
contributions) to be equal to the weight on total lobbying spending.  
 
I am not aware of any theoretical models before the G-M model that presented the 
political impact on trade protection through the PAC variable, as in the G-H model. Therefore, 
prior studies have used control variables (called organized variables by Trefler (1993)), such as 
SCR4, GCR, UNION, EMPSIZE and others, to proxy the political impact, as seen in the model 
structures of Trefler (1993) and others.  After the G-H model was introduced, the impact of 
political contributions on trade protection was not necessarily interpreted through those 
organized variables. However, I still discuss the impact of these control variables.  
 
In equation (11), the coefficient sign of the seller concentration ratio is -0.892, which is 
not positive as expected. According to Trefler (1993), when seller concentration is small, the 
free-rider problem will be an obstacle to lobbying and trade protection will be small. The 
coefficient of the seller concentration ratio is negative and not statistically significant, supporting 
the findings of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).  The coefficients of SCALE, CAPSIZE 
and GROW are -0.0006, -0.0003 and -0.0067. They are negative as expected, but not statistically 
significant. The demand for trade protection decreases when the firms have a large scale and a 
high level of capital stock or high growth rate of GDP. This is because a high level of scale and 
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capital stock and a high growth rate of GDP create large obstacles to the entry of rivals into the 
market.   When employment size is high, the demand to be protected from the risk of 
unemployment will increase. The coefficient of employment size is 0.256, which supports this 
idea.  The coefficient of the level of unionization is negative (-0.002) and not statistically 
significant, supporting the findings of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). It can be explained 
by the fact of that when the percentage covered by unionization increases under the condition of 
a low initial level of import penetration, the demand for trade protection does not increase.  
 
The standardized beta coefficients of SCR4, GCR, SCALE, EMPSIZE, CAPSIZE 
UNION and GROW are -0.1278, -0.0762, -0.2144, -0.4120, -0.0862, -0.1627, and -0.0742, 
respectively. The impact level of those variables on trade protection follows the ordering: 
EMPSIZE > SCALE > UNION > SCR4 > CAPSIZE > GCR > GROW. This shows that 
employment size, scale of the firms and the level of unionization play important roles in trade 
policy, when we consider the impact of inverse imports penetration on trade policy.  The 
coefficients of the control variables in the ERP equation are not statistically significant, a result 
seen in some previous studies. One of the reasons is the omitted variables or the correlations 
between the control variables. Table 3.5 reports the correlation between the control variables. For 
example, the high correlation between SCALE and EMPSIZE, SCALE and CAPSIZE and 
CAPSIZE and EMPSIZE are 0.851, 0.688 and 0.722, respectively.   
 
My estimated results from equation (12) strongly affirm the logic that trade protection 
leads to a decline in import penetration. The standardized beta coefficient of (ERP*e) is -2.156, 
with a 0.001 significance level. If trade protection increases by one standard deviation, import 
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penetration decreases by 2.156 standard deviations. Compared with equation (11), the absolute 
value of the standardized beta coefficient of (ERP * e) is less than that of (z/e) and of [PAC* 
(z/e)]. This implies that import penetration has more impact on trade protection than trade 
protection has on import penetration.   
 
The coefficients of the share of factors in equation (12) are positive and statistically 
significant, except for the coefficient of capital share. The standardized beta coefficients of 
CAPSHARE, INVENSHARE and LABSHARE are 0.0454, 0.0207, and 0.149, respectively. The 
coefficient of LABSHARE is positive and significant at 0.05 levels, which supports the findings 
of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). This shows that labor is a source of comparative 
disadvantage for the United States in general. Due to lack of data, I did not investigate the impact 
of occupation as Trefler (1993) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2002) did. This is a 
limitation of my research that requires further study. 
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It is interesting that Trefler (1993) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) can show 
the concrete source of the U.S. comparative disadvantage:  engineers, scientists and unskilled 
workers.  The coefficient on CAPSHARE has a positive sign, which conflicts with the findings 
of Trefler (1993). However, it is not statistically significant, so we cannot conclude that capital 
stock is a source of the U.S. comparative disadvantage. Since Trefler shows the insignificant 
impact of land and subsoil on import penetration, I did not employ these factors in my 
econometric model.  One difference from previous studies is my finding about the impact of 
trade balance on import penetration: The coefficient of trade balance is -0.2067 and statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level.  This shows the automatically self-adjusting mechanism of the 
economy. A higher trade balance creates motivation to accelerate import-substituting production 
that leads to a decline in imports. Since the standardized beta coefficient of TRABALANCE has 
a higher absolute value than those of LABSHARE, CAPSHARE and INVENSHARE, the trade 
balance surplus will serve as a tool to replace the trade barriers. Therefore, export promotion 
needs to be emphasized in order to keep the trade balance at a surplus.  
 
Finally, I consider equation (13). The standardized beta coefficients of [e*(1/z)] and    
(ERP * e) are 1.248 and -1.0921, respectively, and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
This can be interpreted to mean that one standard deviation increase in (ERP * e) leads to an 
increase of 1.2489 standard deviations in the PAC_VA. This estimated result provides a 
successful test of the implications drawn from the first two equations, since the coefficients of 
[e*(1/z)] and (ERP * e) have opposite signs—an increase in trade protection is accompanied by a 
decrease in import penetration—but the  absolute value of the two coefficients is close.  This 
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result also shows the interaction mechanism of import penetration and trade protection on the 
adjustment of political contributions.  A decrease in trade protection leads to an increase in 
import penetration. But an increase in import penetration turns out to cause the demand for trade 
protection to increase. This forces the owners of specific factories to pay more money for 
lobbying, in the hope of stepping up trade protection in order to reduce the risk of unemployment 
and unprofitable business. Two control variables are UNION and HHindex. Their coefficients 
are 0.701 and -18.748 and are not statistically significant. The coefficient on UNION is expected. 
A higher level of unionization provides a greater amount of lobbying expenditure.  The 
coefficient of the seller concentration ratio (HHindex) is negative and unexpected. The logic of 
this relationship must be as follows: when the seller concentration is small, lobbying is restricted 
by the free rider problem, so spending for lobbying is also small.  
 
Table 3.6 reports the empirical tests of the validity of the instruments. The results show 
that my chosen instruments are valid.  I do not repeat the theoretical description of each test since 
they were presented in the first chapter. 
 
The Wu-Hausman test17 for endogeneity checks whether variables such as (z/e), [PAC* 
z/e], (ERP* e) and (e/z) are endogenous and need to be instrumented. The null hypothesis 
indicates that there is no correlation between the dependent variable in the structural equation 
and the residuals collected from the first-stage regression of the tested variable on all 
instruments.  In the ERP equation, the joint test of (z/e) and [PAC* (z/e)] reports the F-statistic = 
                                                 
17
 Detailed descriptions of the endogeneity test, the weak instrument test and the Sargan test are given in Chapters 5 
and 6 of Wooldridge (2002). 
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6.758 and p-value = 0.0013. This result provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis. It means 
that in the first equation, (z/e) and [PAC*(z/e)] need to be instrumented.  In the import equation, 
the test of variable (ERP * e) gives an F-statistic = 82.336 and p-value = 0.000. This result 
allows us to reject the null hypothesis. We can say that (ERP*e) is the endogenous variable.  In 
the lobbying equation, the joint test of (ERP *e) and (e/z) provides an F-statistic = 5.270 and              
p-value = 0.0054. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and (ERP*e) and (e/z) need to be 
instrumented.  
 
The next test is the weak instrument test.18 An instrument is considered weak when the 
partial correlation with the right-hand side endogenous variable is small.  For the endogenous 
variable (z/e), Table 3.6 (Appendix 1) reports the F-statistic = 6.3590 and p-value = 0.000. So, 
we have some reason to believe that all instruments for (z/e) are not weak.  For the endogenous 
variable [PAC *z/e], the F-statistic = 4.155 and p-value = 0.001.  
 
These results suggest that all instruments for [PAC * z/e] are not weak. For the 
endogenous variable (e/z), F-statistics = 4.569 and p-value = 0.000. This result provides evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the instruments are not weak. For the endogenous variable (ERP * 
e), the F-statistic = 2.278 and p-value = 0.0204. This result provides evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the instruments are not weak. The test for weak instruments of the simultaneous 
equation system in the panel data set has not been studied as sufficiently as in the single 
equation. We did not know the threshold level of the F-statistic that leads to limitation.   
 
                                                 
18
 Detailed descriptions of the endogeneity test, the weak instrument test and the Sargan test are given in Chapters 5 
and 6 of Wooldridge (2002). 
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Table 3.6: Tests for Validity of Instruments  
 
Test of Weak Instrument 
Hypothesis H0 : Some  instruments are weak 
Reject H0, then all instruments are not weak 
 
Tested variable Statistics 
First stage regression of z/e:  Joint test of all 
instruments 
 
First stage regression of PAC* z/e:  Joint test of 
all instruments 
 
First stage regression of  (1/z) * e:  Joint test of 
all instruments 
 
First stage regression of ERP * e:  Joint test of all 
instruments 
F (6, 942) = 6.3590  
p-value = 0.000 
 
F (5, 611) = 4.155  
p-value = 0.001 
 
F (10, 942) = 4.569  
p-value = 0.000 
 
F(8,904) = 2.278  
p-value = 0.0204 
 
Endogeneity Test by WU Hausman Test 
Hypothesis H0: No correlation between dependent variable in the structural equation 
and the residuals that is collected from first stage regression of the tested variable on all 
instruments  
Reject H0, there is correlation and the tested variable need to be instrumented 
 
Equation The tested variable Statistic 
1 z/e  , PAC* (z/e) F (2, 578) = 6.758 & p-value = 0.0013 
 
2 ERP * e F(1, 910) = 82.336 & p-value = 0.000 
 
3 ERP * e, (1/z) * e F (2, 583) = 5.270 & p-value = 0.0054 
 
 
Sargan Test: (overidentificatio test of all instruments):                            
Hypothesis H0:  overidentification restriction is valid. The instruments are valid. 
Reject H0: there some instruments are not exogenous. 
 
Equation Statistics 
1 Sargan test statistic: 4.379       ,      P-value = 0.2234 
2 Sargan test statistic: 6.697       ,      P-value = 0.461 
3 Sargan test statistic: 9.704       ,      P-value = 0.2864 
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The final test is the Sargan test.19 The null hypothesis of this test is that the 
overidentification is valid or all instruments are valid. The Sargan test statistic = 4.379 and p-
value = 0.2234 for equation (1) are reported in Table 3.6. This result gives some reason to 
believe that all instruments excluded from the first equation are valid.  While the Sargan test 
statistic = 6.697 and p-value = 0.461 for the import equation, it is 9.704, and p-value = 0.2864,  
 
for the lobbying equation. This result reveals that all instruments excluded from both the import 
equation and the lobbying equation are valid.  
 
3.4.3 Robustness Check 
 
In this part of the model, I check the robustness of my estimated results (Table 3.7). I 
observe the change in the coefficients of variables when import-demand elasticity is moved to 
the left-hand side of the ERP equation. The coefficients of the right-hand side endogenous 
variables, (z/e), [PAC*(z/e)], (ERP*e) and (e/z), do not change signs for the 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimations. In the 2SLS estimation, four of five right-hand side endogenous variables have 
coefficients, which are statistically significant, except for the coefficient of [PAC*(z/e)]. In the 
3SLS estimation, three of the five right-hand side endogenous variables have statistically 
significant coefficients, except for the coefficients of (z/e) and [PAC*(z/e)].   
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Detailed descriptions of the endogeneity test, the weak instrument test and the Sargan test are given in Chapters 5 
and 6 of Wooldridge (2002). 
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Table 3.7: Robustness Check  
 
Independent  
equation 
2SLS 3SLS 
ERP 
equation 
(ERP) 
Import 
equation 
(1/z) 
Lobbying 
Equation 
(PAC/VA) 
ERP 
equation 
(ERP) 
Import 
equation 
(1/z) 
Lobbying 
Equation 
(PAC/VA) 
z/e -1.4908* 
(0.8430) 
  -1.2228 
(0.7679) 
  
Pac * (z/e) 8.0512 
(5.7420) 
  5.1759 
(5.0785) 
  
(1/z) * e   17.976** 
(7.865) 
  18.7523** 
(7.3432) 
ERP * e  -4.796*** 
(1.187) 
-227.362** 
(97.58) 
 -5.2604*** 
(1.1119) 
-297.3492** 
(93.0365) 
SCR4 0.3190 
(1.6748) 
  -0.1049 
(1.4272) 
  
GCR 0.2945 
(0.3330) 
  0.4462 
(0.2889) 
  
SCALE 0.0009 
(0.0012) 
  -0.0001 
(0.0011) 
  
EMPSIZE 0.0001 
(0.0011) 
  -0.0008 
(0.0008) 
  
CAPSIZE -0.0013 
(0.0183) 
  0.0088 
(0.0145) 
  
UNION 0.1905 
(0.4379) 
 0.714 
(0.825) 
0.1771 
(0.3777) 
 0.8072 
(0.7429) 
GROW 0.0042 
(0.0046) 
  0.0036 
(0.0039) 
  
CAPSHARE  2.006 
(3.713) 
  1.7539 
(3.1535) 
 
INVENTSHA
RE 
 3.228** 
(1.271) 
  3.6958** 
(1.1200) 
 
LABSHARE  2.589** 
(1.081) 
  2.7298** 
(0.9664) 
 
TRABALANC
E 
 -0.037*** 
(0.010) 
  -0.0305*** 
(0.0095) 
 
HHINDEX   -11.895 
(24.201) 
  -15.2000 
(22.000) 
Note: 
* = 0.1 significant level; ** = 0.05 significant level; and *** = 0.01 significant level 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper applies the simultaneous three-equation system and uses U.S. annual data for 
193 four-digit SIC87 industries over the time period of 1997 to 2001, to estimate the G-H model. 
To determine the consistency of the method, I have used several tests, which include the weak 
instrument test, the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity and the test for overidentification 
restriction. I have found evidence to support the G-H model:  (1) in the lobbying industries, trade 
protection increases whenever inverse import penetration increases and import-demand elasticity 
decreases; (2) In the industries without lobbying, trade protection increases whenever the inverse 
import penetration decreases and the import-demand elasticity increases. The share of lobbying 
in the Government’s objectives was very small (0.008), while the share of welfare in the 
Government’s objectives was great (0.992). These estimated results suggest that U.S. trade 
policy was not affected seriously by lobbying in this time period.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPORTS, IMPORTS, FDI AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Even after more than 20 years of carrying out import-substitution industrialization, many 
Asian countries have not improved their economies. At the end of the 1960s, most Asian 
countries shifted from import-substitution industrialization to export-oriented industrialization. 
In addition, Asian countries pursued programs attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), relaxed 
trade barriers and simultaneously carried out social programs, obtaining spectacular economic 
achievement. Such a high level of economic growth in Asian countries calls for research that can 
provide theoretical explanations, lessons for the future and an economic forecast. This paper 
focuses on the following main questions: Are there causal relationships between economic 
growth, exports, imports and FDI? What is the effect of trade liberalization on economic growth? 
What is the implication for economic policy? 
 
There are still many papers trying to understand these issues, in spite of the fact that the 
problem is not new.  The literature partly provides theoretical explanations through the exports-
led growth hypothesis, the growth-led exports hypothesis, the import-compression growth 
hypothesis and the intertemporal budget constraint hypothesis. The empirical results from 
different authors for the same Asian country are sometimes in conflict. For example, two-way 
causality between Korean exports and imports is discovered by Fung, Sawhney, Lo and Xiang 
(1994) and by Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee (1997). But, Mahadevan et al. (2008) and also Kim et 
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al. (2009)  provide evidence of no causality between Korean exports and imports. Chang, Fang, 
Liu and Henry (2000) find a two-way causality between exports and imports in Taiwan, but 
Mahadevan et al. (2008) suggest no causality between them.  There are further examples of 
inconsistency.  What causes these conflicting results?  
 
Observing prior studies of Asian countries, I find that they typically use the two-variable 
VAR model or the three-variable VAR model to consider the dynamic impacts of some of four 
variables (GDP, exports, imports and FDI) on other variables. However, theoretical analysis 
reveals that all three series, FDI, exports and imports, interact as follows with GDP: (1) They 
generate capital flow in or out of the domestic country; (2) They promote technological diffusion 
through relations with foreign partners, in learning by doing, and in other ways; and (3) They are 
influenced by competition in international markets, which requires improvement in management 
and technology.  In addition, there is theoretical evidence suggesting a possible relationship 
between exports, imports and FDI. Furthermore, observing four time series (GDP, exports, 
imports and FDI) in two Asian countries (Malaysia and Korea) during the period from 1970 to 
the present, one can see that they have the same stochastic time trend. Therefore, there may 
possibly be cointegration between the four series. Also, a two-variable or three-variable VAR 
model constructed from two or three series out of the four series (GDP, exports, imports and 
FDI) will be misspecified. In addition, prior studies have ignored dynamic analysis, such as 
impulse responses and variance decompositions, and have had gaps in their econometric 
procedure of applying the VAR model, such as ignoring VAR diagnostics. All of these factors 
may have caused biased results.  
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The paucity of literature encourages me to engage in further study, but with a different 
approach, to correct current shortcomings. Therefore, my paper makes the following 
contributions to the literature: (1) It provides the econometric application in the correct way, to 
avoid misspecification and to minimize the resulting bias. It also tests and estimates the causal 
relationship by applying the four-variable VAR model based on the four time series (GDP, 
exports, imports and FDI); (2) It supplements the literature on relationships between trade 
liberalization, economic growth and empirical evidence about the source of economic 
development for the Asian countries, Malaysia and Korea; (3) It analyzes and maps economic 
policy onto estimated results, and then gives lessons and policy implications. 
 
In this study, I test the long-run and short-run relationships between GDP, exports, 
imports and FDI for Malaysia from 1970 to 2004 and for Korea from 1976 to 2007, using a four-
variable VAR. I apply econometric procedures, including the unit root test of four series, lag 
structure, the VAR diagnostic, the Johansen cointegration test, the Granger causality/block 
exogeneity Wald test (GCBEW test), analysis of impulse response and analysis of variance 
decomposition. 
 
The estimated results suggest that the four variables are cointegrated for both Malaysia 
and Korea. Exports are a long-run source of economic growth for both Malaysia and Korea. For 
Malaysia, there is evidence to support two-way causalities between each pair among the four 
variables, except for causality of GDP on exports. For Korea, there is one-way causality from 
exports, imports, and GDP to FDI, from exports and imports to GDP and from exports on 
imports. Exports are not affected by the other three variables. Trade liberalization has increased 
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Malaysian economic growth through the positive effects of both exports and imports, while trade 
liberalization has also increased Korean economic growth, but only through the positive effects 
of one channel: exports. The difference in the estimated results is explained by the difference 
between the two countries’ economic policies.   Although both countries have implemented 
policies of export-oriented industrialization, the Malaysian government has promoted FDI as a 
tool of industrialization, while the Korean government has built an “integrated national 
economy” using industrial conglomerate structures and does not emphasize the role of FDI.  
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section is a literature review. 
The third section describes the methodology. The fourth section describes the data set and 
reports the primary estimation results. The fifth section offers a conclusion. 
 
4.2 LITURATURE REVIEW 
 
This review includes two parts. The first part is a summary of the theoretical explanation 
of possible causality between exports, imports, FDI and economic growth. The second part is the 
review of empirical studies about causal relationship between exports, imports, FDI and 
economic growth, using the VAR model. 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Review 
 
From the end of World War II until the 1970s, the import-substitution policy was 
dominant in most developing countries. This policy was built on the belief that “the best way to 
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create a strong manufacturing sector was by protecting domestic manufactures from international 
competition” (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2002, p.256). However, many countries applying this policy 
did not gain the desired rate of economic growth. According to Krugman and Obstfeld, this 
policy generated a high effective rate of protection, limited the economic scale and led to higher 
income inequality and unemployment. Thus, developing countries shifted to an export-promoting 
policy and consequently gained a high rate of economic growth. Many economists believe that 
the achievement of Asian countries in this period is explained by the exports-led growth 
hypothesis. They have been trying to build a theoretical model as well as to carry out empirical 
studies to support this hypothesis.  
 
The exports-led growth hypothesis rests on the following assumptions: (1) Exports lead 
to a higher level of specialization in production, which improves productivity and thus increases 
economic growth. (2) Thanks to export growth, resources are allocated more efficiently, through 
shifting factors, to the more productive export sectors. (3) Exports increase the capacity of 
utilization and economies of scale, which improves productivity. (4) Exports promote diffusion 
of knowledge through interaction with foreign buyers and through learning by doing. Economic 
growth is thus increased by higher innovation. (5) Exporting firms are forced to learn 
technological advancements and better management techniques in order to compete in 
international markets, further improving productivity. (6) Exports provide a foreign exchange 
that is used to import capital goods and intermediate goods, thus improving the input quality of 
production, which promotes productivity. Exports promote economic growth, and, consequently, 
the productivity growth leads to lower unit cost, facilitating further exports.  Thus, economic 
growth also promotes exports, an argument that is called the growth-led exports hypothesis 
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(Asafu-Adjaye & Chakraborty, 1999, p. 164; Baharumshah & Rashid, 1999, p.391; Kim et al., 
2009, p.1821; Ramos, 2001, p. 613-614). 
 
While carrying out exports-promoting policies, some Asian countries relaxed trade 
barriers and opened domestic market to attract FDI.  Therefore, FDI can be a factor, beyond 
exports, to explain the strong economic growth of Asian countries in the 1970s. FDI contributes 
to economic growth in the following ways (Lim, 2001, p.3):  (1) FDI contributes to GDP through 
its impact on two of the three main production factors: investment capital and innovation. 
Increase in innovation is due to technology diffusion from multinational corporations to local 
firms. (2) Local firms are forced to use their current sources more efficiently and look for more 
advanced technologies, in order to confront the severe competition arising from the entry of 
multinationals, and their productivity should increase accordingly.  (3) Multinationals provide 
assistance for local suppliers in training, management, organization, finding customers, 
production and skills, thereby increasing the productivity of local suppliers.  
 
The import-substitution policies in Asian countries assumed a negative impact of imports 
on economic growth. After this policy was rejected in most Asian countries, the positive effect of 
imports on economic growth was gradually recognized. The imports-compression growth 
hypothesis suggests that a shortage in imports will restrict economic growth. The imports-
compression growth hypothesis (Asafu-Adjaye & Chakraborty, 1999, p.164; Esfahani, 1991, 
p.95-99; Kim et al. (2009), p.1821) is based on the following arguments. (1) Importing 
consumption goods forces the domestic import-substitution firms to innovate and restructure 
themselves, which improves their productivity. (2) Imports can increase productivity through 
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improving input quality, varieties of inputs and the reallocation of capital and labor to importers. 
(3) Imports of capital goods and intermediate goods can increase economic growth through 
technological diffusion. In contrast, a higher income level pushes up demand for high-quality 
luxury consumption goods, and modern design that may not be domestically produced. On the 
other hand, a higher quality output calls for a higher quality input, which increases the demand 
for importing capital and intermediate goods. 
 
The relationship between exports and imports can be carried out through two channels. 
Exports provide foreign exchange that can be used for importing consumption goods, 
intermediate goods or capital goods. Also, importing high-technological equipment intermediate 
goods for production will accelerate production for exports.  
 
An Increase in FDI may require a high level of importing essential intermediate goods 
and capital goods for production. But, a higher level of importing consumption goods may have 
a negative effect on the import-substitution industry with foreign capital, and thus FDI may 
decrease. Therefore, there may be causality between FDI and imports (Alguacil, 2003, p.20; Liu, 
et al., 2001, p.191-193).  
 
As multinational firms consider the options of exporting goods or establishing factories in 
foreign markets, the choice between exports and FDI depends on the level of convenience, risk 
and profit and long run developing strategy  of firms, competitors, etc (Liu et al., 2001, p.191-
193). The profit is determined by the gap between goods-exporting fees (including money to pay 
for tariffs and transportation costs) and the cost of establishing a new factory in a particular 
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foreign market. Exports are usually easier and less risky, but they face trade barriers such as 
tariffs and nontariff barriers (import quotas, import licensing, and others). Almost all Asian 
countries limit imports in order to protect both main and infant industries, while at the same time 
usually encouraging FDI. However, for multinational firms, the choice of FDI also depends on 
how much advantage can be derived from foreign countries through factors such as cheap labor 
costs, availability of natural resources and the priorities of foreign governments with regard to 
FDI.  For example, some Asian countries implement exports-promoting policies, which offer 
many special benefits, such as low income tax and free import duties for firms manufacturing 
export goods. So, to better receive those benefits, FDI flows into Asian countries in order to 
produce the export goods. Therefore, export promotion attracts FDI, and then FDI increases 
exports. So, we may have two-way causality between exports and FDI.  
 
4.2.2 Empirical Review 
 
I present only the relationships discovered recently in economic research about Asian 
countries, such as the exports-imports relationships, the exports-imports-growth relationships, 
the FDI-exports–growth relationships and the FDI-imports-growth relationships. This part is also 
limited to empirical studies applying the three-variable VAR model, since the two-variable VAR 
tests are likely to be biased. 
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4.2.2.1 Exports and Imports 
 
The relationship between exports and imports was examined later than the relationship 
between exports and growth. The pioneer in exploring the effect of imports on exports and vice 
versa was Husted (1992). After Husted’s study, a series of papers found evidence to support a 
long-run relationship between exports and imports.  Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee (1997), 
applying the two-variable VAR for Korean quarterly data over the time period 1963-1991, found 
that Korea’s exports and imports were cointegrated and converged in a long-run equilibrium.  
However, the two-variable VAR is likely to be biased. On the other hand, the relationships 
between exports and imports are not independent from the relationships between exports and 
imports with the GDP and FDI. Therefore, misspecification in VAR structure may lead to bias in 
their estimated results.  
 
4.2.2.2 Exports, Imports, and Economic growth 
 
Fung et al. (1994) investigated the relationship between exports, imports and growth for 
both advanced countries and NIC countries over the period 1957-1991, by applying the three-
variable VAR model. They used quarterly data on imports, exports and GDP, sourced from 
International Finance Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
four Asian countries were Japan (representing advanced countries) Malaysia, Singapore and 
Korea (NICs).  Their test results revealed that three series were cointegrated in the cases of Japan 
and Korea, but not cointegrated in the case of Singapore. They found two-way causality between 
exports and imports for Korea and Malaysia, between exports and GDP for Malaysia and 
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Singapore and between imports and GDP for Korea and Singapore. They also found 
unidirectional causality of GDP on exports in Korea, of GDP on imports and of exports on 
imports in Japan and of imports on GDP in Malaysia. The role of FDI in the economies of 
Malaysia and Singapore was very important. FDI accounts for most export manufacturing 
industries of Malaysia (Jomo, 2003, pp. 28 and 41). Foreign transnational corporations (TNCs) 
accounted for 84% of the manufacturing exports in 1972 and for 92.9% of the manufacturing 
exports in 1980. Thanks to improved development of the financial sector, good communication 
and better transportation facilities, Singapore has become a “center for international 
procurement” (Kim, 1998, p. 83). This suggests that FDI should be in the VAR system in order 
to avoid misspecification of the problem. On the other hand, biased results may be due to the 
failure of the VAR system to satisfy conditions.  
 
Chang et al. (2000) used the three-variable VAR model to observe the relationships 
between exports, imports and income in Taiwan from 1971 to 1995.  The results showed that the 
three series were cointegrated. Chang et al. also found evidence to confirm bidirectional 
causality between exports and imports, and between imports and growth. They did not find 
evidence to support for exports-led growth hypothesis in Taiwan from 1971 to 1995. This result 
seems not be consistent with the export-oriented industrialization of Taiwan. Taiwan has been 
called “the home of internationalizing subcontractors.” Small and medium entrepreneurs have 
dominated the export sector, producing export goods following design and quality requirements 
of foreign buyers. The manufactured exports of Taiwan account for the high proportion of total 
exports and increase from 72.3% in 1970 to 86.7% in 1981 (Kim 1998, p.69, Table 8).  
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Mahadevan et al. (2008) emphasized the hypotheses of imports-led growth and exports-
led growth for Japan and the Asian Tigers. The point distinguishing this from previous papers is 
that they used the VECM-GARCH Model, which accounts for uncertainty.  The quarterly data 
on GDP, exports and imports was sourced from Datastream International, Inc. For Japan, the 
data covered the time period 1957:1 – 2005:2. For Korea, the data covered the time period 
1970:1 – 2005:2. For Taiwan, the data covered 1961:1 – 2005:2, and for Hong Kong, the data 
covered 1973:1 – 2005:2. Without taking uncertainty into account, Johansen cointegration test 
suggested long-run cointegration between the three series.  Granger causality estimation 
provided evidence to support the exports-led growth hypothesis, in the long run, only for Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. For Hong Kong, the direction of causality was of GDP on exports.  The 
imports-led growth hypothesis was confirmed in the long run for Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
With uncertainty included as a variable, only Taiwan and Hong Kong satisfied the export-led 
growth hypothesis in the long run. There was no evidence to support this hypothesis in Japan or 
Korea.  Imports were the source of GDP growth in the three countries other than Korea. This is 
different from the results of Fung et al. (1994) and Chang et al. (2000). Mahadevan et al. (2008) 
do not find the linkage between exports and imports for Korea and Taiwan, nor for the other 
remaining countries. As mentioned above, Kim (1998) described Taiwan’s economy as largely 
made up of international subcontractors, importing capital goods and raw materials in order to 
produce export goods following the design and quality requirements of foreign buyers. 
Therefore, imports could be assumed to be linked, for the most part, in Taiwan.  
 
 Kim et al. (2009) investigated the relationships between exports, imports and growth in 
Korea from 1980 to 2003, by applying the three-variable VECM and three-variable VAR and 
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Granger causality. They found unidirectional causality of imports on Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP). Imports had a positive impact on economic growth while exports did not. Kim et al. 
(2009) insisted upon the advantage of using TFP, because it accounted for the substitution 
between capital and labor. (TFP is measured as the residual from the regression of GDP on 
capital stock and labor input.)  Similar to Mahadevan et al. (2008), Kim et al. (2009) did not find 
two-way relationship between exports and imports or unidirectional causality of GDP on exports.  
In addition, they found evidence of unidirectional causality of imports on GDP. Section 4.4.3.2 
provides an analysis of Korean economic policy related to possible causality between GDP, 
imports, exports and FDI.  The difference between my results and those of Kim et al. (2009) is 
partly due to misspecification in the structure of the VAR system. 
 
4.2.2.3 FDI, Exports, Imports, and Economic Growth 
 
Liu et al. (2001) investigated the relationships between trade (imports, exports) and FDI 
for China, over the period of 1984 – 1998. They used the Granger causality test based on a three-
variable VAR for the panel data covering 19 regions of China. Their findings were as follows: 
(1) there is a unidirectional causality relationship of imports on FDI. (2) There is a unidirectional 
causality relationship of FDI on exports and (3) there is a unidirectional causality relationship of 
exports on imports. These results suggest that the greater openness of China will lead to higher 
imports, then higher FDI and exports.  
 
Hsiao and Hsiao (2006), in an interesting paper, investigate the relationships between FDI, 
exports and GDP, between eight rapidly developing East and Southeast Asian economies (China, 
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Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) from 1986 to 2004. 
They applied a three-variable VAR model with a dummy variable which accounted for the Asian 
financial crisis.  In using the Johansen test, they found that the three series were cointegrated in 
the case of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.  The Granger causality 
test showed different results for different countries, suggesting that there may not have been a 
general rule for the whole sample. Thus, they constructed panel data covering those eight 
countries from 1986 to 2004. Using the panel data Granger causality test, they found evidence to 
support bidirectional causality between exports and GDP, as well as unidirectional causality of 
FDI on GDP and of FDI on exports. 
 
On the basis of theoretical analysis, we realize that three series (FDI, exports and 
imports) have common characteristics in their relationships with GDP. First, they generate 
capital flow in or out of the domestic country.  Second, they promote technological diffusion 
through relations with foreign partners and through learning by doing and other means. Third, 
they are influenced by competition in the international market, which requires improvement in 
management and technology.  In addition, theoretical studies also provide an explanation of the 
possible relationships between trade (exports and imports) and FDI.  On the other hand, the 
figures of the four series (GDP, exports, imports and FDI) exhibit stochastic time trends and do 
not wander too far from one another. Therefore, there may be the possibility of cointegration 
between the four series. Thus, the two-variable or three-variable VAR model constructed from 
two series or three series out of four series (GDP, exports, imports, and FDI) may be 
misspecified.  To avoid the misspecification problem, VAR needs to be structured with four 
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series. To my knowledge, there have not yet been papers on the relationships between those four 
series revealed by a four-variable VAR model.  
 
On the econometric side, it is necessary to use an appropriate econometric procedure 
when using the VAR model to obtain unbiased empirical results. This has been ignored in many 
prior studies.  For this reason, my study focuses on applying appropriate econometric procedures, 
which include a unit root test of four series, lag structure, VAR stability, VAR diagnostic, the 
Jonhansen cointergration test, and the GCBEW test. Analysis of impulse response, as well as of 
variance decomposition, provides an explanation for how and how much one variable, for 
example GDP, responds to a shock to other variables, such as exports, imports and FDI.  
 
On the other hand, testing the export-led growth hypothesis, the export-driven growth 
hypothesis, the import-compression growth hypothesis, and the intertemporal budget constraint 
hypothesis is very important, since the results will provide orientation in making economic 
policy. Many prior papers have given answers based mostly on the Granger causality test.  
However, the Granger test cannot tell us the magnitude of the impact. 
  
Finally, the economic achievement of Asian countries in the last three decades requires 
research and explanation. On the other hand, Asian countries are the typical examples for which 
the causality relationship between GDP, exports, imports and FDI can be exhibited and 
developed. More than that, the literature review shows that there are conflicts in the findings of 
different authors for the same country. The explanation for these conflicting results has not been 
fully discovered.  According to my assessment, it will be due to misspecification in the VAR 
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structure and insufficient econometric procedures—such as shortage in VAR diagnostics, 
ignoring dynamic analysis, differences in the ordering of variables in the VAR model and 
identification problems. The gap in the literature suggests there should be more studies on this.  
This paper will therefore reexamine the hypothesis and find better explanations by applying the 
econometric procedure in the correct way.  
 
To test for all of the above, I will test the long-run and short-run relationships between 
the variables GDP, exports, imports and FDI, for ten Asian countries from 1970 to 2007, using a 
four-variable VAR model. I will apply Johansen (1991) with VEC restriction to test the long-run 
relationships between variables as well as to test the hypothesis.  I will apply sufficient 
econometric procedure, including a unit root test of four series, lag structure, VAR stability, 
VAR diagnostics, the Johansen cointegration test, the GCBEW test, analysis of impulse response 
and analysis of variance decomposition. 
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, I will review my strategy, which includes the following steps: 
• Test unit root of four time series; 
• Construct four-variable VAR model; 
• VAR diagnostics; 
• Johansen cointegration test; 
• Causality test; 
• Dynamic simulation (impulse response function and variance decomposition); 
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4.3.1 Unit Root Test 
 
I implement the unit root test of four series—(realGDP_l, realexports_l, realimports_l 
and realFDI_l)—by using the Dickey-Fuller (GLS) test.  Consider the equation (Enders, 2003, p. 
182, equation 4.25). 
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Null hypothesis: a1 = 0. Rejecting the null hypothesis means the series is stationary. This series is 
nonstationary if we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Dickey-Fuller with GLS detrending 
(DFGLS) involves detrending yt with GLS technique, and then substituting the detrended yt into 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (see Enders 2003, p.190).  
 
 If those studied series are I(1), they will be used to construct a four-variable VAR. If 
some of the series, or all four, have a higher order than I(1), I will transfer them into other forms 
such as logarithms, share of GDP or form of difference, and then retest the unit root. This step 
will cease when the transformed series are nonstationary with an order of one. 
 
4.3.2. VAR Model 
 
 I consider the four-variable standard VAR model of order p as (unstructured form) (Shin 
and Pesaran, 1998, p. 18, eq.1) 
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where yt is n x 1 random vector. In my model, four-variable VAR, n = 4 and yt = (realGDP_l  
realexports_l realimports_l realFDI_l)’; However, there will be 4! = 24 ordering of vector yt ; 
The Ai is n x n fixed coefficient matrices; p is order of lags; B is n x d coefficient matrix of 
exogenous variables; xj  is d x 1 vector of exogenous variables; For Malaysia, exogenous 
variables are dummy variables for years 1974, 1998 and 2001, while exogenous variables are 
dummy variables for year 1998 and year 2001; Thus, d = 3 for Malaysia  and d =2 for Korea; et 
is a n x 1 random vector of error terms and is a white noise process.  
 
According to Shin and Pesaran (1998), the model satisfies the following conditions:  
Assumption 1:    E(et) = 0;  E(et et’) = ∑e (nonsingular) ;   E(et es’) = 0 if s ‡ t. 
Assumption 2: No roots are inside the unit circle. 
Assumption 3: There are not full collinearity among yt-1, yt-2… yt-p, xt,. 
 
4.3.3 VAR Diagnostics 
 
This step is to check whether the assumptions of our VAR model are met.  It includes the 
following: 
• Lag order selection; 
• VAR residual serial correlation LM test; 
• VAR residual normality. 
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4.3.3.1 Lag Order Selection 
 
According to Enders (2003), the model will be misspecified when lag length is too small. 
The more lags, the more parameters we need to estimate and the less bias in our results. The 
model will be overparameterized if the number of lags is too large. Selecting the lag order is 
simply to understand that we find p such that Ai =0 for all i > p in the VAR model. There are two 
approaches: lag order selection based on the LR test; and lag order selection based on 
Information criteria such as AIC (Akaike’s Information Criterion), FPE (final prediction error), 
SC (Schwarz criterion), HQ (the Hannan & Quinn (1979) criterion)  
(Lutkepohl 2005, p. 142, eq. 4.2.3). 
                   LR (p) = ]ln)[ln( ∑∑ −− reuncT                          (3) 
(Lutkepohl, 2005, p. 147, eq. 4.3.2). 
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(Lutkepohl, 2005, p. 147, eq. 4.3.1). 
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(Lutkepohl, 2005, p. 150, eq. 4.3.9). 
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(Lutkepohl, 2005, p. 150, eq. 4.3.8). 
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where ∑re and ∑un are variance/covariance matrices of the unrestricted and restricted system, 
respectively; T is the number of observations; c is the maximum number of regressors included 
in the longest equation of unrestricted system; n is the number of endogenous variables; p is the 
order of VAR system; q is the total number of restrictions in the system. 
 
LR statistics are distributed chi-squared with the degrees of freedom (q) equal the number 
of restrictions in the system. We reject the null hypothesis of restriction if the p-value is small. 
For information criteria, we need to choose the number of lags that minimize the criteria. 
However, it is not unusual that different criteria give a different number of maximum lag lengths.  
The problem is which criteria we should choose.  To overcome this problem, I will run VAR 
with different lag orders, chosen by different criteria and the LR test, and then implement the 
VAR residual serial correlation LM test and the normality test. I will choose lag order based on 
those tests.  
 
4.3.3.2 The VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test  
 
We can assume that the residual of the VAR model is in the form (Lutkepohl, 2005, p. 
171, equation 4.4.25) 
tptpttt reCeCe +++= −−− ...11 .        (8) 
This test is to test the autocorrelation in the residuals et of the VAR model. The hypothesis is that 
there is no serial autocorrelation up to lag p. 
H0: C1=C2= … = Ct-p = 0. 
H1: Cj ≠ 0 for at least one j < m. 
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The test is performed by the La Grange Multiplier method.  
 
4.3.3.3 The VAR Residual Normality Test  
 
According to Lutkepohl (2005), the VAR residual normality test checks the skewness and 
kurtosis properties (third and fourth central moments) of residual et. The basic idea is that 
if )1,0(Ny ≈ , then third moment E (y3) =0 and fourth moment E (y4) =3.  Consider a K-
dimensional Gaussian white noise process with ),( eet Ne Σ≈ µ , and we have P P’ = ∑e, and then 
ut: = (u1t,…, uKt )’:= ),0()(1 Ket INeP ≈−− µ . 
The test statistics are (Lutkepohl, 2005, p. 176, eq. 4.5.4) 
)(6/: 21'1 KbTbs χλ ≈= ,         (9) 
)(24/  )3-()3(: 2K2'2 KbbT Kk χλ ≈−=  and       (10) 
)2(: 2 Kkssk χλλλ ≈+= ,         (11) 
where  
b1 := (b11, …, bk1 )’ with ∑= 31 /1 ktk uTb    k = 1, …, K, 
b2 := (b12, …, bk2 )’ with ∑=
t
ktk uTb 42 /1    k = 1, …, K. 
4.3.4 The Johansen Cointegration Test  
   
This test allows us to test the long-run cointegration of four time series. Consider the 
model (Enders, 2003, p. 354, eq.6.54) 
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To determine the number of cointegration vectors (r), we can use the maximum eigenvalue test 
and the trace test. Both tests are based on the likelihood ratio test. 
 
4.3.4.1 The Trace Test 
 
The null hypothesis H0 : all λi =0  with i= 1,2,..4 (r = 0).  
The alternative hypothesis HA : some λi ‡ 0  (r>i).   
Test statistics (Enders, 2003, p.352, eq.6. 55):  ∑ −−=
n
i
itrace T )ˆ1ln( λλ ,   (13) 
where iλˆ is the estimated value of eigenvalues (the characteristic roots), which results from the 
estimation of α matrix. T is the number of observations and n is the number of characteristic 
roots. 
4.3.4.2 The Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
 
The null hypothesis H0: all λi =0 with i = 1,2,..4 (r = 0) . 
The alternative hypothesis HA: some λi ‡ 0  (r=i).   
Test statistics (Enders, 2003, p.353, eq. 6. 56): )ˆ1ln(max iT λλ −−= .   (14)  
The definitions of iλˆ and T are the same as mentioned in equation 13. 
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When λ trace and λmax conflict, we should choose the number of the cointegration vector based on 
λmax ,  because “the λmax test has the sharper alternative hypothesis. It is usually preferred for 
trying to pin down the number of cointegrating vectors.” (Enders, 2003, p. 354). 
 
If all series are not stationary with a lag order of 1 and are not cointegrated, we should 
implement VAR in the first difference. If all series are not stationary with a lag order of 1 and 
cointegrated, we should implement VAR in levels (Enders, 2003, p. 358). 
 
4.3.5 The Causality Test 
   
I will apply the Granger causality/ Block exogeneity Wald test (Enders, 2003, p. 284). In 
this test, all endogenous variables can be treated as exogenous. This test detects whether the lags 
of one variable can Granger-cause any other variables in the VAR system. The null hypothesis is 
that all lags of one variable can be excluded from each equation in the VAR system. For 
example, this test helps to answer whether or not all lags of FDI can be excluded from the 
equation of GDP or not. Rejection of the null hypothesis means that if all lags of FDI cannot be 
excluded from the GDP equation, then GDP is an endogenous variable and there is causality of 
FDI on GDP. The test statistic is (Enders, 2003, p. 282, eq.5.44) 
)2(~)log)(log13( 2 ppT unre χ∑∑ −−− ,      (15) 
where T is the number of observations; ∑un is variance/covariance matrices of the unrestricted 
VAR system; ∑re is variance/covariance matrices of the restricted system when the lag of a 
variable is excluded from the VAR system; and p is the number of lags of the variable that is 
excluded from the VAR system. 
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4.3.6 Dynamic Simulation  
 
4.3.6.1 The Impulse Response Function 
 
Rewrite equation (2) in the infinite moving average representation (Shin and Pesaran, 
1998, p. 18, eq.2), as follows: 
∑∑
∞
=
−−
∞
=
+=
00 i
itit
i
it SxeQy         t = 1, 2, . . . , T,      (16) 
where  
pipiii QAQAQAQ −−− +++= ...2211           i = 1, 2, . . . ,     (17) 
BQSIQ ino =<== ii  and   0  ifor  0Q and  . 
    “An impulse response function measures the time profile of the effect of shocks at a given 
point in time on the (expected) future values of variables in a dynamic system” (Shin and 
Pesaran, 1998, p. 18). The impulse response function is defined as  
( ) ( )111 ,),,(m −+−+− =−== tmtttmtt ZyEZheyEZhIR  ,     (18) 
where m denotes the time, h = (h1,…, hm)’ is n x 1  vector denotes the size of shock, Zt-1 denotes 
accumulative information about the economy from the past up to time t-1 (Shin and Pesaran, 
1998, eq. 4). 
 
The choice of h plays an important role in the relations of the properties of the impulse-
response function. Sim (1980) establishes the orthogonalized impulse response (OIR) by 
identifying the shock h through using the Cholesky decomposition of ∑e = P P’. P is n x n lower 
triangular matrix. Thus the orthogonalized impulse response is  
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jmij PQmIR ε=)(0      m = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,         (19) 
where tε  is n x 1 selected vector in which jth element is unity and other elements are zeros. 
 
The IOR is criticized because it is imposed by the restriction. The restriction is that the 
series have no contemporaneous effect on the other series. According to Lutkepohl, when this 
assumption is violated, OIR will change with reordering of endogenous variables. There are two 
approaches to deal with the ordering of the endogenous variables. The choice depends on the 
consistency between the estimated results from impulse response function and the estimated 
results of the GCBEW test.  
 
The first approach is to use the generalized impulse response (GIR) (Shin and Pesaran, 
1998, p.19, eq.10) 
( ) ))( 2/1 jemijGij QgmIR ε∑= ,         (20) 
where hj = (gij )1/2. GIR is invariant to changes in the ordering of the endogenous variables.   
 
The second approach is to use OIR with the ordering of the variables will be as follows 
(Enders, 2003, p. 276): 
• The first place in the list of ordering will be reserved for the variable that is not caused by 
any other variables; 
• The ordering of the remaining variables will follow in order of increasing correlation 
among them; 
• The last place in the list of ordering will be reserved for the target variable. 
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4.3.6.2 Variance Decomposition 
 
According to Enders (2003), variance decomposition tells how much a given variable 
changes under the impact of its own shock and the shock of other variables. Therefore, the 
variance decomposition defines the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting 
the variables in the VAR. If εrealexports_l , εrealimports_l  and εrealFDI_l explain none of the forecast error 
variance of realGDP_l at all forecast horizons, then realGDP_l is said to be exogenous. If 
εrealexports_l or/and εrealimports_l or/and εrealFDI_l can explain some of the forecast error variance of 
realGDP_l at all forecast horizons, then realGDP_l is said to be endogenous. Variance 
decomposition can be derived from the orthogonalized impulse-response function ( )(0 mIRij ) as 
well as from the generalized impulse-response function ( )(mIR gij ) (Shin and Pesaran  1998,       
p. 20).  
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The variance decompositions are also sensitive to the ordering of the variables. We can 
change the ordering of the variables until we get the variance decompositions that are closest to 
the estimated results from GCBEW test (Enders, 2003, p. 280; Sims, 1980). 
 
4.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.4.1 Data and Unit Root Test 
 
The countries that I have chosen to study are Malaysia and Korea. The time of estimation 
is 1970 – 2004 for Malaysia and 1976 – 2007 for Korea. The four time series are realGDP_l, 
realexports_l, realimports_l and realFDI_l. RealGDP_l is the logarithm of real GDP; 
realexports_l  is the logarithm of real exports; realimports_l  is the logarithm of real imports and 
realFDI_l is the logarithm of real FDI. The data is sourced from World Bank. The choice of the 
variables requires some comment. First, to avoid the effect of inflation, I divide four time 
series—GDP, exports, imports and FDI—by a GDP deflator, to obtain realGDP, real exports, 
real imports and real FDI, respectively. However, the four series realGDP, real exports, real 
imports and real FDI are nonstationary with an order higher than one, for which we can’t 
construct VAR.  Therefore, to satisfy the condition of the VAR model that all variables must be 
I(1), I must transfer these series into the natural logarithm.  
 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 provide the evidence that the four time series (realGDP_l, 
realexports_l, realimports_l and realFDI_l) are nonstationary with an order of 1 for Malaysia. 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 provide evidence that these four time series (realGDP_l, realexports_l, 
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realimports_l and realFDI_l) are  nonstationary with an order of 1 for Korea. The first column of 
each table exhibits the name of the series. The next columns report the t-statistic values, the 
numbers of lag, the numbers of maximum lag, and the number of observations, in that order, left 
to right.  
 
Table 4.1: Unit Root Test in Levels for Malaysia 
Series  t-Stat Lag length Max lag Obs 
RealGDP_l -2.283188 1 8 33 
Realexp_l -2.953621 5 8 29 
Realimp_l -2.469140 1 8 33 
RealFDI_l -3.439528 3 8 31 
Note:  
Unit root test by Dickey-Fuller (GLS) test 
1 percent critical value = - 3.770 
 
 
Table 4.2: Unit Root Test in First Difference for Malaysia 
Series  t-Stats Lag Length Max lag Obs 
RealGDP_l -4.455159 0 8 33 
Realexp_l -4.388893 0 8 33 
Realimp_l -4.119046 0 8 33 
RealFDI_l -3.153449 3 8 30 
Note:  
Unit root test by Dickey-Fuller (GLS) test 
5 percent critical values = -1.951 
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Table 4.3: Unit Root Test in Levels for Korea 
Series  t-Stat Lag length Max lag Obs 
RealGDP -2.010870 0 7 31 
Realexp -3.135229 1 7 30 
Realimp -2.816564 1 7 30 
RealFDI -2.662293 1 7 30 
Note:  
Unit root test by Dickey-Fuller (GLS) test 
1 percent critical value = - 3.770 
 
 
Table 4.4: Unit Root Test in First Difference for Korea 
Series  t-Stats Lag length Max lag Obs 
RealGDP -4.635355 0 7 30 
Realexp -3.836050 0 7 30 
Realimp -4.587495 1 7 29 
RealFDI -4.304318 1 7 29 
Note:  
Unit root test by Dickey-Fuller (GLS) test 
5 percent critical values = -1.951 
 
The test result (reported in Table 4.1 and Table 4.3) with constant and time trend shows 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (of nonstationary) at a 0.01 significant level. The t-
statistic values for each series in the case of Malaysia are -2.283, -2.953, -2.469 and -3.439, 
respectively. Their absolute values are less than the absolute value of 1 percent critical value of - 
3.770. The t-statistic values for each series in the case of Korea are -2.010, -3.135, -2.861 and -
2.662, respectively. Their absolute values are less than the absolute value of 1 percent critical 
value of - 3.770. Thus, they have a unit root and I continue to test the unit root of their first 
difference. The test results using a constant and no time trend are reported in Table 4.2 (for 
Malaysia) and Table 4.4 (for Korea). The t-statistics for each series of Malaysia are -4.455, -
4.388, -4.119 and -3.153 and the t-statistics for each series of Korea are -4.635, -3.836, -4.587 
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and -4.304. Since their absolute values are higher than the absolute value of 5 percent critical 
values of -1.951, we can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary at a 0.05 level. Thus, we can 
conclude that the four series are non-stationary with the root of order 1 for both Malaysia and 
Korea.   
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 describe the four series, realGDP_l, realexports_l, realimports_l and 
realFDI_l for Malaysia and Korea, respectively. Examining data and Figure 4.1, we realize that 
the Asian financial crisis in 1998, the OPEC oil crisis in 1974, and the US recession in 2001 had 
a strong impact on the economy of Malaysia.  The OPEC oil crisis in 1974 led the growth rate in 
GDP, exports and imports down from 8.3%, 15.9% and 36.8% in 1974 to 0.801%, -2.99% and -
17.095% in 1975, respectively. The share of FDI in GDP also fell from 5.6% in 1974 to 3.54% in 
1975. To cause the economy to recover, the Malaysian government continued to strongly 
promote export-oriented industrialization, by establishing free trade zones and allowing duty-free 
imports of raw material and capital goods. In 1994, the Malaysian economy boomed again with a 
growth rate of GDP, exports and imports of about 9%, 21.9% and 25.6%, respectively. In 1997-
1998, the Asian financial crisis hurt the Malaysian economy. In 1998, exports growth declined 
about 5% compared with 1997. The growth rates of imports and GDP were down to -18.75% and 
-7% in 1998, respectively. The Malaysian government then implemented a series of programs 
with the aim of stabilizing the currency, restoring and stabilizing the market, and other policies. 
Thanks to these government efforts, the Malaysian economy recovered fully. However, the 
economic downturn repeated itself again in 2001, when the global economy was in danger of 
recession and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States. The GDP 
growth rate reached only 0.517% in 2001. The growth rates of exports and imports fell to -6.8% 
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and -8.23% in 2001, respectively. The share of FDI in GDP was only 0.597%, compared with 
4% in the year 2000. To control for these special events, I use dummy variables: dummy74, 
dummy98, and dummy01. Each dummy variable will receive the value of 1 if the year is 1974, 
1998, or 2001 and zero otherwise.  
 
Figure 4.1: Describe Four Time Series of Malaysia 
 
 
Looking at Figure 4.2 and examining the data set for Korea, we find that the 1998 Asian 
financial crisis and 2001 U.S. recession also affected the Korean economy. Because the Korean 
data set only covers 1976 to 2007, we do not take into consideration the OPEC oil crisis. To 
control for the special events, I use the dummy variables dummy98 and dummy01. Each dummy 
variable will receive the value of 1 if the year is 1998 or 2001 and zero otherwise.  
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Figure 4.2: Describe Four Time Series of Korea 
 
 
4.4.2 Primary Results 
 
4.4.2.1 Malaysia 
 
I construct the VAR system with four endogenous variables (realGDP_L, realexports_L, 
realimports_L  and realFDI_L) and three exogenous variables (dummy74, dummy98, and 
dummy01). The result from the test for lag length criteria, based on the four-variable VAR 
system with the maximum lag number of 4, is reported in Table 4.5. The lag orders chosen by 
the LR test, the FPE, the AIC criterion, and the SC criterion are all 4.  
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Table 4.5: Test for Lag Length Criteria for Malaysia 
        
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ  
        
        0  39.42305 NA   2.61e-06 -1.511165 -0.771042 -1.269903  
1  155.7180  172.5667  4.21e-09 -7.981805 -6.501560 -7.499282  
2  174.1028  22.53621  4.08e-09 -8.135663 -5.915296 -7.411879  
3  208.8670  33.64279  1.59e-09 -9.346257 -6.385768 -8.381211  
4  250.0789   29.24717*   5.34e-10*  -10.97283*  -7.272220*  -9.766525*  
        
        Note: 
(*) indicates the lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC:Akaike Information Criterion 
SC: Schwarz Information Criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion 
 
I run VAR with the lag order of 4. The results of VAR are reported in Table 4.6. The 
results from the VAR residual normality test and the VAR residual serial correlation LM test are 
reported in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8, respectively.  With the data from Table 4.7, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis of normality properties, since P-values are 0.5922, 0.4665 and 0.6055 for 
skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera test. This provides some support for the hypothesis that 
residuals from our VAR model have a normal distribution.  Table 4.8 shows that we also cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to lag 5, since P-values are 0.6273, 0.7736, 
0.1147, 0.5396 and 0.9795 for the lag order of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  These two tests 
give support to the assumptions of our model about white noise residuals. 
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Table 4.6: VAR Model with Lag of Four and Dummy Variables (1974, 1998, and 2001)  
 
     
     
 REALGDP_L REALEXP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L 
     
     REALGDP_L(-1)  0.647111  0.179518  0.395451 -1.050808 
  (0.30209)  (0.50780)  (0.28040)  (0.84949) 
 [ 2.14214] [ 0.35352] [ 1.41029] [-1.23699] 
REALGDP_L(-2)  0.245256  0.286731  0.595571  0.508008 
  (0.25045)  (0.42101)  (0.23248)  (0.70429) 
 [ 0.97924] [ 0.68105] [ 2.56183] [ 0.72130] 
REALGDP_L(-3) -0.395830 -0.277350  0.211687 -1.727269 
  (0.48598)  (0.81693)  (0.45110)  (1.36661) 
 [-0.81450] [-0.33950] [ 0.46927] [-1.26391] 
REALGDP_L(-4)  0.160928 -0.154698 -0.185253  2.676573 
  (0.35974)  (0.60472)  (0.33392)  (1.01161) 
 [ 0.44735] [-0.25582] [-0.55479] [ 2.64586] 
REALEXP_L(-1)  0.146521  1.145285  0.403589  0.512872 
  (0.16611)  (0.27924)  (0.15419)  (0.46713) 
 [ 0.88205] [ 4.10147] [ 2.61743] [ 1.09793] 
REALEXP_L(-2) -0.273971 -0.401343  0.123865  2.039328 
  (0.25000)  (0.42025)  (0.23206)  (0.70302) 
 [-1.09587] [-0.95501] [ 0.53376] [ 2.90080] 
REALEXP_L(-3)  0.608077  1.049759  0.591281 -0.257556 
  (0.23786)  (0.39984)  (0.22079)  (0.66887) 
 [ 2.55647] [ 2.62546] [ 2.67806] [-0.38506] 
REALEXP_L(-4) -0.015761 -0.269045  0.410873  1.043130 
  (0.22506)  (0.37832)  (0.20890)  (0.63287) 
 [-0.07003] [-0.71116] [ 1.96681] [ 1.64825] 
REALIMP_L(-1)  0.109557 -0.294999  0.299976  0.160276 
  (0.22569)  (0.37939)  (0.20949)  (0.63466) 
 [ 0.48543] [-0.77757] [ 1.43191] [ 0.25254] 
REALIMP_L(-2) -0.151617 -0.174671 -0.866361 -0.650335 
  (0.23976)  (0.40303)  (0.22255)  (0.67422) 
 [-0.63237] [-0.43339] [-3.89285] [-0.96457] 
REALIMP_L(-3) -0.482309 -0.956386 -0.698072 -1.028931 
  (0.22754)  (0.38250)  (0.21121)  (0.63987) 
 [-2.11963] [-2.50036] [-3.30507] [-1.60804] 
REALIMP_L(-4)  0.164141  0.776936 -0.052905 -1.802223 
  (0.18478)  (0.31062)  (0.17152)  (0.51962) 
 [ 0.88829] [ 2.50125] [-0.30845] [-3.46833] 
REALFDI_L(-1)  0.035568  0.082424  0.099003  0.431450 
  (0.02715)  (0.04563)  (0.02520)  (0.07633) 
 [ 1.31026] [ 1.80630] [ 3.92914] [ 5.65208] 
REALFDI_L(-2)  0.044059  0.087575  0.127590  0.369349 
  (0.02398)  (0.04031)  (0.02226)  (0.06743) 
 [ 1.83744] [ 2.17266] [ 5.73239] [ 5.47755] 
REALFDI_L(-3)  0.030798  0.034916  0.057044  0.078184 
  (0.02969)  (0.04991)  (0.02756)  (0.08349) 
 [ 1.03726] [ 0.69956] [ 2.06978] [ 0.93640] 
REALFDI_L(-4)  0.011160 -0.058811 -0.031996 -0.074026 
  (0.04495)  (0.07557)  (0.04173)  (0.12641) 
 [ 0.24825] [-0.77826] [-0.76678] [-0.58559] 
C  2.876051 -0.569493 -9.208637 -5.327591 
  (2.75414)  (4.62969)  (2.55647)  (7.74483) 
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 [ 1.04426] [-0.12301] [-3.60209] [-0.68789] 
DUMMY01 -0.296448 -0.422590 -0.240961 -3.314420 
  (0.17039)  (0.28642)  (0.15816)  (0.47914) 
 [-1.73985] [-1.47542] [-1.52354] [-6.91744] 
DUMMY98 -0.416886 -0.265084 -0.489520 -0.757724 
  (0.06155)  (0.10347)  (0.05713)  (0.17309) 
 [-6.77302] [-2.56202] [-8.56803] [-4.37775] 
DUMMY74  0.006568  0.112351  0.419895  1.506881 
  (0.07432)  (0.12493)  (0.06899)  (0.20899) 
 [ 0.08838] [ 0.89930] [ 6.08662] [ 7.21014] 
     
     
 R-squared  0.996450  0.996558  0.998916  0.990015 
 Adj. R-squared  0.990318  0.990614  0.997044  0.972769 
 Sum sq. resids  0.021793  0.061580  0.018777  0.172329 
 S.E. equation  0.044510  0.074821  0.041315  0.125165 
 F-statistic  162.5063  167.6398  533.6550  57.40522 
 Log likelihood  68.54561  52.44471  70.85441  36.49411 
 Akaike AIC -3.131975 -2.093207 -3.280930 -1.064136 
 Schwarz SC -2.206822 -1.168054 -2.355777 -0.138983 
 Mean dependent  20.26644  19.92651  19.84779  16.92738 
 S.D. dependent  0.452357  0.772283  0.759966  0.758497 
     
     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  7.29E-11   
 Determinant resid covariance  1.16E-12   
 Log likelihood  250.0789   
 Akaike information criterion -10.97283   
 Schwarz criterion -7.272220   
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Table 4.7 VAR Residual Normality Test for Malaysia 
Component Skewness Chi-sq Df Prob. 
     
1  0.167632  0.145187 1  0.7032 
2  0.396988  0.814265 1  0.3669 
3 -0.225524  0.262782 1  0.6082 
4  0.552263  1.575804 1  0.2094 
     
Joint   2.798038 4  0.5922 
     
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq Df Prob. 
     
1  2.313992  0.607867 1  0.4356 
2  2.534493  0.279900 1  0.5968 
3  3.662707  0.567276 1  0.4513 
4  4.281239  2.120366 1  0.1454 
     
Joint   3.575408 4  0.4665 
     
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
1  0.753053 2  0.6862  
2  1.094165 2  0.5786  
3  0.830058 2  0.6603  
4  3.696170 2  0.1575  
     
Joint  6.373446 8  0.6055  
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Table 4.8: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test for Malaysia 
Lags LM-Stat Prob  
    
    1  13.61586  0.6273  
2  11.56153  0.7736  
3  22.96220  0.1147  
4  14.79601  0.5396  
5  6.646689  0.9795  
    
    Probs from chi-square with 16 df.  
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To test the long-run cointegration relationship between the four time series, I carry out 
the Johansen cointegration test (1993). The test results, reported in Table 4.9, indicate that four 
series are cointegrated and there are three cointegrating vectors. Table 4.9 is divided into two 
parts. The first part reports the results from the trace test, while the second part reports the results 
of the maximum eigenvalue. In each part, columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 report the number of 
cointegrating vectors we want to test, the eigenvalue, the value of λTRACE equal to each number 
of cointerating vectors, the critical value at the 0.05 significance level and the P-value, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.9: Johansen Cointegration Test with Optimal Lag Length of Three for Malaysia 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.930588  161.3113  47.85613  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.854538  78.61259  29.79707  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.422458  18.84953  15.49471  0.0150 
At most 3  0.057365  1.831346  3.841466  0.1760 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.930588  82.69872  27.58434  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.854538  59.76305  21.13162  0.0000  
At most 2 *  0.422458  17.01819  14.26460  0.0179  
At most 3  0.057365  1.831346  3.841466  0.1760  
      
      
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
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To consider the hypothesis that the variables are not cointgrated (r=0) against the 
alternative of one or more cointegrating vectors (r>0), we have to look at the value of λTRACE. 
Column 3 of the first part of Table 4.9 indicates the value of λTRACE equal to each number of the 
cointegrating vector:   λTRACE (0) = 161.31,  λTRACE (1) = 78.61,  λTRACE (2) = 18.84 and λTRACE 
(3) = 1.831  Since the value of λTRACE (2) exceeds the critical value (15.495) at the 0.05 
significance level, we can reject the null hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors (r=2) and accept 
the alternative hypothesis of more than two cointegrating vectors (r>2) at the 0.05 level. Because 
the value of λTRACE (3) is less than the critical value (3.841) at the 0.05 level, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of r ≤ 3 and reject the alternative hypothesis of four or more cointegrating vectors 
at the 0.05 level. If we consider the hypothesis that the variables are not cointgrated (r=3) against 
the alternative of three cointegrating vectors (r=4), we need to look at the λMAX. Column 3 of the 
second part of Table 4.9 indicates the values of λMAX (0), λMAX(1), λMAX(2) and λMAX(3) are 
82.69, 59.76, 17.01 and 1.83, respectively.  The test of the null hypothesis r=3 against the 
specific alternative r=4 cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level, because the value of λMAX(1) is less 
than the 5 percent critical value of 3.84. This suggests that the number of cointegration vectors is 
three. 
 
The Johansen test gives the estimate that there are three contegrating vectors within the 
four series. Since the number of cointegration within the four series is affirmed, I continue to the 
next step of testing the causality relationships between them. Table 4.10 reports the results from 
the GCBEW test. Table 4.10 includes four parts. The first part reports the result of testing 
whether we can exclude each variable out of the equation of realGDP_L. Similarly, the next part 
reports the results of testing for the equation of realexports_L, realimports_L and realFDI_L. 
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Each part of Table 4.10 includes four columns. The first column lists the variables which will be 
excluded from the equation. The next columns are the value of chi-sq, degrees of freedom and P-
value. The last row in each part of Table 4.10 reports the joint statistics of the three variables 
excluded from the equation.  
 
Table 4.10: Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Test for Malaysia 
    
    Dependent variable: REALGDP_L  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    REALEXP_L  15.68534 4  0.0035 
REALIMP_L  10.69470 4  0.0302 
REALFDI_L  9.238898 4  0.0554 
    
    All  24.55474 12  0.0171 
    
    Dependent variable: REALEXP_L  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    REALGDP_L  2.467139 4  0.6505 
REALIMP_L  12.92560 4  0.0116 
REALFDI_L  9.341260 4  0.0531 
    
    All  21.70638 12  0.0409 
    
    Dependent variable: REALIMP_L  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    REALGDP_L  25.05008 4  0.0000 
REALEXP_L  93.08102 4  0.0000 
REALFDI_L  62.68971 4  0.0000 
    
    All  122.8555 12  0.0000 
    
    Dependent variable: REALFDI_L  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    REALGDP_L  18.17507 4  0.0011 
REALEXP_L  45.38248 4  0.0000 
REALIMP_L  34.01062 4  0.0000 
    
    All  233.6008 12  0.0000 
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The GCBEW test suggests that the four variables—realGDP_L, realexports_L, 
realimports_L and realFDI_L—are not exogenous, because the P-values of the joint test for each 
equation of those variables are 0.0171, 0.0409, 0.000 and 0.000, respectively. The test also 
provides evidence that we can reject the null hypothesis of excluding almost all variables except 
one case.  We fail to reject the null hypothesis of excluding realGDP_L from the realexports_l 
equation at a 0.100 significance level, due to the fact that chi-sq = 2.467 and the P-value = 
0.6505. It suggests that GDP does not cause exports. This test provides some reason to believe 
that there are bidirectional causalities between FDI and imports, FDI and exports, FDI and GDP, 
GDP and imports and exports and imports. The only unidirectional causality is of exports on 
GDP. Causalities from FDI to GDP and from FDI to exports are significant at the 0.05 level, 
while all other causalities are significant at the 0.01 level. Tentatively, it looks as if FDI shows 
weaker signs of causal impact on GDP and exports than other causal relations. This conclusion 
needs to be compared with those from the impulse response function and the variance 
decomposition. These results are different from Fung et al. (1994). While Fung et al. (1994) did 
not find any causality of GDP on imports for Malaysia, my results do show that. While I did not 
find any causality of GDP on exports for Malaysia, Fung et al. (1994) did find it.  My results are 
consistent with Malaysian economic policy (see Section 4.4.3.1). Therefore, the difference 
between my results and those of Fung et al. (1994) may be due to misspecification in the VAR 
model. However, this test does not provide information about the direction of the impact, nor the 
relative importance between variables that simultaneously influence each other.   For example, 
this test shows the causality of exports on GDP and also of imports on GDP. Based on this test, 
we do not know whether or not exports and imports have a positive effect on GDP. It is also 
unclear whether or not the impact of exports on GDP is stronger than that of imports on GDP. To 
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answer these questions, we analyze the impulse-response function and the variance 
decomposition. 
 
Figure 4.3 exhibit the generalized asymptotic impulse response function.  It includes 16 
small figures which are denoted Figure 4.3.1, Figure 4.3.2 . . . Figure 4.3.16. Each small figure 
illustrates the dynamic response of each target variable (realGDP_L, realexports_L, 
realimports_L and realFDI_L) to a one-standard-deviation shock on itself and other variables. In 
each small figure, the horizontal axis presents the six years following the shock. The vertical axis 
measures the yearly impact of the shock on each endogenous variable. 
 
Figure 4.3.1 presents the long-run positive effect on GDP of a shock to GDP.   After 
slightly decreasing, GDP returns to its preshock level after five years. Thereafter, it reduces very 
slightly over time.   The Granger causality /block exogeneity test shows that GDP does not affect 
exports. But Figure 4.3.2 shows that a shock to GDP has short-run positive impact on exports 
from the first through the third years. After that, the impact is not significant. This data conflicts 
with the GCBEW test. Under a shock to GDP, imports increases considerably after five years. 
The impact of a shock to GDP on imports turns out to be statistically insignificant thereafter 
(Figure 4.3.3).  Figure 4.3.4 shows that shock to GDP leads to increase in FDI only in the third 
and fifth years. Outside of those years, the impact of a shock to GDP on FDI is not statistically 
significant. 
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   Figure 4.3.1      Figure 4.3.2 
                     
 
 
 Figure 4.3.3      Figure 4.3.4 
                      
         
Figures 4.3.5 through 4.3.8 suggest that in the long run, a shock to exports has positive 
significant impact on GDP, imports, FDI and exports. The new equilibrium of all variables is 
reached after about five years.  After reaching the minimum level in the third year, GDP 
increases over time. A shock to exports leads to an increase in imports for five years. It takes 
about six years to reach a new equilibrium, which is five times higher than the starting level. 
Before the second year, the impact of a shock to exports on FDI is not statistically significant. 
Thereafter, FDI increases over time and the response of FDI to export shock has a staircase 
shape. The response of exports to shocks on exports has a wave shape. It begins to increase 
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slightly and reaches a maximum in the second year, then returns to preshock level and down to a 
minimum level in the third year; thereafter, it increases again and reaches a maximum level in 
the fifth year, before decreasing again to the new equilibrium after the sixth year. 
 
Figure 4.3.5      Figure 4.3.6 
                     
 
Figure 4.3.7      Figure 4.3.8 
                       
 
 
Figures 4.3.9 through Figure 4.3.12 show the responses of GDP, exports, imports and 
FDI to import shock.  Import shocks have short-run positive effects on GDP, exports, and 
imports and FDI. In the first two years, import shock leads to an increase in GDP, exports and 
imports. Thereafter, the impacts of import shock on GDP as well as on exports and imports are 
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not statistically significant. Import shock has a positive effect on FDI only in the third year. For 
other years, the impact of import shock on FDI is not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 4.3.9      Figure 4.3.10 
                      
 
Figure 4.3.11      Figure 4.3.12 
                        
 
Looking at Figures 4.3.13 and 4.3.16, a shock to FDI has statistically insignificant effects 
on GDP, exports and imports. This is in conflict with the GCBEW test results. But, the shock to 
FDI has a short-run positive effect on FDI for the first two years. Thereafter, the impact of FDI 
shock on FDI is not statistically significant.  
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Figure 4.3.13      Figure 4.3.14 
                       
 
                   
Figure 4.3.15      Figure 4.3.16 
                        
  
In summary, impulse response is mostly consistent with the GCBEW test, except for the 
impact of shock to FDI on GDP, exports and imports, and the impact of shock to GDP on 
exports. All significant impacts are positive. Based on analysis of the above estimated results and 
the performance of the Malaysia economic policy mentioned in section 4.4.3.1 and the accuracy 
of GCBEW test, I prefer the results from the GCBEW test.  
 
Results from the GCBEW test are robust, since they are consistent with the economic 
facts of Malaysia from 1970 to 2004 (see Section 4.4.3.1). The misspecification in structuring the 
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VAR system makes the estimated results of Fung et al. (1994) different from my results. Fung et 
al. (1994) construct three variables in VAR based on three variables—exports, imports and 
GDP—and finds causality of GDP on exports, but I do not find evidence for this.  
 
Table 4.11 reports the variance decomposition of each endogenous variable. This table 
contains four parts. The first part reports the variance decomposition of realGDP_L. The 
following parts present the variance decomposition of realexports_L, realimports_L and real 
FDI_L, respectively.  In each part, there are six columns. The first column lists the time periods. 
The second column reports the standard error of the sample set. The remaining columns report 
the variance proportion of the shock to each variable in each time period. The number in the 
parenthesis reports the standard error of the coefficient of variance proportion. 
 
Table 4.11:  Variance Decomposition for Malaysia 
Variance Decomposition of realGDP_L 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALGDP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L 
      
      
 1  0.044510  58.29825  41.70175  0.000000  0.000000 
   (11.1220)  (11.1220)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.060076  65.07595  33.77356  0.696485  0.454006 
   (12.9930)  (12.5413)  (4.45809)  (0.70082) 
 3  0.069539  59.65168  36.51093  0.526018  3.311379 
   (14.9958)  (14.1898)  (4.56535)  (2.19963) 
 4  0.083192  60.37793  27.19957  4.999343  7.423153 
   (17.1632)  (15.0005)  (5.52887)  (3.92453) 
 5  0.105746  66.89622  16.83452  8.206329  8.062931 
   (15.3455)  (13.9314)  (6.74347)  (3.85607) 
 6  0.126046  71.33686  14.38464  7.040865  7.237633 
   (14.2664)  (12.9520)  (5.93970)  (3.54565) 
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Variance Decomposition of realexp_l 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALGDP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L 
      
      
 1  0.074821  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.112913  98.40425  0.460208  0.445332  0.690204 
   (5.57647)  (3.47637)  (2.41383)  (0.83221) 
 3  0.132103  93.22448  2.117101  1.340131  3.318289 
   (10.7244)  (6.41192)  (5.74238)  (2.57798) 
 4  0.162574  86.87339  1.525765  6.371994  5.228853 
   (13.1734)  (8.79499)  (7.23310)  (3.58131) 
 5  0.192609  85.28043  3.320760  6.621013  4.777793 
   (11.9220)  (8.78269)  (6.81159)  (3.30163) 
 6  0.215804  82.22300  8.088420  5.378865  4.309717 
   (12.7645)  (10.4284)  (6.52262)  (2.93806) 
      
      
 
 
Variance Decomposition of realimp_l 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALGDP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L 
      
      
 1  0.041315  28.64207  0.020316  71.33761  0.000000 
   (13.5929)  (3.09017)  (13.2982)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.067397  61.41540  4.800254  30.98939  2.794949 
   (11.9645)  (6.93608)  (11.0723)  (1.63977) 
 3  0.108082  64.28080  12.05942  15.78998  7.869790 
   (13.7295)  (9.05271)  (6.83575)  (3.55625) 
 4  0.156624  66.39535  10.07907  14.72992  8.795664 
   (15.9670)  (10.9640)  (7.97180)  (4.10882) 
 5  0.202545  73.75662  6.279328  12.77066  7.193393 
   (14.3079)  (8.83909)  (8.69442)  (3.73181) 
 6  0.240906  74.60503  8.464300  10.80167  6.128996 
   (13.5322)  (9.21920)  (8.61516)  (3.47272) 
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Variance Decomposition of realfdi_l 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALGDP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L 
      
      
 1  0.125165  3.452186  6.716352  7.153008  82.67845 
   (7.33552)  (8.55318)  (8.18333)  (12.8071) 
 2  0.136942  2.962069  6.995421  8.116230  81.92628 
   (7.43730)  (7.87631)  (8.84338)  (13.8846) 
 3  0.220332  53.45616  2.748089  3.287926  40.50783 
   (13.1913)  (4.76177)  (5.13689)  (10.3520) 
 4  0.281224  57.28586  4.308757  6.899840  31.50554 
   (13.5008)  (7.72989)  (6.07683)  (9.30283) 
 5  0.393450  63.33581  2.610052  15.37060  18.68353 
   (14.1047)  (6.16625)  (9.14200)  (7.03473) 
 6  0.496962  67.13638  3.654766  16.88496  12.32390 
   (13.7799)  (9.18469)  (9.94689)  (5.20484) 
      
      
 
Looking at Table 4.11, the fluctuations of GDP are explained mainly by GDP shocks and 
export shocks, in the long run. GDP shock accounts for 41.7% in the first year. Its proportion in 
the variance of GDP decreases over time and reaches 15.75% in the sixth year. Export shock 
accounts for 58.29% in the first year. Its proportion increases over time and reaches 71.33% in 
the sixth year.  Export shock, which is assumed to account for the whole variance of exports in 
the first year, continuously dominates in the following years. Its proportion decreases over time, 
but still accounts for 82.22% in the sixth year.  In the long run, export shock is the most 
important source of imports variability. The role played by export shock increases over time and 
accounts for 74.6% in the sixth year. In addition, the fluctuation of imports is also explained by 
its shock. Import shock accounts for 71.33% in the first year and falls to 10.8% in the sixth year.  
The evidence suggests that FDI shock is the important factor explaining FDI variability. FDI 
shock accounts for 82.67%. Its proportion decreases over time and reaches 12.32% in the sixth 
year. 
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In summary, export shock is the most important source of shock to GDP and imports. Shocks to 
GDP, imports and exports are important sources of variability for themselves at first, but this 
self-effect diminishes for all variables except exports.  
 
The estimated results from the Granger causality/ Block exogeneity test, the impulse-
response function and variance decomposition confirm the exports-led growth hypothesis, 
imports-compression growth hypothesis and the intertemporal budget constraint hypothesis. The 
positive effect of trade liberalization results from positive effects of both imports and exports on 
economic growth.  
  
4. 4.2.2 Korea 
 
As with Malaysia, I construct a four-variable VAR system with four endogenous 
variables (realGDP_L, realexports_L, realimports_L and realFDI_L) and two exogenous 
variables (dummy98 and dummy01). The results from the test for lag length criteria, based on 
the four-variable VAR system with a maximum lag number of 5, is reported in Table 4.12. The 
lag order chosen by the LR test and the SC criterion is 1, (by the FPE criterion), 2, and, by the 
AIC and HQ criteria, 4.  
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Table 4.12: Test for Lag Length Criteria for Korea 
         
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
  
         
         
0  11.70564 NA   1.21e-05  0.021805  0.597732  0.193058 
  
1  128.4014   172.8827*  7.26e-09 -7.437143  -6.093312* -7.037551 
  
2  149.1957  24.64503   5.93e-09* -7.792272 -5.680538 -7.164342 
  
3  167.6133  16.37122  7.15e-09 -7.971355 -5.091718 -7.115088 
  
4  188.9186  12.62539  1.07e-08 -8.364343 -4.716802 -7.279738 
  
5  226.8587  11.24149  1.44e-08  -9.989531* -5.574087  -8.676588* 
  
         
         Note: 
(*) indicates the lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC:Akaike Information Criterion 
SC: Schwarz Information Criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion 
 
 
I run VAR with the lag order of 1, 2 and 5. For each lag order, I will apply the normality test and 
the LM test for VAR residuals. Since only a lag order of 2 satisfies both the normality test and 
the LM test, I choose a lag order of 2 as the appropriate order for the four-variable VAR system.  
The results of four-variable VAR with a lag order of 2 are reported in Table 4.13  
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Table 4.13: VAR Model of Korea with Lag of Two and Dummy Variables (1998 and 2001) 
     
     
 REALGDP_L REALEXP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L 
     
     
REALGDP_L(-1)  1.023080  0.145202 -0.121273 -3.134711 
  (0.25146)  (0.38365)  (0.30448)  (2.94745) 
 [ 4.06848] [ 0.37848] [-0.39829] [-1.06353] 
REALGDP_L(-2) -0.007714 -0.128993  0.191425  5.526554 
  (0.24231)  (0.36968)  (0.29340)  (2.84015) 
 [-0.03183] [-0.34893] [ 0.65244] [ 1.94587] 
REALEXP_L(-1)  0.828110  1.677445  0.736414  4.488236 
  (0.18502)  (0.28228)  (0.22403)  (2.16870) 
 [ 4.47567] [ 5.94246] [ 3.28706] [ 2.06955] 
REALEXP_L(-2) -0.265466 -0.496184 -0.300288  2.980913 
  (0.25078)  (0.38261)  (0.30366)  (2.93947) 
 [-1.05854] [-1.29685] [-0.98890] [ 1.01410] 
REALIMP_L(-1) -0.770692 -0.494140  0.615231 -2.608679 
  (0.27335)  (0.41704)  (0.33098)  (3.20399) 
 [-2.81941] [-1.18488] [ 1.85879] [-0.81420] 
REALIMP_L(-2)  0.181448  0.348080 -0.149837 -5.715754 
  (0.30433)  (0.46430)  (0.36849)  (3.56708) 
 [ 0.59622] [ 0.74969] [-0.40662] [-1.60236] 
REALFDI_L(-1)  0.000747 -0.014856 -0.006514  0.328179 
  (0.02190)  (0.03342)  (0.02652)  (0.25674) 
 [ 0.03413] [-0.44457] [-0.24560] [ 1.27828] 
REALFDI_L(-2)  0.001135  0.010671  0.028728 -0.320007 
  (0.02076)  (0.03167)  (0.02514)  (0.24333) 
 [ 0.05468] [ 0.33691] [ 1.14287] [-1.31514] 
C  0.240383 -0.986320  0.212286 -18.83481 
  (1.18382)  (1.80608)  (1.43340)  (13.8756) 
 [ 0.20306] [-0.54611] [ 0.14810] [-1.35740] 
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DUMMY98 -0.515967 -0.186249 -0.525966  0.898778 
  (0.06577)  (0.10033)  (0.07963)  (0.77084) 
 [-7.84560] [-1.85629] [-6.60506] [ 1.16597] 
DUMMY01 -0.177022 -0.238609 -0.323665 -0.135480 
  (0.07290)  (0.11121)  (0.08826)  (0.85442) 
 [-2.42842] [-2.14551] [-3.66696] [-0.15856] 
     
     
 R-squared  0.987374  0.976285  0.982264  0.841155 
 Adj. R-squared  0.980729  0.963804  0.972930  0.757553 
 Sum sq. resids  0.063088  0.146842  0.092494  8.667269 
 S.E. equation  0.057623  0.087912  0.069772  0.675405 
 F-statistic  148.5867  78.21949  105.2290  10.06138 
 Log likelihood  49.89827  37.22581  44.15896 -23.94350 
 Akaike AIC -2.593218 -1.748387 -2.210598  2.329567 
 Schwarz SC -2.079446 -1.234615 -1.696825  2.843339 
 Mean dependent  22.31521  21.21140  21.19537  16.52648 
 S.D. dependent  0.415093  0.462081  0.424067  1.371690 
     
     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.66E-08   
 Determinant resid covariance  2.66E-09   
 Log likelihood  125.8843   
 Akaike information criterion -5.458953   
 Schwarz criterion -3.403863   
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The results from the VAR residual normality test and the VAR residual serial correlation 
LM test are reported in Table 4.14 and Table 4.15, respectively.  By Table 4.14, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis of normality of properties, since P-values are 0.293, 0.267 and 0.218, for 
skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera test. Table 4.15 shows that we also cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to lag 3, since P-values are 0.1305, 0.2684 and 0.6495 for lag 
orders 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  Two tests support the contention that the assumptions of our 
model about white noise residuals are met. 
 
Table 4.14: VAR Residual Normality Test for Korea 
 
     
     Component Skewness Chi-sq Df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.712472  2.538082 1  0.1111 
2  0.659506  2.174739 1  0.1403 
3 -0.327146  0.535121 1  0.4645 
4 -0.226558  0.256643 1  0.6124 
     
     Joint   5.504585 4  0.2393 
     
     Component Kurtosis Chi-sq Df Prob. 
     
     1  4.901626  4.520226 1  0.0335 
2  3.178346  0.039759 1  0.8420 
3  2.444207  0.386132 1  0.5343 
4  2.547986  0.255396 1  0.6133 
     
     Joint   5.201513 4  0.2672 
     
     Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  7.058308 2  0.0293  
2  2.214498 2  0.3305  
3  0.921254 2  0.6309  
4  0.512039 2  0.7741  
     
     Joint  10.70610 8  0.2189  
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Table 4.15: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test for Korea 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  22.40837  0.1305 
2  19.00505  0.2684 
3  13.31700  0.6495 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
 
The Johansen cointegration test results reported in Table 4.16 indicate that the four series 
are cointegrated and there is one cointegrating vector. Column 3 of the first part of      Table 4.16 
indicates that the value of λTRACE (1) = 19.893 is less than the critical value (29.797) at the 0.05 
level, and therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of r ≤ 1 and reject the alternative 
hypothesis of more than two cointegrating vectors at the 0.05 level. Column 3 of the second part 
of Table 4.16 indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis r=1 against the specific 
alternative r=2 at the 0.05 level, because the value  λMAX(1)= 17.294 is less than the 0.05 critical 
value of 21.131. This suggests that the number of cointegration vectors is 1. 
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Table 4.16: Johansen Cointegration Test with Optimal Lag Length of Three for Korea 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.652535  51.60650  47.85613  0.0213 
At most 1  0.438136  19.89379  29.79707  0.4300 
At most 2  0.049438  2.598905  15.49471  0.9821 
At most 3  0.035290  1.077842  3.841466  0.2992 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.652535  31.71271  27.58434  0.0139 
At most 1  0.438136  17.29488  21.13162  0.1585 
At most 2  0.049438  1.521063  14.26460  0.9978 
At most 3  0.035290  1.077842  3.841466  0.2992 
     
     
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
The GCBEW test reported in Table 4.17 suggests that the three variables realGDP_L, 
realimp_L  and realFDI_L are not exogenous, since the P-values of the joint test for each 
equation of those variables are 0.000, 0.000, and 0.009, respectively. Exports are exogenous 
because we fail to reject the null hypothesis of excluding realGDP_l, real imp_l and realFDI_L 
from realexp_l at the 0.1 significance level, since chi-sq = 3.593 and P-value = 0.7315. This data 
implies that GDP, imports and FDI do not have causal on exports. We also fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of excluding realFDI_l from the realGDP_l equation and excluding realGDP_l and 
realFDI_l from the realimp_l equation.  
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Table 4.17: Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Test for Korea 
         
         Dependent variable: REALGDP_L       
         
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.      
         
         REALEXP_L  22.91372 2  0.0000      
REALIMP_L  11.49603 2  0.0032      
REALFDI_L  0.004291 2  0.9979      
         
         All  59.62624 6  0.0000      
         
         Dependent variable: REALEXP_L       
         
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.      
         
         REALGDP_L  0.144426 2  0.9303      
REALIMP_L  1.413775 2  0.4932      
REALFDI_L  0.300981 2  0.8603      
         
         All  3.593115 6  0.7315      
         
         Dependent variable: REALIMP_L       
         
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.      
         
         REALGDP_L  0.559915 2  0.7558      
REALEXP_L  11.79093 2  0.0028      
REALFDI_L  1.348383 2  0.5096      
         
         All  33.77495 6  0.0000      
         
         Dependent variable: REALFDI_L       
         
         Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.      
         
         REALGDP_L  5.617262 2  0.0603      
REALEXP_L  10.98645 2  0.0041      
REALIMP_L  9.695391 2  0.0078      
         
         All  16.98314 6  0.0093      
         
         
 
 
This test provides some evidence that there are causalities from imports and exports on 
GDP; from exports on imports; from GDP, exports and imports on FDI. These findings are 
different from prior studies, such as Fung et al. (1994), Mahadevan et al. (2008) and Kim et al. 
(2009). While Fung et al. (1994) find the evidence of causality of GDP on exports, of GDP on 
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exports and of imports on exports for Korea, my results reject these causalities. Kim et al. (2009) 
do not find causality of exports on GDP or of exports on imports for Korea, but I find evidence 
of this causality. However, my results and those of Kim et al. (2009) both find that Korean 
exports are exogenous. This is different from Mahadevan et al. (2008) who report that imports 
are exogenous in the case of Korea. The difference between my results and the results of the 
prior studies can be explained by the absence of FDI in their VAR model or by invalidity of the 
VAR system. My results are consistent with Korean economic policy (see Section 4.4.3.2). 
 
As mentioned in section 4.3.6.1, because the estimated results from GIR are not 
consistent with those from the GCBEW test, we use OIR and change the prior ordering of the 
endogenous variables. Exports are not affected by any other variables, and thus exports are 
placed first in the ordering of the list. GDP is considered a target variable, and thus it is placed at 
the end of the ordering of the list.  The magnitude of FDI is higher than that of imports, since 
FDI is affected by exports, imports and GDP, while imports are affected only by exports. For this 
reason, FDI is placed after imports in the ordering of the list. Thus, the ordering of variables in 
my VAR system is as follows: exports, imports, FDI and GDP. The estimated results from OIR 
(as mentioned below) are consistent with those from the GCBEW test with this ordering of 
variables, confirming the robustness of this ordering.  
 
Figure 4.4 exhibits the Cholesky asymptotic impulse response function. It includes 16 
small figures which are denoted Figure 4.4.1, Figure 4.4.2 . . . Figure 4.4.16. Each small figure 
illustrates the dynamic response of each target variable (realGDP_L, realexports_L, 
realimports_L and realFDI_L) to a one-standard-deviation shock on itself and other variables. In 
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each small figure, the horizontal axis presents the six years following the shock. The vertical axis 
measures the yearly impact of the shock on each endogenous variable. 
 
Figure 4.4.1 presents a short-run positive effect of GDP shock on GDP.  Figures 4.4.2 
through 4.4.4 show that GDP shocks do not have effects on exports, imports and FDI. Figures 
4.4.5 through 4.7.7 suggest that, in the long run, export shocks have positive significant impacts 
on GDP, imports, and GDP itself. Under export shock, FDI increases little in the first and second 
years. Thereafter, the impact of export shock on FDI turns out to be insignificant (Figure 4.4.8). 
  
Figure 4.4.1      Figure 4.4.2 
                     
 
Figure 4.4.3      Figure 4.4.4 
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Figure 4.4.5      Figure 4.4.6 
                 
              
Figure 4.4.7                                                                Figure 4.4.8 
                  
 
Figure 4.4.9 shows that import shock has a short-run positive effect on GDP at the 
beginning. Thereafter, this impact seems to be insignificant in the second year, and turns out to 
be negative in the third year. Finally, this impact becomes insignificant in the fifth year.  There is 
no impact of import shock on exports in Figure 4.4.10. Figure 4.4.11 shows that import shock 
has a short-run positive effect on imports in the first and second years. After that, the impact is 
not significant. Import shock does not have an effect on FDI at the beginning. The impact of 
import shock on FDI turns out to be negative in the second, third and fourth years, and then 
becomes insignificant (Figure 4.4.12).    
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Figure 4.4.9                                                                    Figure 4.4.10 
                          
 
Figure 4.4.11                                                                  Figure 4.4.12 
                            
 
      Looking at Figures 4.4.13 – 4.4.15, FDI shock is statistically insignificant in its effect 
on GDP, exports and imports. But, it has a short-run positive effect on FDI for the first two 
years. Thereafter, the impact of FDI shock on FDI is not statistically significant (Figure 4.4.16). 
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Figure 4.4.13                                                                    Figure 4.4.14 
                              
                
Figure 4.4.15                                                                      Figure 4.4.16 
                               
 
In summary, impulse response results are mostly consistent with the GCBEW test, except 
for the impact of GDP shock on FDI. There is a short-run negative effect of imports on GDP and 
FDI. The impact from exports on FDI and imports is positive. Exports are not affected by GDP, 
imports and FDI, which   also differs from the Malaysian results. 
  
Looking at Table 4.18, the fluctuations of GDP are explained mainly by GDP and export 
shocks. GDP shock accounts for 58.9% at the first year. Its proportion in the variance of GDP 
decreases over time and reaches 23.5% in the sixth year. Export shock accounts for 14.37% in 
the first year. Its proportion increases over time and reaches 55.51% in the sixth year.  Export 
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shock, which is assumed to account for the whole variance of exports in the first year, 
continuously dominates for the following years. Its proportion decreases over time but still 
accounts for 94.132% in the sixth year.  Export shock is the most important source of import 
variability. The role played by export shock increases over time and accounts for 88.66% in the 
sixth year. In addition, the fluctuation in imports is also explained by import shock. Import shock 
accounts for 62.6% in the first year, falls to 15.1% in the third year and is not significant 
thereafter.  FDI variability is due to FDI and export shocks. FDI shock accounts for 78.67% in 
the first year. Its proportion decreases over time and reaches 27.37% in the sixth year. Export 
shock is an important source of the variability of FDI. It accounts for 16.38% in the first year, 
and then increases over time and reaches 31.78% in the sixth year.  
  
In summary, export shock is the most important source of effects on GDP, imports and 
also FDI. Shocks to GDP, imports and exports are also an important source of their own 
variability. 
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Table 4.18:  Variance Decomposition for Korea 
Variance Decomposition of realGDP_l 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L REALGDP_L 
      
      
 1  0.057623  14.37624  21.47465  5.185356  58.96375 
   (13.3902)  (12.8812)  (5.06982)  (13.0743) 
 2  0.098492  45.15806  9.776402  3.758596  41.30694 
   (15.9700)  (6.59574)  (5.37893)  (11.7953) 
 3  0.150483  51.93426  14.45985  2.394616  31.21128 
   (18.1753)  (10.1176)  (5.61814)  (11.6293) 
 4  0.203151  52.91728  19.00384  1.354684  26.72420 
   (21.0164)  (13.3413)  (6.37415)  (12.5086) 
 5  0.251680  53.65105  20.72171  0.969634  24.65761 
   (23.6061)  (15.2541)  (7.16959)  (13.9573) 
 6  0.294294  55.51130  20.27906  0.974179  23.23546 
   (25.4916)  (16.5155)  (7.93036)  (15.2886) 
      
      
 
 
Variance Decomposition of realexp_l 
 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L REALGDP_L 
      
      
 1  0.087912  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
   (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.154972  97.75755  1.866846  0.203730  0.171877 
   (5.87234)  (3.30693)  (2.59127)  (2.11274) 
 3  0.214860  95.53514  3.643932  0.152108  0.668822 
   (11.6416)  (6.03718)  (5.62998)  (5.12109) 
 4  0.268790  94.33288  4.582398  0.158640  0.926087 
   (15.5993)  (7.49658)  (7.62594)  (7.59332) 
 5  0.318477  93.96773  4.745874  0.269073  1.017319 
   (18.2492)  (8.69080)  (8.72860)  (9.67019) 
 6  0.366074  94.13246  4.456714  0.400873  1.009949 
   (20.1654)  (9.90842)  (9.35261)  (11.2609) 
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Variance Decomposition of realimp_l 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L REALGDP_L 
      
      
 1  0.069772  37.39146  62.60854  0.000000  0.000000 
   (14.5798)  (14.5798)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.115864  69.36945  30.19124  0.224812  0.214490 
   (13.0188)  (12.2330)  (3.08541)  (2.41567) 
 3  0.163803  84.30055  15.10539  0.381512  0.212545 
   (10.9766)  (8.48179)  (3.96507)  (3.69005) 
 4  0.214234  88.67431  10.42153  0.491330  0.412829 
   (12.0321)  (7.32764)  (5.47868)  (5.17732) 
 5  0.264432  89.21776  9.645542  0.323847  0.812852 
   (14.5487)  (8.24416)  (7.09742)  (6.83071) 
 6  0.313771  88.66792  9.623179  0.310414  1.398484 
   (17.1925)  (9.76825)  (8.31776)  (8.48733) 
      
      
 
 
Variance Decomposition of realfdi_l 
 Period S.E. REALEXP_L REALIMP_L REALFDI_L REALGDP_L 
      
      
 1  0.675405  16.38801  4.933555  78.67843  0.000000 
   (13.1526)  (9.18030)  (13.3483)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.817935  25.03464  14.82932  57.26041  2.875632 
   (14.3157)  (11.2778)  (13.5534)  (5.57388) 
 3  0.947295  28.23029  23.97675  44.53591  3.257054 
   (14.9717)  (12.3132)  (12.2491)  (6.50668) 
 4  1.091878  28.68329  28.85665  34.19319  8.266871 
   (16.0531)  (13.3380)  (11.6244)  (8.60620) 
 5  1.185697  29.82354  30.02594  29.16363  10.98689 
   (17.1086)  (14.1043)  (11.6183)  (11.1519) 
 6  1.234119  31.78338  29.13199  27.37955  11.70509 
   (17.6951)  (14.0199)  (11.0690)  (12.6004) 
      
      
 
The estimated results from the Granger causality/Block exogeneity test, the impulse 
response test and variance decomposition demonstrate the export-led growth hypothesis. There is 
causality of imports on GDP, but this impact is weak. We cannot give any conclusion about the 
impact of trade liberalization on economic growth in the case of Korea. 
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The differences in estimated results between Korea and Malaysia ask for explanationa. 
Section 4.4.3 will map the economic policies of Korea and Malaysia onto the results of the 
Granger causality/Block exogeneity test, the impulse response-function and variance 
decomposition.  
 
4.4.3. Analysis, Comparison and Explanation of the Differences in the Estimated Results 
from Malaysia and Korea 
 
The differences in the estimated results from Malaysia and from Korea are due to 
differences between the two countries’ economic policies. The most fundamental differences 
arise from the governments’ visions of the role of FDI at the times these data were collected. The 
Malaysian government considered FDI to be the country's leading industrialization program 
(Jomo, 2003, p.100), whereas South Korea built an integrated national economy based on the 
lead role of the “chaebol” (Kim, 1998, p. 81).  
 
This section consists of two parts. The first part explains the estimated results through an 
analysis of Malaysian economic policy. The second part explains the estimated result through an 
analysis of Korean economic policy and points out the differences between the two countries.  
 
4.4.3.1 Malaysia 
  
Malaysia shifted from an import-substitution policy to an export-oriented policy in 1968 
(Jomo, 2003, p. 36). In 1977, the policy substantially accelerated, when the government 
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stimulated exports using tools such as insurance, credit-refinancing schemes, devaluation of the 
ringgit, and other methods (Jomo, 2003, p.49). From the 1970s on, the government considered 
the export-oriented policy to be the most important long-term policy for developing Malaysia’s 
economy. Indeed, the success of this policy supports my finding that exports have had a positive 
effect on Malaysian economic growth. Table 4.19 shows that Malaysia's export share of GDP 
increased from 41.4% in 1970 to 110.2% in 2007. The average export growth rate and the 
average economic growth rate were 9.39% and 6.67%, respectively, from 1970 – 2007 (Table 
4.19). In the economic and financial crisis, a heavy decrease in export growth rate led to a 
decrease in the GDP growth rate. Table 4.19 also reports the GDP export share, the export 
growth rate, and the GDP growth rate of Malaysia from 1970 to 2007. For example, in the 1974–
75 oil crises, the export growth rate fell from 15.9% (1974) to -3% (1975), which partly led to a 
decrease in the GDP growth rate from 8.3% (1974) to 0.8% (1975). The 1998 Asian financial 
crisis caused the export growth rate to fall from 9.2% (1996) to 0.5% (1998), which led to a 
decrease in GDP growth rate from 10% (1996) to -7.4% (1998). These facts are consistent with 
one-way causality of exports on economic growth. 
 
To promote exports, the Malaysia government exempted an import tax on intermediate 
input—capital goods—that were used for export production or import-substitution industries. 
Therefore, in Malaysia, imports of intermediate goods and capital goods promoted export 
manufacture and domestic production. In other words, imports had a causal relationship with 
exports and GDP. The export value of Malaysia increased from 1.17 billion USD in 1970 to 114 
billion USD in 2004 (Table 4.19), and provided a foreign exchange source for reimporting 
intermediate input, capital goods, and consumption goods. One can see that the Malaysian import 
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value also increased from 1.6 billion USD in 1970 to 119 billion USD in 2004 (Worldbank 
Dataset - WDI). In 2004, the intermediate goods and equipment for export manufacturing had 
not yet been produced by domestic industries, and thus the country still had to import. Therefore, 
an increase in GDP asks for increase in imports of intermediate goods and capital goods. These 
facts are consistent with the estimated results from Granger Causalities,  that exports and imports 
as well as imports and GDP in Malaysia have two-way causalities. 
 
Table 4.19: Export Share on GDP and Export Growth Rate of Malaysia, 1970-2007 (%) 
Year Export 
Share on 
GDP 
Export 
Growth 
Rate 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate  
Year Export 
Share on 
GDP 
Export 
Growth 
Rate 
GDP  
Growth  
Rate  
YR1970 13.6 19.6 8.3 YR1989 30.8 -4 6.7 
YR1971 15 21.7 8.2 YR1990 28 4.5 9.2 
YR1972 19.4 37.2 4.5 YR1991 26.3 11.1 9.4 
YR1973 28.7 56 12.0 YR1992 26.6 12.2 5.9 
YR1974 26.7 -1.9 7.2 YR1993 26.5 12.2 6.1 
YR1975 26.9 18.7 5.9 YR1994 26.6 16.3 8.5 
YR1976 30 39.5 10.6 YR1995 28.8 24.4 9.2 
YR1977 30.4 21.6 10.0 YR1996 27.9 12.2 7.0 
YR1978 28.4 14.2 9.3 YR1997 32.4 21.6 4.7 
YR1979 26.6 2 6.8 YR1998 46.2 12.7 -6.9 
YR1980 32.1 8.2 -1.5 YR1999 39.1 14.6 9.5 
YR1981 34.3 16 6.2 YR2000 38.6                  
YR1982 33.2 8.2 7.3 YR2001 35.7 -3.4 4.0 
YR1983 33 14.3 10.8 YR2002 33.1 12.1 7.2 
YR1984 33.4 8.2 8.1 YR2003 35.4 14.5 2.8 
YR1985 32 4.2 6.8 YR2004 40.9 19.7 4.6 
YR1986 35.6 26.8 10.6 YR2005 39.3 7.8 4.0 
YR1987 38.3 21.8 11.1 YR2006 39.7 11.4 5.2 
YR1988 36.4 11.7 10.6 YR2007 41.9 12.6 5.1 
    Average 31.5 15.1 6.9 
Sources: World Bank, WDI.  
 
Nearly three times larger than Korea, at 748 sq km, Malaysia has rich natural resources 
(Data source: U.S. Department of State) and primary goods (raw material and agricultural plants) 
as main export goods in the early stage of the export-oriented policy (Jomo, 2003, p. 28). Since 
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the 1980s, resource-processing exports have fallen, and exports of manufacturing goods have 
increased significantly. Table 4.20 illustrates the changes in Malaysia's export structures from 
1970 to 1995. In 1968, exports of metal accounted for 65.8%; however, in 1995, those exports 
fell to just 2.5 %. Exports of electronics accounted for only 0.7% in 1968, but have increased to 
67.5% in 1995, and are dominated by foreign capital.  
 
Table 4.20: The Component of Malaysian Exports on Manufacturing, 1970-1995 (%) 
Industries 1968 1973 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Food 17.5 19.6 5.7 6.2 3.8 1.8 
Beverages and tobacco 0.9 2.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Textile, clothing and footwear 1.4 6.1 10.5 11.9 8.8 4.6 
Wood 3.4 9.7 5.7 3.2 3.4 4.4 
Chemicals 3.0 5.2 2.0 3.8 2.9 4.0 
Rubber 0.9 1.7 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.3 
Non-metallic mineral 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.2 
Iron and steel 0.5 1.9 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.9 
Other metals 65.8 43.3 31.5 2.0 2.2 2.5 
Machinery 2.5 3.8 2.6 5.8 8.1 7.0 
Electrical machinery 0.7 2.1 32.8 51.4 50.5 67.5 
Transport equipment 2.6 2.7 2.6 5.0 4.3 3.7 
Other manufactures NA NA 4.2 7.2 9.7 NA 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: UNCTAD (as cited in Jomo, 2003, p. 53) 
 
According to Jomo (2003), foreign investment accounts for most manufacturing export 
sectors of Malaysia (Jomo, 2003, p. 41), not just in the electronics industry, and foreign 
investment policy is tightly related to the export-oriented policy. Attracting FDI is the goal of 
promoting exports (Jomo, 2003, p. 28). In the 1970s and 1980s, the Malaysian government 
established ten Free Trade Zones (FTZs), which provided government infrastructure subsidies. 
Foreign firm or joint-venture companies located in the FTZs received pioneer status (PS), such 
as a ten-year tax exemption. The export share of FTZ firms in total manufacturing exports 
increased from 1% in 1972 to 75% in 1979 (Jomo, 2003, p. 97). In the 1980s, the Malaysia 
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government enacted the new Promotion Investment Act, intended to promote exports by relaxing 
regulation of ownership of foreign capital firms. This law allowed 100% foreign-owned firms, if 
they exported more than 80% of their manufactured products (Jomo, 2003, p. 99). The above 
examples are consistent with the fact that in Malaysia, FDI and exports have had two-way 
causalities. 
 
As in the above analysis, FDI goes into Malaysia to enjoy pioneer status, no import tax 
on intermediate goods and also capital goods. Foreign firms, therefore, have higher added value 
than domestic firms, because they can import intermediate goods from their country with lower 
prices and no import taxes. This shows that imports lead to push up FDI. In contrast, a higher 
FDI demands higher imports of intermediate goods and capital goods. In other words, Malaysian 
imports and FDI have a two-way causality. 
  
Among second tiger ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines), Malaysia is the leader in attracting FDI. Foreign investment accounts for most 
manufacturing export sectors of Malaysia, while the country's domestic investment only focuses 
on resource-based industries such as palm oil or timber products. FDI in Malaysia plays a 
leading role in high technology. The new Promotion Investment Act in the 1980s attracted FDI 
with high technology products. A foreign firm received pioneer status if it satisfied four criteria: 
a 30-50% value added; a 20-50% local content level, a high technological level and an FDI 
contribution to l of Malaysia’s industrial structure (Jomo, 2003, p. 100). In the 1990s, Malaysia 
continued to promote high technology through FDI activities. The Malaysian government 
enacted the second industrial plan, which increased the technological level and the value added 
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of the assembly-dominated export industries by encouraging investment in the production 
component, design and R&D, as well as in trading, marketing and local brand development. An 
FDI project was awarded pioneer status if it satisfied three criteria: 30% or more value added, 
15% local managerial, technical, or supervisory personnel, and a contribution level to Malaysia’s 
industrial structure (Jomo, 2003, p. 100). FDI is preferred in high technology industries such as 
computers, LCDs (liquid crystal displays), medical equipment, bio-technology, automation 
equipment, advanced material, electronics, software, alternative energy and aerospace. In 
summary, FDI increased productivity through promoting technology and innovation, which then 
increased GDP.  In contrast, when productivity increased, the cost per unit will decrease. This 
turns out to automatically lure FDI.  This fact is consistent with two-way causality between FDI 
and Malaysian economic growth.  
 
4.4.3.2. Korea 
 
Korea is a smaller area, but has a larger population (48.63 million, which is nearly twice 
that of Malaysia) and poorer natural resources than Malaysia (data source: U.S. Department). 
Therefore, the Korean government chose their Growth-Industry Outward-Oriented strategy 
(GIO) (Song, 2003, p.113).  
In the 1960s, Korea lacked foreign exchange, due to a decrease in US aid (Cho, 1994, p.153). 
Therefore, an export-oriented policy was central in their attempt to improve the payment 
imbalance. To promote exports, the Korean government provided tools, such as loans with low 
interests, permission in importing intermediate goods for export manufacturing and rewards for 
successful exporters. In the first five year plan (1960-1965), the export growth rate reached 44% 
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(Cho, 1994, p.147), which was higher than the export growth rate of Malaysia in the same 
period.  
 
At the beginning of the export-oriented policy, Korea was different from Malaysia. While 
in the 1960s, exports of primary goods dominated the export goods of Malaysia, exports of 
manufacturing goods accounted for two-thirds of the total Korean export goods. Labor-intensive 
manufacturing goods accounted for 70% of total export-manufacturing goods (Cho, 1994, 
p.147). While Malaysia has continued to consider export orientation as its leading policy, from 
the 1960s to the present, Korea realized that maximizing exports was not always a good policy, 
and made an adjustment in economic strategy. Hence, the Korean export share of GDP increased 
from 13.6% in 1970 to 32.1% in the 1980s (Table 4.21), and was then kept around 30%–40% up 
to the present. However, the Malaysian export share of GDP increased continuously from 41.4% 
in 1970 to 110.2% in 2007 and had a high average level of 74.5% (Table 4.21). 
 
Since the 1960s, Korea has realized that the value added of export-manufacturing 
industry was low because intermediate goods and capital goods were imported (Cho, 1994, 
p.147) and therefore immediately inaugurated a change in its economic development strategy. In 
the 1970s, Korea focused on developing heavy industries and a chemical industry, for exports 
through “chaebol”. Successful industrialization of Korea was represented by a change in the 
structure of export goods. The proportion of heavy industry exports, in total, increased from 
14.2% in 1971 to 60.4% in 1992. Table 4.22 shows that the proportion of light industry products 
in total exports fell from 72.1% in 1971 to 32.4% in 1992. South Korea obtained a large market 
share for exporting ships and is a large exporter of automobiles, after the US, Japan and Western 
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countries (Kim, 1998, p. 81). Industrialization success has enabled Korea to leave Malaysia 
behind. Due to lack of success in industrialization, the economic structure of Malaysia is 
unbalanced. Light industries dominate the Malaysia economy. Heavy industries are not 
developed. 
 
 
Table 4.21: Export Share on GDP and Export Growth Rate of Korea, 1970 - 2007 (%) 
 
Year Export 
Share on 
GDP 
Export 
Growth 
Rate 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate  
Year Export 
Share on 
GDP 
Export 
Growth 
Rate 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate  
YR1970 41.4 5 6.0 YR1989 71.4 15.2 9.1 
YR1971 38.2 1.6 5.8 YR1990 74.5 17.8 9.0 
YR1972 34 2 9.4 YR1991 77.8 15.8 9.5 
YR1973 39.2 14.2 11.7 YR1992 76 12.6 8.9 
YR1974 45.6 15.9 8.3 YR1993 78.9 11.5 9.9 
YR1975 43 -3 0.8 YR1994 89.2 21.9 9.2 
YR1976 48.9 17 11.6 YR1995 94.1 19 9.8 
YR1977 47.4 4.2 7.8 YR1996 91.6 9.2 10.0 
YR1978 48.3 7.6 6.7 YR1997 93.3 5.5 7.3 
YR1979 55.2 18 9.3 YR1998 115.7 0.5 -7.4 
YR1980 56.7 3.2 7.4 YR1999 121.3 13.2 6.1 
YR1981 51.6 -0.8 6.9 YR2000 119.8 16.1 8.9 
YR1982 50.1 10.7 5.9 YR2001 110.4 -6.8 0.5 
YR1983 50.4 12.3 6.3 YR2002 108.3 5.4 5.4 
YR1984 53.5 13.8 7.8 YR2003 106.9 5.1 5.8 
YR1985 54.1 0.4 -1.1 YR2004 115.4 16.1 6.8 
YR1986 55.5 11.8 1.2 YR2005 117.5 8.3 5.3 
YR1987 62.9 14.6 5.4 YR2006 116.7 7 5.8 
YR1988 66.4 10.9 9.9 YR2007 110.2 4.2 6.3 
    average 74.5 9.4 6.7 
Sources: World Bank, WDI. 
 
In spite of the fact that export-oriented policy was not as appreciated in Korea as in 
Malaysia, the average Korean export growth rate from 1970 to 2007 was still 15.1% (Table 
4.21), which is higher than the average Malaysian exports growth rate in the same period. The 
contribution of exports to Korean economic growth is not as great as in Malaysia, but the role of 
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exports in Korean economic growth is still substantial. Therefore, the Korean economic model 
confirms the causality of exports on GDP.  
 
Table 4.22: The Component of Korean Exports, 1971 - 1992 (%) 
Year Manufacture Goods Nonmanufacture 
Goods Light Industry Heavy  
Industry 
1971 72.1 14.2 13.7 
1972 66.6 21.3 12.1 
1973 63.4 23.8 12.8 
1974 54.1 32.5 13.4 
1975 57.4 25.0 17.6 
1976 59.0 29.2 11.8 
1977 53.6 32.2 14.2 
1978 54.5 34.7 10.8 
1979 51.4 38.5 10.1 
1980 49.4 41.5 9.1 
1981 49.4 41.6 9.0 
1982 45.0 46.9 8.1 
1983 41.1 50.6 8.3 
1984 39.5 52.5 8.0 
1985 38.6 53.4 8.0 
1986 44.0 48.4 7.6 
1987 43.8 49.1 7.1 
1988 41.8 52.1 6.1 
1989 42.0 52.2 5.8 
1990 41.1 53.6 5.3 
1991 37.8 56.1 6.1 
1992 32.4 60.4 7.2 
Sources: Korea Foreign Trade Association, the Statistics of Foreign Trade (as cited in Cho, 1994, p. 146)  
 
In the 1980s, to expand exports, the Korean government created 12 General Trading 
Companies (GTCs) (Cho, 1994, p.150) from the largest firms, which satisfied some government 
criteria and gained cost advantages from economies of scale. The GCTs were successful in 
expanding exports and the companies became the leaders in Korean exports. The export share of 
GTCs in total exports in 1985 was 51.3% (Cho, 1994, p. 43). A characteristic of GCTs was that 
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import volume was very small and the GCT import share on the total import of Korea was only 
8.3% (Cho, 1994, p. 43). This showed that promoting Korean exports did not require an import 
increase as in Malaysian's economic model. In other words, in the Korean economic model, there 
was no causality of imports on exports—except at the beginning of the export-orientation policy 
in the 1960s.  To promote GCT activities, the Korean government provided special benefits, such 
as low interest rates, priority on the foreign exchange, financial supports and others, if GCTs 
exceeded export goals. A GCT could borrow foreign capital with a low interest rate (Cho, 1994, 
p. 44); thus it did not use FDI to finance its activity, because it was afraid of losing market share. 
This explains why FDI did not promote exports in Korea and why there was no causality of FDI 
on Korean exports. In summary, exports become exogenous in that they do not depend on 
imports, FDI or, of course, GDP. 
 
Success in export-oriented industrialization (EOI) led to an improvement in the Korean 
payment balance, as well as in firm and individual profits.  Higher profits led to higher 
reinvestment in production, hence to an increase in imports of inputs. On the other hand, 
increases in individual income led to increased consumption spending, hence to increased 
importation of consumption goods. Therefore, an increase in exports led to an increase in 
imports; this explains the causality of exports on imports in the Korean economic model. 
 
As mentioned above, in the 1960s, the Korean government provided export incentives, 
such as no import taxes on intermediate goods and capital goods, in order to promote export-
oriented industrialization. In spite of that, there were still barriers to imports such as special laws, 
foreign exchange regulation, export obligation and import quotas (Cho, 1994, p.153-154). 
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However, imports increased considerably, from 22 million in 1967 to 68 million in 1968 (World 
Bank, WDI). In the 1970s, the government gave priority to imports in order to promote 
industrialization in the heavy and chemical industries. Therefore, imports of intermediate goods 
and capital promoted exports and GDP. Table 4.23 shows the increase in the import proportion 
of input to total imports of Korea, from 79.3.3% in 1971 to 89.0% in 1982. On the other word, 
imports have causal relationship with GDP. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the effective rate 
of protection was very high, due to low tariffs on primary goods and high tariffs on consumption 
goods (Cho, 1994, p.156).  
 
 The big difference between the Malaysian and Korean economic systems was the 
role of FDI. The Malaysia government considered FDI to be the leading industrialization 
program, while the role of FDI was not promoted in Korea, where the government chose the 
leading role. The Korean average share of FDI in GDP was 0. 5 %, while the Malaysian average 
share of FDI in GDP was 4% from 1976 to 2007. According to Tcha and Suh (2003), FDI was 
not a good match with the size of the Korean economy (p. 300). The share of FDI in gross 
domestic investment was very small compared with that of Malaysia. From 1976–1980, they 
were 0.4 and 10.5 for Korea and Malaysia, respectively. From 1991–1993, they were 0.6 and 
24.6 for Korea and Malaysia, respectively (Table 4.24). Due to a very small contribution of FDI 
to domestic investment and industrialization in Korea, FDI inflows into the country did not cause 
economic growth from 1970–2007. This is consistent with the results from the Granger 
causality/Block exogeneity test. 
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Table 4.23: The Component of Imports of Korea, 1971 – 1992 (%) 
 
Year Food and 
Consumption 
Goods 
Industrial 
Supplies 
Capital Goods 
1971 21.0 50.6 28.4 
1972 18.5 51.6 29.9 
1973 18.3 55.0 26.7 
1974 15.4 57.7 27.0 
1975 16.2 57.2 26.5 
1976 12.0 60.5 27.5 
1977 10.9 61.4 27.7 
1978 10.6 55.6 33.8 
1979 11.5 57.5 31.1 
1980 12.1 65.0 23.0 
1981 14.2 62.2 23.6 
1982 10.2 64.1 25.7 
1983 10.7 59.5 29.8 
1984 9.5 57.5 33.0 
1985 8.5 55.9 35.6 
1986 9.8 54.2 36.0 
1987 9.7 54.8 35.5 
1988 9.8 53.5 36.8 
1989 10.2 53.3 36.4 
1990 10.0 53.6 36.5 
1991 11.2 52.2 36.6 
1992 10.5 52.1 37.4 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association, The Statistics of Foreign Trade (as cited in Cho, 1994, p. 148) 
 
Table 4.24: The Share of FDI in Gross Domestic Investment, 1977 - 1993 (%) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-93 
Korea 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.6 
Malaysia 15.2 10.5 10.8 10.5 24.6 
Source: UNCTAD (as cited in Jomo, 2003, p. 24) 
 
Before the financial crisis, the role of FDI was not recognized by the Korean government. 
It gave no incentives to attract FDI, due to fear that a foreign company would dominate the 
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market. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the domestic firms did not have any incentive to 
use FDI because they could receive a government benefits to borrow foreign capital with low 
interest rates.  
 
 The 1997 Asian financial crisis changed the Korean government notions about FDI and 
it was forced by the IMF to make some changes in FDI regulation. “Economic and financial 
crisis in Korea is necessary evil” (Tcha and Suh, 2003, p. 300) because thanks to the crisis, the 
Korean government realized the role of FDI in economic growth. By comparison, the Malaysian 
economy, which is based on FDI, can confront the economic crisis without interference from the 
IMF (Tcha and Suh, 2003, p. 300). Since 1998, the Korean government has carried out a series 
of activities to attract FDI, such as enacting a foreign investment promotion act, establishing a 
Korean trade investment and promotion agency (KOTRA), establishing six sophisticated free-
investment zones (FIZs) to provide tax priority, infrastructure support and low rate of utilities. 
The government also established a Korean investment service center to help foreign investors 
obtain investment licenses, foreign land ownership and cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(Tcha and Suh, 2003, p. 300 and p. 156). Therefore, in 1999, FDI reached a maximum of U.S. 
$9333.4 million and continued high in 2000.  In the 2001 U.S. crisis, FDI inflows into Korea 
were down to $3525 million. FDI in Korea improved after 2001 and reached a high in 2004 (U.S. 
$9246.2 million). In 2007, Korean FDI decreased to U.S. $1578.8 million due to the U.S. 
financial crisis (Table 4.25). In general, the future Korean FDI trend will increase.  
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Table 4.25:  FDI inflows in Korea and Malaysia (USD million) 
Year Korea Malaysia 
FDI Share on 
GDP (%) 
FDI Inflows 
(Million USD) 
FDI Share on 
GDP (%) 
FDI Inflows 
(Million USD) 
1976 0.27 81 3.24 381.3 
1977 0.25 94 2.90 405.9 
1978 0.17 89 3.00 500.0 
1979 0.05 35 2.65 573.5 
1980 0.01 6 3.75 933.9 
1981 0.14 102 4.97 1264.7 
1982 0.09 69 5.12 1397.2 
1983 0.08 68.5 4.11 1260.5 
1984 0.12 110.2 2.31 797.5 
1985 0.24 233.5 2.19 694.7 
1986 0.41 459.6 1.73 488.9 
1987 0.44 616.3 1.31 422.7 
1988 0.54 1014.1 2.04 719.4 
1989 0.49 1117.8 4.29 1667.9 
1990 0.30 788.5 5.30 2332.5 
1991 0.38 1179.8 8.14 3998.4 
1992 0.22 728.3 8.76 5183.4 
1993 0.16 588.1 7.48 5005.6 
1994 0.19 809 5.83 4341.8 
1995 0.34 1775.8 4.70 4178.2 
1996 0.42 2325.4 5.04 5078.4 
1997 0.55 2844.2 5.13 5136.5 
1998 1.57 5412.3 3.00 2163.4 
1999 2.10 9333.4 4.92 3895.3 
2000 1.74 9283.4 4.04 3787.6 
2001 0.70 3527.7 0.60 553.9 
2002 0.42 2392.3 3.18 3203.4 
2003 0.55 3525.5 2.24 2473.2 
2004 1.28 9246.2 3.71 4624.2 
2005 0.75 6308.5 2.87 3966.0 
2006 0.38 3586.4 3.88 6063.6 
2007 0.15 1578.8 4.53 8455.6 
Average 0.5 2166.6 4.0 2685.9 
Sources: World Bank, WDI. 
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In spite of the rapid increase in FDI from 1997 to 2007, the proportion of FDI in Korean 
domestic investment is still small. On the other hand, successful Korean industrialization has 
provided import-substitution goods with high technology and reasonable prices, including 
intermediate input and equipment and machinery for domestic production, which can be seen in 
Table 4.23. In spite of the FDI’s increase six times from 1984 – 1992, the proportion of imported 
capital goods in total Korean imports increased only 2% in the same period (Table 4.23). This 
shows that an increase in FDI does not seem to cause an increase in imports. In addition, when 
productivity increases, production cost per unit reduces, which is an important factor in attracting 
FDI. Therefore, an increase in productivity or in GDP will increase FDI. Finally, FDI in export-
manufacturing industries will be higher than others since FDI projects in those industries will 
receive pioneer status. This explains the causality of exports on FDI. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter applies the four-variable VAR model, which is constructed from four 
endogenous variables—the logarithm of real GDP, the logarithm of real exports, the logarithm of 
real imports and the logarithm of FDI—in order to observe the integrated relationship between 
trade, FDI and economic growth for Malaysia and Korea during the time period from 1970 to 
2004 (Malaysia) and from 1976 to 2007 (Korea).  
 
The estimated results suggest that the four variables are cointegrated for both Malaysia 
and Korea. Exports are a long-run source of both Malaysian and Korean economic growth.  The 
exports-led growth hypothesis, imports-compression growth hypothesis and intertemporal budget 
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constraint hypothesis are confirmed in the case of Malaysia, but only the exports-led growth 
hypothesis and the intertemporal budget constrain hypothesis are found in the case of Korea.  
 
For Malaysia, there is evidence to support two-way causalities between each couple 
among the four variables, except for the absence of causality of GDP on exports. All causalities 
have positive signs. For Korea, there is one-way causality of exports, imports and GDP on FDI, 
of exports and imports on GDP, and of exports on imports. Only causalities of exports on GDP 
and FDI, of GDP on FDI and of exports on imports have positive signs. Exports are not affected 
by the three other variables. Trade liberalization has a positive effect on Malaysian economic 
growth. The causality from trade liberalization on economic growth can be seen through export 
channel.  
The difference in the estimated results is explained by the difference in the economic policies of 
the two countries.  Both countries have implemented export-oriented industrialization, but while 
the Malaysian government has given the role of leading industrialization to FDI, the Korea 
government has built an integrated national economy, thanks to the industrial conglomerate 
chaebol stucture, and has not strongly promoted the role of FDI.  
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Appendix a: The Relative Weight of Social Welfare in the U.S. Government’s Objectives 
 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) show that 
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where γ is the coefficient on (z/e) and δ is coefficient on [PAC*(z/e)] in the ERP equation. 
Divide γ by δ, and we have 
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Appendix B: The Delta Method and Its Application to Calculating the Standard Error of β 
 
Based on the  Two-Variable Taylor Series Expansion, any functions f(x, y) can be written in the 
form: 
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Therefore, β can be displayed under the form: 
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γ0 -1.555305 10-3 
δ0 8.216 10-3 
var(γ) 0.515287 10-6 
var(δ) 15.6435 10-6 
cov(γ, δ) -2.75303 10-6 
C1 0.008107635 
C2 -0.985275741 
 
Plug the above value into the equation (2.10), we have Var (β) = 1.52302 10-5. Therefore, the 
standard error of β is 3.902593 10-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
